Data and Language in Organizations: Epistemological Aspects of Management Support Systems by Lee, R.M.
Data and Language in 
Organizations: Epistemological 
Aspects of Management Support 
Systems
Lee, R.M.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-83-046
April 1983 
Lee, R.M. (1983) Data and Language in Organizations: Epistemological Aspects of Management Support Systems. IIASA 
Working Paper. WP-83-046 Copyright © 1983 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/2266/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
DATA AND LANGUAGE IN ORGANIZATIONS: 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECfS OF MANAGEMENT 
SUP'PoRrms 
Ronald M. Lee 
April 1983 
WP-83-46 
WorEng Rzpers are interim reports on work of the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and have received only 
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not 
necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National 
Member Organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
236 1 Laxenburg, Austria 

DATA AND LANGUAGE IN ORGANIZATIONS: 
EPISl'EMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MANAGE3ENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Ronald M. L e e  
CONTENTS: 
Chapter 1: 
Chapter 2: 
Chapter 3: 
Chapter 4: 
Chapter 5: 
Chapter 6: 
Chapter 7: 
Chapter 8: 
Chapter 9: 
Chapter 10: 
Chapter 11 : 
Appendix: 
Management Data and Language 
Databases and Logic 
Formal Semantics of Databases 
Naming: Individuals and Natural Kinds 
The Semantics of Measurement 
The Semantics of Accounting 
The Logical Structure of Contracts 
Analyzing Red Tape: Deontic Pertormatives 
Bureaucracy, Bureaucrats and Inlormation Technology 
Applications Software and Organizational Change 
Towards a Theory of Management Support Systems 
A Formal Description of Contractual Commitment 

This book contributes to the literature on management decision sup- 
port systems (DSS). DSS research is motivated by the observation that 
much of what mallagers do involves unstructured problem solving. For 
t h s  reason, the structured, procedural models implemented in manage- 
ment information systems (MIS) have had little impact on actual 
managerial practice. 
Actually, the terms 'decision' and 'problem solving' over-simple the 
image of managerial activity, if what is meant is choosing from a set of 
well-detined alternatives. Management also includes such aspects as real- 
ity testing, problem finding, scenario generation, and just plain muddlrng 
through. A broader conception of management cognit ion - of which deci- 
sion making is only a part - is therefore adopted. The challenge to tech- 
nology development is to ~11pp07-l these unstructured managerial activi- 
ties. The emphasis is to amplify managerial cognition and to improve 
decision effectiveness. .However, to achieve t b s  we must go beyond plati- 
tudes and come to a better understanding of what managers actually do. 
The activity of managers is almost entirely hguistic. Computers, as 
symbolic processors, ought to be an effective complement. However, a 
fundamental problem, stressed repeatedly throughout the book, is 
semantic change. The context of managers is always changing, whereas 
computational inference depends on fixed semantics. Herein Lies the 
basis for a theory of management support systems. The theory takes the 
form of an applied epistemology: how do managers know their world and 
detect its changes? 
Thus, while this book is oriented towards improving information tech- 
nology, its attention is primarily to the content of management informa- 
tion and only secondarily to technology. Technological innovations 
abound. What is needed now is a better understan- of what these tech- 
nologies are to do. 
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A practical theory for Decision Support will not emerge until we 
are w i l w  to deal with more profound conceptions of human 
decision making. Each of us should take care to become aware 
of the cultural Limitations inherent within a "technrcal" or 
"engineering" orientation. Each of us should recognize, with 
deep humility, that our fundamental values may tragically dis- 
able our honest mission of improving managerial decision mak- 
ing. 
The use of information technology to aid management has been of 
interest since the early days of computing. Yet, contrary to expecta- 
tions, the activities of managers have been relatively unaffected, notwith- 
standing enormous advances in the technology. Managers, for their part, 
are often keenly disappointed at this. The velocity and complexity of 
managers' activities seem to keep increasmg, with no relief in sight. 
Advances in production technologies (especially micro-electronics) lead 
to shorter product development times, hence sharper competition to 
innovate. Moreover, in the technically more advanced societies, there 
seems to be a growing dissatisfaction with simple materialist economics, 
resulting in growing pressures from labor, consumer groups, regulatory 
agencies, etc. (Schuhmacher 1973, Toffler 1980). 
Advances in communications technologies expand the scope of busi- 
ness markets into other countries and cultures. Entrepreneurs in Hong 
Kong and London compete for sales in Minneapolis. The Third World rum- 
bles for attention. While the advance of production and communications 
* Di.cusrdon group no. 4, at the IFIP/IIASA T a s k  Farce Meeting on Proceaes and Tools for D c  
cision Support, Schloss Luxenburg, Austria. Proceedings aa F'ick and Sprague (1980). 
Membem of the g m q  were P. Boxer, F. Flores, R. Hackathorn, P. Hearson, G. Kochetkw, S. 
Perwm, C. Stabell, B. Tnppett 
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technologies makes the manager's world bigger, more complicated and 
more dynamic, there do not seem to be compensating technological con- 
tributions for the task of management itsell. 
The medium of management is almost entirely linguistic. Comput- 
ers, as symbol processors, would seem to be the ideal cognitive comple- 
ment, extendmg the manager's memory and inferential abilities. The dif- 
ficulties are certainly no longer for want of information processing tech- 
nology. Newspapers and trade journals are screaming with new computer 
products that are faster, cheaper and more powerful than those the 
month before. But these are all improvements in the fonn of information 
processing. The more basic problem, we believe, is in the content of what 
computers do for management. 
This book is motivated by what is seen as a gap between computer 
science and its areas of application, in particular to 'the management of 
organizations. The literature that describes what managers do and how 
they might do it better tends to be heavily sociological. Computer people 
tend to regard this somewhat impatiently, finding it 'soft', and so prefer 
their own more tractable - albeit considerably less realistic -- models of 
management. Rather patronizingly, systems are designed to be able to 
interact wi th  the 'naive user'. What is meant, of course, is the technically 
inexperienced user, though the associations are often generalized. 
The communications gap between computer science and manage- 
ment is seen especially in their respective views of data. To the computer 
scientist, data is composed of bits, bas such types as character strings, 
n a b e r s  (octal, hexadecirnal, floating point, etc.), and can be collected in 
'data structures' such as lists, arrays, records, relations, etc. To the 
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manager, data is distinguished in terms of its content: production data, 
accounting data, market research data. The views of course reflect dif- 
ferent pre-occupations. The two perspectives must merge, however, in 
order to achieve a successful computer application. Unfortunately, there 
is little science at this meeting point. 
Applications are analyzed on a one by one basis with little generaliza- 
tion of these experiences between applications or between organizations. 
The recognized problems are concerned mainly with software compatibil- 
ity and other technical issues. On the other hand, the fundamental prob- 
lem is often not that the system 'works right', but rather that it does the 
'rlght thngs'. There is hardly any research about the content of com- 
puter applications. 
The two areas most relevant to W s  problem are the research in 
database semantics' withn the field of database management (DM) and 
the knowledge representation work in artificial intelligence (AI). In both 
cases, however, the representations proposed are general purpose, mak- 
ing no presumption of organizational (or any other kinds of) application 
areas. The result is that the use of these representations is ad hoc and 
idiosyncratic. There is no accumulation of knowledge from one applica- 
tion to another. We are continually starting over from scratch. 
The goal here is to initiate research into computational representa- 
tions that a n  domain dependent. The focus is therefore not on data gen- 
erally, but on management  d a t a .  Clearly, management data cannot be 
distinguished simply by its symbolic appearance. What is relevant is the 
semantics of management data, what it refers to in the organization, and 
what commonalities can be found between various administrative 
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applications. 
Given the thousands and thousands of organizations that exist 
throughout the world, public and private, in manufacturing, financial, 
regulatory or other service areas, this objective may sound rather 
preposterous. But, the goal is not to solve all the world's problems. It is 
rather to identify a course of technology development that doesn't 
repeatedly throw away what it learns. 
That there is somethmg common to management in all these dif- 
ferent organizations is evidenced by the fact that numerous management 
schools exist and flourish. In the U.S., thousands of MBA's (= Master of 
Business ~dministration) are graduated each year. 1ntro.duction of 
management training is further seen as an important component of aid 
programs to developing countries. 
Much of what is taught in management schools is not formal 
knowledge, however. Aside from operations research and statistics, 
management courses also include organizational psychology, marketing, 
business policy and so on. These are typically taught using case studies. 
Accounting and finance mght  be regarded as areas of intermediate for- 
malization. I t  is a serious issue whether the more behavioral topics of 
management studies can evm be formalized. In any case, there is no 
rigorous theory in sight at present. On the other hand, the more formal 
topics do also play an important role in management tramtag. The syn- 
thesis of these 'hard' and 'soft' subjects is a central issue to management 
education. It is likewise the basic issue for developing effective manage- 
ment decision support systems. 
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But what is meant by saying that some management knowledge is 
'hard', some 'soft'? What makes some managerial problems 'structured' 
others 'unstructured'? The basic issues are epistemological. A major 
part of how managers know their world is through linguistic inputs in the 
form of printed reports, correspondence, conversations, discussions in 
meetings, etc. The data maintained by a computer system constitutes 
one part of t h s  larger organizational language. Our strategy for evaluat- 
ing the potential contribution of information technology in managerial 
tasks is therefore to look at the (actual, possible) role of formalized data 
in management activities. To find the areas where information technol- 
ogy can contribute, we need to have some way of mapping out the domain 
of managerial knowledge, and what parts of that might be augmented 
computationally. 
B. DEFTNITTONS: SIZANTICS. ONTOLOGY, EPISfEMOLOGY 
These are three terms that occur repeatedly throughout the book. 
Since they are fundamental to the discussion, starting definitions are 
warranted. 
Semantics is the relationship between the vocabulary and expres- 
sions of a language and the thmgs or phenomena signified. It is the map- 
ping between language (or data) and the world. 
Untology asks the question, "what is there?". It is the set of assump 
tions of what basic entities exist in the world, quite apart from how we 
describe them in language. For instance, it is common to assume an 
ontology including physical objects. Of interest is whether these are the 
only t h q s  we need to assume in order to explain managerial cognition. 
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Epistsmtogy asks the question "how do you know?". I t  is concerned 
with the foundations of knowledge. Whereas ontology hypothesizes basic 
entities, and semantics relates those entities to language, epistemology is 
what we do with the language in constructing hgher order concepts. An 
epistemology of management therefore seeks to find the principle con- 
ceptual structures used by managers. 
A fourth term, which we tend to use somewhat more loosely, is cogni- 
tion. Cognition refers to mental activity. However, we also apply this to 
describe the symbolic activity of machines insofar as it behaviorally 
resembles human cognition. 
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C. NATURAL VS FORTdAL LANGUAGE IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Sometimes in a discussion an apparent disagreement ends up to be 
only a difference in semantics. The parties attached different meanings 
to the terms they were using. This book is about similar types of seman- 
tic problems raised to the level of communication and discussion 
throughout the organization. Our particular concern is the role that 
information technology might play in these processes. 
Thls involves, in particular, technologies to store and manipulate the 
organization's data, namely database management systems. O u r  interest 
here is not with the technical details of these systems, but rather their 
effect on the organization and its management. Of special concern is the 
role databases play as a communications channel between separated par- 
ties in the organization. How do these parties know to attach the same 
meaning to the data they find in the database? 
The problem of semantics in c~mmunication is of course an old one 
and has been the object of considerable linguistic and philosophcal 
study. While current theories appear to be making progress, many deep 
problems remain. These studies apply to all uses of language, however, 
and therefore have to deal with the immense variation of all aspects of 
human experience, from baby-talk to poetry. Our workmg hypothesis is 
that the language of administration, especially those communications 
likely to be routed through information systems, are more restricted, 
hence more tractable. Managers of course converse using natural 
language. The language is 'natural' in the sense that it is a product of 
cultural evolution (Whorf, 1958). Contrasting with natural languages are 
artificial or J m a l  languages where the syntax and semantics are 
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specified in fixed and exacting rules. The temptation is to distinguish 
natural from formal languages on the basis of syntactic complexity 
and/or semantic range. This however would be relative to the state of the 
art in lmguistics, which is advancing on both counts. (See, for example, 
the claims of Montague, 1974, regarding "English as a Formal Language".) 
The distinction we emphasize is, rather, one of aufhwity -- the syntax and 
semantics of natural languages is decided by the linguistic population as 
a whole (more often perhaps by evolving accident than consciously nego- 
tiated consensus). Formal languages, whose character is embodied in 
explicit rules, are the product of a single authority, whose pronounce- 
ments remain fixed. Hence, though we might conceive of a set of explicit 
rules explaining the structure and scope of English, this will (here) still be 
a formal language since it is then fixed by the rules. 
The distinction between natural and formal languages is a recurring 
theme in this book. While an information system might standardize the 
vocabulary and form of the communications routed through it, the sys- 
tem does not control the meanings users attach to the symbols that are 
communicated. That is to say, the system enforces syntax but not 
semantics. Thus, a basic issue is how do users of an information system, 
eeparated in space and time, know what the other is communicating 
about? 
The Luzguistic/philosophical research on natural language semantics 
will obviously be of use here. However, that work is mainly directed 
towards explaining language phenomena that are otherwise regarded as 
beyond any particular authority's control to modify. 
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However, in information systems we do control the syntax and voca- 
bulary and (partly, potentially) the way t h s  language is taught to its 
users. Thus, the semantics of communication through an information 
system is more a matter of design and deliberated consensus. 
As noted above, databases are regarded here as a convenient focal 
point for studying this issue. The data, whether routed through elec- 
tronic networks or communicated through 1/0 devices, relies on the basic 
logical structure and definitions of the database(s) that they access. The 
semantics of a database is the correspondence between its symbolic data 
representations (a  formal language) and phenomena in the organizational 
and/or societal environment. Our interest will be to explore the nature of 
tlvs correspondence and how it arises, whether naturally or by design. 
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D. DATABASES AS FORYLAL LANGUAGE ASSERTIONS 
The above definition of semantics was of course informal and intro- 
ductory. This concept will be developed more carefully in later chapters. 
However, for the moment it suffices to regard database semantics as the 
relationship between 'data and reality' (Kent 1978). 
Semantic issues have been a recurring theme in the database 
management literature: Much cf this discussion ,is concerned with 
developing richer, more expressive data models. This is a very worthwhile 
enterprise, but it is not semantics in the sense meant here. It is rather, 
the design of syntactically richer, hence more expressive languages. 
Here we need to be careful with terminology. In ordinary language 
we classify sentences to be declarative, interrogative, imperative, etc. 
Suppose we regard a database as a collection of declarative statements 
about the organizational environment. Let the language in which these 
statements are expressed be called L. Then the syntax of L, that is, its 
basic vocabulary and compound expressions, are determined by the data- 
base schema. The data model is the set ot representational constructs 
for defining the schema. 
The data model is then a sort of meta-language** tor describing the 
syntax (structure, permissible vocabulary) of the assertions made in the 
~ g b t m c e ,  Abrial (1974), Chen (1878), Smith and Smith (1677), BiUa and Neuhold (1 878), 
Lee and Cerrit.sn (1878), Codd (Ion), Mylopoula, Bematein and W q  (19f30), Hammer and 
H&od (lWl), Brodie (1882), GxSith (1882). 
** Thare is a technioal dintinction between the data model, which is a collection of represcn- 
taiopal comtncta, and a d a b  Wcrigtion l c q p u g a  @DL), which is used to specify the 
sab4ms. The data model is more conceptual, h a v i -  a variety of notaticmm (e.g., data struc- 
ture diagrams). The DDL is a pcrticular notation for the data model, pod* spec- oth- 
er implemantatiom aspects as well. Tlsia didnction is however not material to the discueiau 
h m .  
- 12- Chapter 1 
database. Rus is not a typical characterization. Databases are normally 
not regarded as languages in themselves but more often as tabular 
arrangements of data items, e.g., as in the relational data model of Codd 
(1970). 
The view of databases as col lect iom oj assertions in a jownal 
language underlies all of the observations we have to make in this book. 
This apparently innocuous change in perspective leads to some substan- 
tially different issues about databases than have so far been considered. 
As will be seen, these are linked with  foundational aspects in other areas 
such as organizational theory, accounting, and management decision 
making. 
E. THE PROMISE OF' NRIF'ICIAL LNTELUGENCE 
Another theme throughout this book will be . the potential role of 
artificial intelligence (AI) in management applications. Whereas database 
management (DM) has always had a strong pragmatic orientation and was 
realized in products and applications from the outset, AI has had a dif- 
ferent history. The original concerns of AI were in using the computer as 
a theoretical model in psychology (Newell and Simon 1972, Simon 
1889/1881, Simon 198la). 
This is stil l  an important theme. For example, much of the work on 
semantic nets has had the goal of mode- the associative structures of 
human memory (Quillian 1968, Norman and Rumelhart 1975, Findler 
1878). Using the machine to model human cognition leads also to 
attempts to extend cognition. This was the goal of the early project MAC 
('machine aided cognition') a t  MIT. However, in this agenda, AI seemed to 
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be less successful. For a long time it seemed to produce only 'toy sys- 
tems' that served to illustrate some theoretical point or another, but 
were not otherwise extendable. 
More recently, though, AI has begun to break out of its ivory tower 
image and has started to win market appeal. Various AI-based companies 
are springing up. The principle areas of commercial interest seem to be 
in robotics and so-called expert systems. 
The interest in robotics is mainly for industrial applications, espe- 
cially where the work requires h g h  precision (e.g. electronic circuitry), is 
tedious (various types of assembly line work), or dangerous (as in atomic 
plants). The advantage over conventional mechanization is that robots 
are teachable (programmable) to follow prototype human behavior of the 
task.* Thus they are the ideal of Taylor's (1911) 'scientific management', 
a mechanistic conception of labor management -that was popular, but 
unsuccessiul, during the first part of the century. 
Expert systems are the intellectual counterpart to robots. Here the 
promise is to replicate the application of various types of professional 
knowledge, e.g. of medical doctors, lawyers, engineers. The economic 
motivations are however somewhat different. Professional training is an  
expensive and time consuming process. As the background knowledge 
required becomes more complex, a greater proportion of the individual's 
life is spent in training 'and less in the productive application of that 
knowledge. Further, this intellectual investment is lost when the indivi- 
dual dies, retires or changes professions. Also, expertise of this sort 
llre b d c  research i.nrce are the coordination d motor devices with tactile and visual sen- 
- Kent (1081) disc- the neuro-physiological comparisons. 
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tends to be inefficiently distributed geographically. For example, medi- 
cal specialists tend to concentrate in the larger cities of wealtbier coun- 
tries. This leaves rural villages and poorer countries unattended. 
The types of expertise embodied in expert systems are those that 
are 'rule based'; that is, they can be described in terms of fixed and expli- 
cit rules. A well-known example is the MYCIN system (Shortliff e 1976) for 
doing medical diagnosis. 
The central problem in developing expert systems is so-called 
'knowledge representation'. 'Jhs has two aspects. One is the develop- 
ment of convenient yet robust formalisms for expressing expert 
knowledge in a way interpretable to the machme. Several alternatives 
are production systems (e.g., Davis and King 1975), semantic nets (e.g., 
Brachman 1979), logic programming (e.g., Kowalski 1979a). Brachman 
and Smith (1980) is a survey of ongoing research in knowledge represen- 
tation illround the world. 
The other part of the problem, sometimes called 'knowledge 
engineemg', is the application of these formalisms to a particular prob- 
lem domain. The most successful applications have been to medical 
areas, but include other scientific domains such as analytical chemistry, 
synthetic organic chemistry, protein X-ray crystallography, biochemistry, 
cognitive psychology and geological prospecting (Infotech 1981). 
There is, on the other hand, some doubt as to the sufficiency of these 
approaches to fully represent what might be called 'mature expertise', 
i.e., that gained not simply from formal training, but refined through long 
experience. S. Dreyfus (1982) regards nrle based knowledge as merely an 
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early stage in the formation of mature expertise, which is more holistic 
and integrated in character. He uses the example of learning to drive a 
car. One begins with a certain set of learned rules - e.g. at  what speed to 
ehift gears, when to turn the wheel in parallel par*. Later these rules 
are refined for unusual circumstances, e.g. shifting gears on hills or 
curves, parallel parking on an incline. However, still later, the awareness 
of distinct rules fades entirely and we simply shift, park, etc. as 'second 
nature'. 
The expertise of a mature doctor or engineer seems also to have this 
holistic character. (Lee 1982 examines some of the social consequences 
of this conjecture.) Of interest here is whether knowledge engineering 
approaches are applicable to management. A problem seems to be that 
managers apparently rely considerably less than doctors or engineers on 
a formalized body of knowledge. We return to t h s  in the final chapter. 
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P. MANAGEMENT DECISION SUPPORT SYSEMS 
Databases are typically regarded as the central component of infor- 
mation systems. Other components included data communications, tran- 
saction processing routines, user interfaces, etc. In the 1960's and early 
70's these used to be called Management Information Systems (MIS). The 
implication was that they were primarily directed towards the informa- 
tion needs of managers. However the subsequent experience has been 
that these systems have concentrated mainly on operational level data 
processing, and have had relatively little impact on management activity. 
Gorry and Scott-Morton (1971) explain t h s  in terms of the 'unstruc- 
turedness' of management tasks. Making use of a popular taxonomy by 
Anthony ( 1965), management activity is distinguished as: 
a) strategic planning 
b) management control 
c )  operational control 
Operational control involves managing the productive operations of 
the organization. It is task oriented and involves planning periods meas- 
ured in days or weeks. Management control involves intermediating 
between hgher level planning and the operational level. Importantly, it is 
not merely a vertical link, but involves substantial horizontal coordination 
between the various functional departments. Strategic planning involves 
the positioning of the firm with respect to markets and competition. It is 
outmrd directed, and has long term planning horizons. 
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Gorry and Scott-Morton also make use of a distinction by 
~imon(1960/ 1977) be tween 'programmed' vs 'non-programmed' tasks. A 
programmed task is one where a decision algorithm or procedure exists. 
To avoid associations with computer programs, they change the terminol- 
ogy to 'structured' vs 'non-structured'.' Their general observation is that 
tasks at  the operational level tend to be much more structured than 
those of the upper levels. (See Figure [1.1].) Managers at the Manage- 
ment Control level tend to be exception handlers. They deal with the 
shortcomings of plans, the surprise changes, etc. Routinized activities 
are delegated to subordinates, thus their task remains hghly unstruc- 
tured. Further, in their capacity as coordinators, they rely heavily on 
diplomatic skills: effectively a r b i t r a w  between diverse personalities is a 
Q h l y  unstructured ac tivlty. 
Unstructured 
Structured 
* r e  1 . I .  S t n ~ ~ t u r e d  vs ulrst.nrctured tasks compared to 
managsment levels. 
Thin im unfortunate since the term '.tructundl is much more ambiguous than 'pre 
pammsd'. Lnportantly, Simon's concept of 'programmed' tasks referred to +he state of ra- 
tiamalizatitm in the organbat ion  'Structured' ir &en used to describe an inherent property 
of the t d  it.elf, rather than tba organization's policy towrds it. 
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A t  the strategic planning level these same characteristics apply to an 
even greater degree. The environments they face are primarily social 
ones - economic and political movements, competitive behavior, labor 
complaints, market trends. There is little that formal science has to con- 
tribute in these areas. 
If lniormation technology is to have an impact at  these levels of 
management, a different set of starting assumptions is needed. This has 
led to the concept of a management decision support system (DSS). Keen 
and Scott-Morton (1978), often regarded as definitional authorities in t h ~ s  
area, remark: 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) represent a point of view on the 
role of the computer in the management decision-making pro- 
cess. Decision support implies the use of computers to: 
1. Assist managers in their decision processes in semistructured 
tasks. 
2. Support, rather than replace, managerial judgment. 
3. Improve the effectiveness of decision-making rather than its 
efficiency. 
We note the emphasis on decision. That is perhaps already too nar- 
row a focus insofar as it connotes a final choice between well-defined 
alternatives. Instead we prefer a broader conception of managerial cog- 
nition that includes aspects of reality testmg, problem findmg, scenario 
generation and just plain muddhg through 
Also, the above characterization of DSS seems to presume a solitary 
decision maker (this is true of expert systems as well). Managers how- 
ever spend relatively little of their time in solitary contemplation (22 per 
cent in Mintzberg's 1973 study). Organizations are social activities and so 
too are the activities of its managers. 
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Here we see the interplay between concepts of information systems 
and decision support systems. Information systems constitute a network 
of formal communications in the organization. Decision support systems 
will need to interact with this in some more or less 'loosely coupled' way. 
The term 'decision support' has now become well established. It is 
perhaps more appropriately characterized as a philosophical attitude 
towards technology application than a technology itselt. In that regard, 
the continuation of the remarks by the discussion group quoted a t  the 
beginning are noteworthy: 
We believe that managers live in a constant state of transition. 
Perplexity is always within the manager's mind, and this will not 
change. The manager will continue to act without fully under- 
standing and will not consider this to be a problem; while 
attempting to increase his understandug, he never expects to 
arrive a t  a full understanding. 
op. cit diecusrrion group no. 4. 
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G. LANGUAGE AND COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
The concepts of language and cognition are strongly related. f i l e  
we do not necessarily thmk in language, it is dubious whether very many 
products of thought, i.e. our culture, could exist without language. 
The relationship between language and managerial cognition has its 
counterpart in computer technology. The theory of computers, so-called 
automata t h e w ,  postulates a hierarchy of abstract machmes of increas- 
ing computational power. Hopcroft and Ullman (1969) show that the con- 
cept of an automaton is equivalent to a grammar for translating an input 
set of symbols to an  output set. The vocabulary of symbols constitutes a 
formal language processed by the grammar, and the various abstract 
automata are distinguishable based on the syntactic complexity of the 
formal languages they process. These are compared to the categories of 
formal languages proposed by Chomsky (see e;g. Levelt 1974). The 
correspondence is as  follows: 
GRAMMAR AUTOMATON 
3. REGULAR = F'INITE 
2. CONTEXT FREE = PUSHDOWN 
1. CONTEXT S E N S I m  = LINEAR BOUNDED 
0. RECURSTVELY ENUMERABLE = TURING MACHINE 
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The recent work in Artificial Intehgence suggests a generalization of 
the concept of cognition to apply not only to humans but also to 
machines. Adopting this usage, we see a certain parallel between human 
vs mechanical cognition and the earlier distinction made between natural 
vs formal languages. 
The relationships are shown in Figure [1.2]. The diagram has two 
parts, comparing managers to an automaton. In part a) a standard con- 
ception of a Turing machine is drawn having an input, output and inter- 
mediate store. The symbol stream of this automaton is presumed to con- 
stitute a formal language, hw, describing the r e d  world. hw therefore 
corresponds to the data stored, updated and retrieved in the 
organization's databases. Tim language is distinguished from LC, the 
computer language for programming the automaton. 
In part b) of Figure [1.2]. the role of the automaton is substituted by 
a human manager, or perhaps a team of managers. Again, there is a 
language, LRW, describmg the real world, which these managers process. ' 
In this case Lm is a natural language, though it may contain formal 
language components. (Recall that formal languages have explicit and 
fixed rules c o n t r o ~  their syntax and semantics. Natural languages 
may evolve, depending on the consensus of the linguistic community.) 
Correspondrng to LC, the computer language used to program the 
automaton, managers learn their duties in LB (for 'bureaucracy'), the 
language of their job descriptions and other directives. 
The vocabulary of LB and LRw may of course overlap. Likewise, the 
vocabulary of LC and LRw may also overlap. (LISP programmers, for 
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(LC) 
7 J. I AUTOMATON 
INPUT (LRw) OUTPUT (LRw) 
w i  
0 0 
a. Mechamcal cognition 
b.  Managerial cognition 
instance, regularly deny the difference between programs and data.) The 
&tinctions made here are for expository purposes, based mainly on 
semantic scope. LC and LB refer to the actions, respectively, of the euto- 
maton and the manager. LRw refers to descriptions of the (actual, 
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possible) environment that the automaton and manager process. 
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H. ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
The distinctions between LRw, describing the real world, and LB vs LC, 
used for instructing (human vs computer) information processors, pro- 
vide the organizing basis for the chapters to follow. 
Chapters [2] through [5] are concerned specifically with aspects of 
h. 
Chapter [2], [Databases and Logic], considers the use of databases 
for decision support purposes. Rather than simple retrieval of data, 
these applications require inf erencing on the elementary facts to achieve 
the more abstracted, -her level concepts used by managers. This 
motivates an examination of ongoing developments relating database 
representations to predicate logic, and to the possibilities of so-called 
'logic programming'. 
Another motivation for relating databases to logic is to relate the 
substantial existing research on formal semantics to the role of data in 
organizations. This is the subject of chapter [3], [Formal Semantics of 
Databases]. Semantic issues are developed, in particular the semantic 
problems arising in dynamic environments: how to maintain a consistent 
interpretation of the symbolic vocabulary. This involves considerations of 
so-called 'possible worlds semantics'. 
In Chapter [4], [Naming: Individuals and Natural Kinds], the philo- 
sophical literature on this problem is brought to bear. The issues of 
names for individual objects (proper names) are shown to be related to 
those for generic terms for 'natural kinds'. The concept of possible world 
Is examined in the emergent 'new theory of reference', and the sociologi- 
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cal aspects of semantics are observed. These aspects are particularly 
characteristic of language use in organizations. 
Whereas chapters [3] and [4] deal with the semantics of qualitative 
terms identifying individuals and classes, chapter [S], [Measurement], 
considers numeric data. Current research in measurement theory is out- 
lined. The semantic aspects of measurement are discussed. 
In organizational administration, one particular type of measure- 
ment dominates, namely accounting measurement. In chapter [ 6 ] ,  [The 
Semantics of Accounting], the cliche that 'accounting is the language of 
business' is taken literally. Accounting statements are examined as con- 
stituting a formal language, and the semantic foundations are studied. As 
measurement, accounting data consists of two components: the domain 
of measurement, i.e. the objects being measured, and the scale of meas- 
urement, i.e, monetary values. Among the objects that accounting meas- 
ures, contractual objects figure prominently. Included here are receiv- 
ables, payables, notes, bonds, stocks, leases, licenses, insurance con- 
tracts, etc. Indeed, contractual relationships are the bindug force of the 
economy and of organizations themselves. They distinguish an organiza- 
tion from a mere collection of objects and people. 
However, from a semantic standpoint, contracts are rather difficult 
thugs to understand. We seem to treat them simultaneously as ~ e l a f i o n -  
ships and objects. In chapter [7 ] ,  [The hgical  Structure of Contracts], an  
informal discussion of these issues is presented. (A more rigorous treat- 
ment is postponed to the appendix.) Fundamental insights are provided 
by the developing area of & o d i c  logic. 'Deontic' refers to a concern with 
normative systems. Eiforts to formalize reasoning in this area include 
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logical operators of obligation, permission and prohibition. These opera- 
tors apply to human actions. Thus an explication of action is also 
required. This includes a concept of personal responsibility for a change 
in the state of the world. From these components, a concept of contrac- 
tual commitment is constructed. Various problems remain. One is the 
extension of propositional deontic logics to recognize first order individu- 
als. Another is the treatment of contingent commitment, currently at 
the center of debate in deontic logic. Further, the role of time is funda- 
mental to contractual commitment, requiring the integration of temporal 
logic with deontic logic. 
Referring back to Figure [1.2], the chapters thus far have dealt pri- 
marily with LRW, the (formal and informal) language describing the organ- 
izational environment. Attention next turns to the way this language is 
processed, i.e. by machines and people in the organization. Rather than 
confront the mechanical details of technology development and the many 
unanswered questions of cognitive psychology, we instead examine the 
imperative languages (LC and LB) by which information processing in the 
organization is directed. 
In chapter [ B ] ,  [Analyzing Red Tape: Deontic Performatives], the dis- 
cussion relating to contractual commitment between organizations is 
applied to analyze activity within the organization. The phenomena stu- 
died here are internal transactions and in particular the role of bureau- 
cratic documents. Transactions that are merely informative (LRw) are 
distmguished from those that are performative (Lg). The latter have an 
imperative aspect, involving the exercise of authority. These are shown 
to have an underlying structure analogous to contractual relationships, 
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hence also relying on deontic aspects. An important difference between 
these transactions and purely informative ones is in the individuation of 
the document itself. It is by means of deontic performatives that the 
organization controls its human based information processing. A concept 
of bureaucratic software is suggested. 
In chapter [9], [Bureaucracies, Bureaucrats and Information Tech- 
nology], the comparison between human-based vs computer-based infor- 
mation processing in organizations is further considered. The neutral 
concept of bureaucracy originally proposed by Weber is contrasted with 
the negative connotations it has since acquired. The problem of bureau- 
cratic rigidity is examined in terms of the personal interests of bureau- 
crats themselves, and the complexity of bureaucratic rule systems. A 
taxonomy by J. Galbraith is proposed for examining the effectiveness of 
different administrative methods for coping with complexity and uncer- 
tainty in the environment. Bureaucracy is observed to be effective for 
complex but stable (certain, predictable) environments. To cope with 
greater uncertainty, the organization needs to rely on greater discretion 
among its employees. An explanation for organizations that apparently 
cope well in environments that are both complex and uncertain is pro- 
vided by the concept of 'corporate culture' by Deal and Kennedy. 
In chapter [lo], [Applications Software and Organizational Change], 
the problems of software adaptation are examined from an organizational 
standpoint. This is currently a critical issue for the software industry. 
The difficulties of software change limit the extent to which the organiza- 
tion can rely on computer technology for its administrative operations. 
Otherwise the technology, while efficient, will restrict the organization's 
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ability to adapt and innovate. The effect is similar to the inflexibilities of 
bureaucratic rationalization, but the causes are different. Innovations 
from artificial intellqence are proposed to relieve this problem. 
Artificial intelligence won't, however, provide a complete answer. As  
regards organizational management, human judgment and understandmg 
will continue to be needed. This is not moralizing, rather epistemologiz- 
ing. In chapter [ll], [Towards a Theory of Management Decision Sup- 
port], the arguments of the previous chapters are reviewed and 
integrated into an evaluation of the potential impact of future informa- 
tion technology on management. Here the risky game of technology fore- 
casting is avoided by consider~ng a logical idealization of computer based 
information processing, namely as a formal language processor. 
The basic limitation is semantic change in the language LRW describ- 
ing the environment. The phenomena in the world are far richer in their 
number and aspects than our vocabulary for describing them. In natural 
language we circumvent this difficulty by changing the semantics as we 
speak. These are not the long term gradual developments usually studied 
in socio-linguistics, but the temporary shifts in meaning we introduce into 
each conversation where a new idea is discussed. As the organization 
seeks to adapt and innovate, these temporary shifts in meaning become 
part of the organization's language. Computers, as automata, control 
only the syntax (= vocabulary + formation rules + transformation rules) 
of the formal languages they process. The semantics of these languages 
(i.8. LRw) is not part of the computer system itself. but rather of the way 
it is interpreted by its users. The iderences performed by the system 
are valid only under the presumption of a fixed semantics. Even in an 
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idealized form of the technology, this will not change*. Herein lies the 
kernal of a theoretical foundation for management support systems. The 
mechanisms of semantic change, whether local to a single conversation, a 
change in the organizational dialect, or widespread change in the 
language of the whole society, depends on sociological mechanisms. 
The role of computer aids in management processes will therefore be 
limited to situations, narrow or broad, short term or long term, where the 
semantics can be assumed fixed. The complementary role of human cog- 
nition will be to track and/or initiate semantic change and delineate the 
contexts where the semantics can be assumed stable, hence where com- 
putational inference will be applicable. 
The consequences of these observations for developing organization- 
wide information systems is to emphasize the restrictive effect these sys- 
tems can have on the organization's .ability to adapt and innovate. 
Improvements in the modifiability of software are a critical consideration. 
Likewise, these same observations provide a thoretical foundation for 
a separate field of decision support systems, distinct both from informa- 
tion systems and artificial intehgence. 
Throughout the other chapters, three senses of the term 'model' are 
used: a da ta  model, i.e. a descriptive representation scheme; an i n f m -  
tid model (as in operations research or artificial intelhgence), where 
computational manipulations are meant to correspond to structural 
cheracteristics of the world; and a semantic model, in the Tarskian sense 
of an i n t v e t a t i o r t  of a formal system, e.g. of a data model or inferential 
Fully automated factories notwithsranding. A mbot factory ai13 has the problem of mark- 
eting to a- consumer tastes. 
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model. I t  is this third sense of model that is emphasized In decision sup- 
port systems. 
Decision support systems are concerned with models management in 
all three of these senses. We need to manage descriptive representations, 
inferencing schemes on these representations, but also the interpreta- 
tions applied to our models. The consequences are not only for technol- 
ogy development but also for management education. Managers need to 
be sensitive to what a computational model can and cannot do for them. 
The limitations are semantic. Indeed, these are the limitations of organi- 
zational rationalization in general. Just where and how managers should 
manage this rationalization is the central theoretical issue for further 
DSS research. 
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A. DATABASE MANAGEMENT 
Database management (DM) arose originally from a need for a spe- 
cialization of labor in data processing. Applications programmers had the 
dual function of satisfying user requirements as well as efficiently main- 
taining the data on various storage devices. 
As long as applications tended to be relatively independent, this was 
not a great problem. However, as more and more data files came to be 
shared among various applications, coordination problems arose. Dif- 
ferent applications favored different types of data organization. 
Database Management Systems (DBMSs) offered a separation of these 
concerns. Essentially, a DBMS translates between an abstracted view of 
data, accessed by application programs, and its actual physical represen- 
tation.. What the appropriate abstracted view should be, so-called 'data 
models', became an interest- research question and has been the sub- 
ject of prolonged debate for nearly a decade. The basic camps, eventu- 
ally, centered around a graphical view called the Network Model as 
opposed to a tabular view, the Relational Model. (Date, 1977, gives a good 
comparison.) While the two views are closely compatible, the Network 
Model seems to have certain advantages from the user engineering stand- 
point, and has been more widely implemented. The Relational Model, on 
the other hand, is mathematically simpler, and for that reason has been 
the more favored view in research discussions. The Relational Model is 
also adopted here as representing the database management paradqgm. 
The abstraction process may actually go a step further as recommended by the 
ANSI/X3/SPARC report (Tsicbrrritsis and Klug, 1077). Following that report, programs would 
accesl an 'external view' of the data, which is a subset of a master view called the 'conceptu- 
al schema'. This in turn is mapped to the 'Mernal achema' indicatmg actual physical 
storage. 
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B. THE FELATIONAL DATA K O D L  
The Relational Model was originally proposed by Codd (1970). In t b s  
view, data items are regarded as arranged in rectangular tables consist- 
ing of columns and rows. Columns are called attributes, rows are called 
tuples, while the entire table is called a relation. An example relation, 
containing data on employees, is the following: 
EMPLOYEE (ID#, NAME, RANK, SALARY) 
12 JONES CLERK 10000 
51 SMITH CLERK 10000 
27 DOE MANAGER 25000 
05 ELIOT PRESIDENT 50000 
Note that rows correspond to individual employees whereas the columns 
indicate the various recorded features of the employee. This is the gen- 
eral convention, i.e. that rows correspond to indwiduals in the environ- 
ment ('instances') while columns indicate their attribute s. In the 
EMPLOYEE relation, the attribute ID# (identification number) is a 'key 
attribute', that is, a unique identifier (of the individual in the environment 
correspondmg to the tuple). Such keys serve as cross references to 
other relations, such as in the following relation, showing 
superior/subordinate relationships. 
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In this case, both SUPERIOR# and SUBORDINATE# refer to ID# data items 
in the EMPLOYEE relationship. The identifying key for the WORKS-FOR 
relation is however the conjunct of the SUPERIOR# and SUBORDINATE# 
attributes. 
In the theory behind the Relational Model, database relations are 
regarded as mathematical relations over various domains of data items. 
An important concept in thls theory is the so-called 'functional depen- 
dency' that may arise between attribute domains. That is, it one attri- 
bute, A,' is functionally dependent on another, B, then an update to B 
requires a corresponding update to A. 
In the above example, for instance, it may be the case that salary 
depends on rank. That is, each rank has a fixed salary. Hence, knowing 
an employee's rank, we can determine his or her salary. In this case, the 
database would be redundant, since the salaries of clerks are recorded 
twice. To avoid potential inconsistencies (e.g. having one clerk's salary 
different than another's) the database should be normalized so that each 
such fact is recorded only once. In this example, the EMPLOYEE relation 
would be divided into two relations, EMPLOYEE and PAY-SCALE, as shown 
below. (For further discussion on normalization, see Codd, 1972, Fagin, 
1977.) Note that in the PAY-SCALE relation, the attribute RANK serves as 
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the identifying key. 
QdPLOYEE (ID#, NAME, RANK) 
12 JONES CLERK 
51 SMITH CLERK 
27 DOE MANAGER 
05 ELIOT PRESIDENT 
PAY-SCALE (RANK, SALAKY) 
CLERK 10000 
MANAGER 25000 
PRESIDENT 50000 
However, this decomposition is appropriate only ij the organization's 
personnel policy makes salary a unique function of rank. The equal 
salaries of the two clerks may only have been an accidental coincidence, 
not due to a functional dependency. Thisis a fundamental point: func- 
tional dependencies cannot be detected from patterns in the actual data 
alone. They reflect relationships between posstble values of attributes. 
This is due to the fact that organizational databases are dynamic, 
that is, they are continually being updated reflecting the effect of organi- 
zational transactions such as sales, inter-departmental transfers, produc- 
tion runs, etc. If the database were completely static, functional depen- 
dencies could be detected from the actual data, but then they would not 
be of interest; since there are no updates. no accidental inconsistencies 
could arise. 
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C. INFERENCING ON DATABASES 
The major use of DM databases to date has been in data processing 
applications; hence mainly for structured, operational level activities 
such as sales order processing, billing and inventory control. These appli- 
cations are characterized by high volumes of routine transactions. Per- 
formance criteria are mainly speed and efficiency. Databases might also 
be useful in less structured, longer range activities, though the require- 
ments in this case are somewhat different: 
a. information is usually required in more summarized form 
b. access is less routine -information must be retrievable in a 
variety of farms and combinations 
c. the lntormation is often used in combination with other informa- 
tional and computational resources. 
These are criteria for using DM databases in decision support appli- 
cations. The principle point is that the data needs in these cases, though 
contained in the database, will often not be at the detail level nor in the 
structural arrangement in whch the database was designed. It is for 
these uses that a mechanism providing inferencing on the database is 
needed. 
One obvious way of summarizing data is simple arithmetic calcula- 
tions - e.g. counts of inventory. Laclang however is a corresponding 
framework of qualitative inferencing. For instance, it you have an inven- 
tory of three apples and two oranges and count them up, you have five 
'thmgs', but what descriptive label should be attached to thrs broader 
class? In t h s  case a system of qualitative inference is needed. More 
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realistic examples abound, e.g. in accountmg data it you have $500 in 
cash and $700 in accounts receivable, then you have $1,200, but of what? 
Conversely, one might wish to make a query about the quick assets.of the 
company when the database only contained data on cash and accounts 
receivable. 
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D. PREDICATE CALCULUS AND LOGIC PROGRMKING 
Further discussion of database inferencmg for decision support 
applications requires a brief background on predicate logic and its com- 
putational counterpart, logic programming. 
1. Predicate Calculus 
It is assumed that the reader is at least generally familiar with the 
first order predicate calculus (FOPC) and its syntax. The following is thus 
only a review. 
The description of a logical system begins by declaring its unwerse 
of d&cmme. In a propositional (zero order) logic, this amounts to a set  
of statements (propositions) asserted to be true. In a first order logic, a 
separation is made between individual entities (or just individuals),  and 
the properties and relationships to other individuals. The latter are indi- 
cated, respectively, by one and n-place predicates. For a first order logic 
the domain of discourse is called the domain 01 individuals. (For the 
moment, the individuals described by the logic can be imagined as 
discrete physical objects at  a point in time.) In summary form, the basic 
constructs of a first order predicate calculus are as follows: 
1. Proposifio7ts. 
These are complete logical statements having a truth value. 
These are indicated symbolically by capital letters -e.g. P,Q,R. 
2.  Logical connectives. 
These combine one or more propositions to form new logical 
statements, also having a truth value. The logical connectives 
Chapter 2 
used here are as follows: 
- equivalence 
-+ implication 
& conjunction 
V disjunction (inclusive) 
W disjunction (exclusive) 
" negation 
3. Individualcmtanfsandvariables. 
These stand for objects in the domain of discourse - e.g. indivi- 
dual trucks or employees. 
Individual constants are denoted as one or more upper case 
letters, possibly containing non-lea- Q i t s  or hyphens; e.g. A, 
GEORGE, TRUCK-7. 
Individual variables are denoted as either lower case letters, e.g. 
x, y, z, or as a "?" followed by one or more capital letters or 
-its, e.g. ?ID, ?SALARY. (The dual notation here is a comprom- 
ise between the logical convention of variables as lower case 
letters, and the database management convention of capitaliz- 
Fng names of attributes that are recognized as variables in a log- 
ical interpretation.) 
4. FLcnctions. 
These map one or more individuals to another - e.g. SUPERVI- 
SOR (JONES) refers to another in&vidual who is Jones' 
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supervisor. Functions may take zero or more arguments and 
always result in a reference to a single individual. Functions 
may thus appear wherever an individual constant is allowed. 
Indeed, a zero-place function is the same as an individual con- 
stant. Functions are therefore denoted in the same way as indi- 
vidual constants, but followed by an argument list, e.g, F(A). 
BOSS(SM1TH) 
5.  Predicates. 
These indicate features, properties, attributes, etc., applied to 
zero or more individuals. Predicates will be denoted by upper 
case letters or words, e.g. P(x), RED(?X), OWN(x,y). When a 
predicate is applied to individual constants or to quantified indi- 
vidual variables (see below), or to functions of these, it has a 
truth value and may be combined to form other logical state- 
ments using the logical connectives above. ' A zero-place-predi- 
cate is equivalent to a proposition. 
6. Logical q u u n t i . s .  
These indicate the range of individual variables. The principal 
ones are: 
Wx universal quantifier 
(for all x, for each x. - 
ranging over all individuals 
in the universe) 
2 x existential quantifier 
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(for some x -ranging over 
at  least one individual) 
Parentheses are used in the usual fashion. 
2. I.agicPro&-ng 
Mechanical theorem proving in the predicate calculus has been a 
central area of AI research since its outset. As with logic generally, the 
original goal was to reproduce mathematical reasoning. Thus, an early 
success was the Logical Theorist program by Newell, Shaw and Simon 
(1963), wbch reproduced the proofs of Russell and Whitehead's Plincipia 
Mrrthed ica .  Indeed, the program found several original proofs of cer- 
tain theorems. A more recent success is the AM* program of Lenat 
(Davis and Lenat, 1982). The goal in AM is not only to prove specitied 
theorems from a given set of axioms, but also to decide for itself which 
axioms are interesting to prove. I t  thus is a model of mathematical 
discovery. 
Just as modern logic is now used to formalize reasoning in non- 
mathematical subjects, AI theorem-proving systems have also been 
applied to model reasoning in other areas. Basic axioms about the world 
are asserted and the system deduces further statements (theorems) 
based on these axioms. 
Whereas mechanical theorem-proving for the propositional calculus 
is relatively easy, theorem-proving in the (first order) predicate calculus 
Lenat: "the original meaning of this mnemonic haa been abandoned. As Ekodus states, 'I 
RllI what I M." (Davis and Lenat, 1882, p. 3). 
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is computationally much more difficult. One problem is that there are 
typically a number of inference rules available, corresponding for exam- 
ple to different arrangements of leading quantifiers or different combina- 
tions of logical connectives. While these are a convenience to human logi- 
cians, they lead to excessive branchmg and an extremely large search 
space for mechanical proofs. 
The so-called 'resolution method' of Robinson (1965) offers consider- 
able computational simplification by reducing logical assertions to an ele- 
mentary 'clausal' ('Horn clause') form. In this form, only one inference 
rule, resolution, is needed. (Resolution essentially combines the ider-  
ence rules of modus ponens and substitution.) Assertions in clausal form 
have the. followmg general pattern: 
where the Pi are predicates of the form P(xl, x2, .. ., xk). This can be read: 
"to prove Po it is sufficient to prove P1, P2, ..., and P,. AU variables are 
assumed to be universally quantified. It can be shownL that any first 
order assertion can be reduced to this form. The resolution method pro- 
vides the basis for a family of theorem-proving languages that together 
have come to be known as 'logic programming'. The best known among 
these is the language PROLOG (abbreviating PROgramming in LOGic), ori- 
ginally invented by Alain Colmerauer about 1970. Useful texts are Kowal- 
ski (1979a), Coelho, e t  al. (198O), and Clocksin and Mellish (1981). The 
discussion here is based mainly on PROLOG, with shght syntactic variants 
Thir reduction requires the inclusion of so-called Skolern functions, which take the role of 
existential quantification. These are not discussed here. Further discussion of clausal form 
is given in N i i n ,  1980, and Clocksin and Mellish, 1981. 
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to make it consistent with the preceding logical notation. 
In logic programming, one typically distinguishes between facts and 
nrles.  A fact is a clause containing only the left hand side and no vari- 
ables. For example, 
MALE(DICK). 
SIBLING(DICK, JANE). 
are facts. Rules are clauses with expressions on both sides of the implica- 
tion and containing variables. For example, 
BROTHER(x, y) .- SIBLING(x, y) & MALE(x) 
Disjunction is expressed using multiple rules. For example, 
BROTHER(x, y) can be proven in two ways, namely: 
BROTHER(x, y) .- SIBLING(x, y) & MALE(x). 
BROTHER(X, y) .- SIBLING(X, y) & MALE(Y). 
The first is the rule just discussed; the second allows for the reverse 
matchmg of arguments (because SIBLING is symmetric while BROTHER is 
not). Though this is the typical way of indicating disjunction in logic pro- 
gramming, for notational simplicity the connective, V, will sometimes be 
used. This is assumed to have lower priority than &. For instance, 
BROTKER(x, y )  .- SIBLING(x,y) & MAU(x) V SIBLING(y,x) & h ( y ) .  
is equivalent to: 
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Goal theorems (i.e. thngs to be proved) are denoted with a question 
mark, e.g. , 
BROTHER(DICK, JANE) ? 
asks whether DICK is the brother of JANE. In this example the system 
would respond YES. Variables can also occur in goal theorems. In these 
cases the system's response is similar to that of database queries, 
namely, it returns all combinations of variable bindings that result in a 
provable theorem. For instance, the logic program: 
MALE(D1CK). 
MALE(T0M). 
MALE( HARRY). 
MALE(x) ? 
would respond: 
x = DICK 
x = TOM 
x = HARRY 
A shghtly more complicated example is the following: 
SIBLING(DICK, SALLY). 
SIBLING(TOM, DICK). 
SIBUNG(HARRY, TOM). 
SIBUNG(x, z) + SIBLING(x, y) & SIBLING(y, z). 
The last rule indicates that the SIBLING relationship is transitive. Thus, 
the query, 
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SIBLING(x, SALLY) ? 
results in the response: 
x = DICK 
x = TOM 
x = HARRY 
Note that three levels of inferencing are involved here. The first is simply 
a match to the fact, SIBLING(DICK, SALLY). The second requires the infer- 
ence that TOM is a SIBLING to DICK and that DICK is a SIBLING to SALLY so 
TOM and SALLY must be SIBLINGS. The third is similar but with the addi- 
tional inference that HARRY is SIBLING to TOM so that HARRY must be a 
SIBLING to DICK, hence also SIBLING to SALLY. 
An important aspect of logic programming as compared with other 
types of computer languages is that it is non-procedural, or 'declarative'. 
In purely declarative languages, the order in which statements are 
evaluated is not controlled by the programmer*. Thus the order of the 
statements in a logic program doesn't matter as regards the system's 
inferencing capability. (It may however make a difference from an effi- 
ciency standpoint.) Logic programs are therefore an extreme form of 
modularity in computer program design. 
However, there is one aspect of this non-procedurality that has to-be 
compromised in order to address practical applications; this is for 
numeric computations. To do calculations in a strictly logical way would 
involve inferenc~ng on the basic axioms of arithmetic. This would be 
Thia is true of 'pure' logic programming. In PROLOG, a certain amount of execution cantrol 
e m  be specified by usiw the secalled 'cut' operator. 
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impossibly inefficient for any but trivial numeric computations. Logic 
programs therefore make calls to special subroutines when arithmetic is 
done. This is denoted here using a functional notation plus the usual 
arithmetic operators (+, -, *, /) tor addition, subtractim, multiplication 
and division. For example, consider the following logic program: 
HEIGHT-IN-METERS(DICK, 1.5). 
HEIGHT-IN-FEET(x, z) c- HEIGHT-IN-METERS(x, y) & z = y + 3.28. 
HEIGHT-IN-FEET(DICK, Z) ? 
z = 4.92. 
Note that in logic programming, numeric constants are regarded as logi- 
cal individuals. The subroutine invoked in computing z is logically 
regarded as a huge collection of facts givrng all possible sums, products, 
etc. 
W h a t  has just b-een described is the basic kernal of logic program- 
ming. Implementations include a variety of other aspects including in 
particular 'evaluable predicates' that have certain side effects permitting 
input /output, modification of assertions, etc. Also, more complex data 
structures (e.g. character strings, lists) are typically involved. These 
extensions enable logic programming to be used for a variety of applica- 
tions beyond the usual conception of theorem-proving, e.g. natural 
language parsing, graph searches, user interfaces. 
The motivation for introduc~ng logic programming here is to examine 
the possibilities of database inferencmg. This subject is considered next. 
Chapter 2 
E. THE ENTITY-RELATIONSHIP INTERPREXATION 
In the past decade, the Relational Model of Codd (1870) has clearly 
established the paradigm for database research. However, a criticism of 
the relational model is that it avoids commitment as to the semantics of 
the database, i.e. how the database structures signify or denote 
phenomena in the environment. A step in this direction is provided by 
the Entity-Relationship interpretation of Chen (1976). (This is normally 
called the Entity-Relationship Model, or ERM. It is, however, more an 
interpretation applied to the Relational Model.) The import of this 
approach is to draw attention to the role of relational keys. These are 
generally identitying labels for entities in the environment, e.g. part 
numbers, social security numbers. With this observation, certain rela- 
tions serve to describe individual entities (entity relabons), while others 
indicate relationships between entities (relationship relations). 
The ERM hghlights the ezistential ass11rnptions 'of a database. Each 
tuple in a database is assumed to correspond to a particular entity in the 
environment or a relationship between entities. 
The ERM is sometimes criticized that it fails to prescribe what count 
as entities, e.g. only physical objects? Should abstract objects also be 
admitted? The reply, of course, is that this depends on the organization's 
phenomenology. There is no absolute answer; what the organization 
recognizes as entities depends on its technology and view of the world. 
For instance, the popular example database 
STUDENT (S#, . ..) 
COURSE (C#, . ..) 
Chapter 2 
ENROLLMENT (S#, C#, ...) 
recognizes students and courses as entities, and enrollment as a relation- 
s h p  between them. This is a convenient view for university administra- 
tors, even though the concept of a 'course' is an abstraction that might 
be rather troublesome to pinpoint ontologically. 
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F. PREDICATE LOGIC DTTERPRE3ATION 
Ignoring, tor the moment, the deeper semantic issues, the ERM has a 
straightforward interpretation in predicate logic: 
a. entity relations = one-place predicates 
b. relationship relations = multi-place predicates. 
While this is a satisfactory interpretation of the definition of relations, the 
data in the relations are still unexplained. Generally, these seem to be of 
three types: 
a. data items functioning as i d d . s  of entities (in the role of 
logical names) 
b. data items correspondmg to r e d i c a t e s .  
c. data items representing n u m r i c  m a ~ ~ ~ ~ e m m t s .  
For example, consider the relation: 
EMPLOYEE (NAMX, SEX, SALARY) 
SMITH M A . U  35000 
JONES FEMALE 42000 
corresponding logical assertions would be: 
EMPLOYEE(SMITH) & MALE(SMITH) & SAWLKY(SMITH, 35000). 
EMPLOYEE(J0NES) & F'EMALE(J0NES) & SALARY(JONES, 42000). 
Here the values of the first attribute, NAME, translate as individual names 
in logic. The values of the second attribute, SEX, translate as predicate 
names, i.e. U ( x ) ,  FEMALE(x). The values of the third attribute 
translate as numbers, which in logic programing are taken to be 
- 20 - Chapter 2 
another type of individual. To relate the human in&vidual to the numeric 
individual, a two place predicate, SALARY(x, n), is introduced. Since the 
use of numbers in databases typically indicates a functional mapping 
from the real world entity to a numeric domain, a functional notation is 
often used, e.g. 
SALARY(SM1TH) = 35000. 
SALARY(J0NES) = 42000. 
Database management models typically distinguish between the 
s t n u t w e  and contents of the database. In the logical form this distinc- 
tion is not made. In database management, the structure/content dis- 
tinction gives rise to the view of databases as repositories, somewhat akin 
to physical inventories. A database query specifies retrieval conditions, 
and the' database contents that match these conditions are delivered to 
the user. In logical form queries are processed not simply by matching 
character strings, but rather by logical inf'erence (this point is elaborated 
below). 
This reflects a fundamental difference in the two perspectives. Data- 
base management regards data as character strings that the system 
stores and delivers to the user upon request. The in terpretat ion of these 
character strings lies outside the theoretical concern. (Recall: GIGO = 
garbage-in-garbage-out; there is little in database management systems 
that requires that the data be meaningful.) 
Representing data as logical assertions, however, one is more 
inclined to regard these as statements about the environment. This leads 
to a consideration of the epistemological evidence behind these asser- 
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tions, and the extrapolations and deductions that can be made from 
them. 
A hmdarnental difference between logic programming and the more 
usual concept of theorem-proving is in the basic ontology. Theorem prov- 
ing, following the usual pattern of logic, presumes some basic universe of 
discourse, e.g. numbers, blocks on a table. Logic programming, on the 
other hand, is much less restricted in this regard. In particular, much of 
logic programming is oriented towards objects that are data or syntactic 
structures. So, in addition to the more typical applications of predicate 
logic, logic programming may be used for example in sorting a list, or 
parsing natural language sentences. Thus, logic programming seems to 
blur the distinction between processing data structures and inferencing 
on logical assertions. For our purposes here, this ambiguity in logic pro- 
gramming serves as a useful bridge between the database management 
and logical views of databases. 
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G. RELATIONAL DATABASES AND LOGIC PROGFtAMXING 
Logic programming makes use of.mechanical theorem-proving tech- 
niques as the basis for a general purpose programming language. The 
focus here is the use of logic programming for database inferencing. 
The link between relational databases and logic programming is 
made by recognizing that, logically, a relation is the extension of a predi- 
cate. That is, a relation P(xl, ..., s) consists of all the n-tuples, 
<xl, ..., %>, that satisfy the predicate, P. Thus, for example, the data- 
base: 
EMPLOYEE (NAME, SEX, SALARI) 
SMITH, MALE, 35000 
JONES, FEMALE, 42000 
would be stated in a logic program as: 
EMPLOYEE (SMITH, MALE, 35000). 
EMPLOYEE (JONES, FEMALE, 42000). 
Note that while the structure of the original relation is preserved, 
the attribute names are no longer used. Here the relation name, 
EMPLOYEE, is re-interpreted as a three place predicate and the attribute 
wlues in each tuple are its constant arguments. To refer to the entire 
relation, rather than individual tuples, attribute names might be 
translated as variables, e.g., 
EMPLOYEE (?NAME, ?SEX, ?SALARY). 
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However here, the former attribute names are merely arbitrary variable 
names. An equivalent designation would be: 
Note how this example differs from its counterpart in the last section. 
Here EMPLOYEE is regarded as a single predicate, whereas before it was 
translated as a conjunct of three predicates. In conventional predicate 
logic the arguments of a predicate are normally regarded as names for 
individuals (in the universe of discourse). Here, on the other hand -and 
this is typical of most databases - not only do the arguments contain 
names for individuals, but other predicate names (e.g. MALE, F E W ) ,  as 
well as numbers (measurements). 
As noted earlier, the ontology adopted by an organization (i.e., what 
basic individuals it recognizes) is a relative matter, depending on how it 
choses to view the world. (However, external reporting requirements may 
press it towards a more standardized ontology.) 
In most databases, however, there Is apparent recognition of an 
underlying ontology. This, again, is because data is generally retrieved in 
the same form that it is stored, without intermediate mferencing. For 
example, it is doubtful that any organization would regard FEMALE as 
naming a unique individual in the same sense that JONES does. But for 
database applications where logical inferencing is included, it becomes 
important to make this ontology explicit. 
One of the simplest and perhaps most useful types of inferences for 
databases is for hierarchies of classification, so-called 
'generalization berarchies'. These were first proposed in the database 
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management literature by Smith and Smith (197?), though they were &s- 
cussed in Artificial Intelligence some years earlier, e.g. QuiUian (1968). 
An alternative notation, based on the Entity-Relationshp interpretation, 
is given in Lee and Gerritsen (1978). 
A generalization hierarchy is a graphical representation of a 
sequence of subset relationships between categories. An example of the 
Smiths' (19?7:109) is reproduced in Figure [2. I]. 
vehicle 
licle \ water vehicle 
Figure [2.1]. A generic hierarchy over vehcles 
The arcs in such generalization hierarchies are often read 'is a'. Thus an 
air vehicle 'is a' vehcle; a plane 'is a(n)' air vehicle; a passenger aircraft 
'is a' plane; etc. Assuming that the primative predicates stored in the 
database are at the bottom of the tree, the generalization hierarchy 
translates into logic programming rules as follows: 
PLANE (x) e- PASSENGER-AIRCRAF~(X). 
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and so o n  But now the ontological issues begin to emerge. Such infer- 
ences can only be made on relational attributes that are themselves 
predicates, and not, for instance, on attributes that are individual names 
or identifiers. In the terminology of the relational model, generalization 
hierarchies reflect the ambiguity that predicates may appear either as 
relation names or attribute values. These inferences are perfectly valid. 
However, they can only be recognized in the context of particular rela- 
tions. Consider the following very simple example. Agsume a relation: 
EMPLOYEE (?ID, ?MARITAL-STATUS). 
where ?ID is the employee's identification code and ?MARITAL-STATUS can 
have the values SINGLE, MARRIED or DIVORCED. (Note that the above 
expression is not a complete logic programming statement, as it is nei- 
ther a fact or a rule. This expression could however be entered as a 
query, with a "?" followmg, which would then return all the tuples of the 
relation.) To plan office parties, we would like to specify: 
However, having marital status as an argument of the employee relation, 
we are led to define it as follows: 
EMPLOYEE2(?ID, ELIGIBLE) - EMPLOYEE(?ID, SINGLE) V 
EMPLOYEE( ?ID, DIVORCED). 
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The important thing to note is that we are forced to create a new relation 
name, EMPLOYEEZ. The difference between EMPLOYEE and EMPLOYEE2 is 
that the latter has a different interpretation of its second argument. 
The difficulty is that in typical relational form, with features (prefi- 
cates) appearing as arguments, the governing predicate name carries the 
sense of these features implicitly. In the above example, the term 
EMPLOYEE carried not only the sense of employment, but also assertions 
about marital status. 
Further deductive rules would entail the invention of turther variants 
of the employee relation, e.g. EMPLOYEES, EMPLOYEE4, each having its 
own peculiar interpretation of arguments. Hence, as the deductive rules 
become more complex, it becomes advantageous from the standpoint of 
conceptual clarity to promote these embedded features to the status of 
explicit predicates. Continuing the previous example, we would have: 
EMPLOYEE (x) e- EMPLOYEE( x, y) . 
(Note: like-named predicates with different numbers of arguments are 
regarded as different predicates.) 
SINGLE(x) e- EMPLOYEE(x, SINGLE). 
MARFUED(X) +- EMPLOYEE(X. MARRIED). 
DIVORCED(x) e- EMPLOYEE(x, DIVORCED). 
Another type of data typically appearing in databases is numeric 
measurement. A similar rationale applies. As iderencing on the features 
indicated by these measurements becomes more complex, it becomes 
advantageous to separate out these features explicitly. For example, 
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consider the relation: 
BUILDING(?ADDRESS, ?HEIGHT-IN-METERS) . 
To convert to feet, we would like to spec* the rule: 
HEIGHT-IN-FEET(x,n) * HEIGHT-IN-METERS(x,m), & n = m 3.28. 
However, as embedded in these relations, separate rules for the units 
conversion would be needed for each length attribute of each relation, 
e.g., 
BUILDING2(x,z) * BUILDING(x,y) & z = y 3.28. 
Again we are faced with the introduction of the confusing terminology 
BUILDING2. Like before, the problem stems from the interpretation of the 
predicate name BUILDING to include more than the elementary concept 
of buildinghood, but also the measurement of that building's height. To 
distinguish these concepts explicitly, we would use the rules: 
BUILDING(x) .- BUILDING(x,h) . 
HEIGHT-METERS(x, h) * BUILDING(x,h). 
(*) HEIGHT-FEET(x, z) +- HEIGI-IT-METERS(x,y), z = y 3.28. 
Having distinguished 'height' explicitly, we can now make use of'this unit 
of measure conversion for other entities having the feature of height. For 
example, another relation might be: 
PERSON(?ID, ?HEIGHT-IN-METERS) 
To separate the concept 'person' from his or her height measurement, we 
add the rules: 
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PERSON(?ID) e- PERSON(?ID, ?H). 
HEIGHT-METERS (x, y) e- BUILDING(x,y). 
By using the rule (+) above, we may now infer the height in feet of any 
buildmg recorded in the database. 
Likewise, with the concepts 'buildmg' and 'person' separately &s- 
tinguished, we may want to add additional deductive rules about them. 
For instance, 
PHYSICAL-OBJECT(X) e- +ERSON(X) v BUILDING(X). 
i.e. persons and buildmgs are both physical objects. With this abstrac- 
tion, general knowledge pert- to physical objects can then be added, 
e.g. that they have mass, height. 
These examples reflect an important insight suggested by the graph- 
ical notation of generalization herarches.  One would like to specify 
deductive rules to apply as generally as possible. For instance, it is a 
characteristic of vehicles of all types that .they may change from one 
location to another. It is a characteristic of all water vehcles that their 
location will always be in some body of water. In normal database 
representations, one would have to specify these inferences repeatedly 
for each of 'submarine', 'kayak', 'sailboat', etc. 
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A DATABASE SEMANTICS 
A key motivation in the growth of database technology has been the 
integration of information. For example, production and sales may both 
need access'to inventory records. If they each keep separate copies, the 
two sets of records may become unsynchronized, resulting perhaps in 
foregone orders or frustrated customers. Consolidating the record keep- 
ing in an integrated database avoids this problem. Note however that t h s  
presumes that both sales and production have a common conception of 
what is meant by inventory. Normally this is not a problem since the two 
departments have had to interact long before the appearance of the com- 
puter, and so arrived (informally, naturally) at  a common understandmg. 
Thls phenomenon is so ubiquitous that we seldom notice it until we 
change organizations. Then we may find that in the new environment, 
familiar phenomena are now designated by different terms, or that once 
familiar terminology now designates other thmgs. Further, the transla- 
tion is .in many cases not straightforward, particularly in the language 
pertainmg to the technical details of the enterprise. 
As noted earlier, not only do organizations tend to differentiate 
themselves hguistically, but also this linguistic differentiation is an 
important component of their successful functioning. 
However, opposing this tendency towards hguistic differentiation. 
there are also requirements for linguistic standardization between organ- 
izations. Contracts, for example, must be mutually understood; financial 
reports must be comparable to those in other organizations. The discip- 
lines of law and financial accounting exist largely to provide this linguistic 
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standardization between organizations. For good or ill, it is an empirical 
fact that governmental regulation is rapidly increasing in the US and 
Europe and elsewhere. Clearly the terminology of this regulation has to 
coincide with that used in the organizations being regulated. Efforts at 
international cooperation, reflected in international law, international 
trade agreements, international standards, etc., also depend on linguistic 
standardization. In these cases, multiple natural languages may also be 
involved. 
The concern here is with those facts and communications that are 
likely to be channeled through an information system.' The semantic 
problem can be viewed in terms of communicating from one idormation 
system t o  another, often called the problem of database translation. 
Given that the respective databases have been conceived in separate 
organizational environments, how can we ensure that data exchanged will 
be interpreted consistently in the two contexts? Kent presents a number 
of examples of this problem: 
A "book" may denote something bound together as one physical 
unit. Thus a single long novel may be printed in two physical 
parts. When we recognize the ambiguity, we sometimes try to 
avoid it by agreeing to use the term "volume" in a certain way, 
but we are not always consistent. Sometimes several "volumes" 
are bound into one physical "book". We now have as plausible 
perceptions: the ons book written by an author. the two books 
in the library's title files (Vol. I and Vol 11), an the t e n  books on 
the shelf of the library which has five copies of everyt hmg... 
IBM assigns "building numbers" to its buildings for the routing of 
internal mail, recording employee locations, and other pur- 
poses. One two-story buildlng in Palo Alto, California, is "build- 
ing 046," with the two stories distmguished by suffixes: 046-1 
and 048-2. Right next door is another two-story building. The 
upper story is itself called "builduq 034," and the lower story is 
split into two parts called "building 032" and "buildmg 047". IBM 
didn't invent the situation. The designations correspond to 
three different postal addresses: 1508, 1510, and 1512 Page Mill 
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Road are all in the same building. [1978:4] 
A basic point, elaborated in later chapters, is that this problem, 
being semantic, is not subject to mechanical solution. Richer, more 
expressive database representation languages will not solve the problem, 
for it involves the relation of these languages to their referrents, not sim- 
ply the languages alone. 
It follows from the basic theory of automata and formal languages 
(e.g., Hopcroft and Ullman,. 1969) that the most an information system 
can do is syntactic transformations. The interpretations we apply to the 
symbols output from an  information system rely heavily on their similar 
ity to natural language vocabulary with which we are already familiar, 
either through our general education or through the narrower context of 
the organizational environment. Consider how much sense we could 
make from them if they were presented, say, using the Greek alphabet or 
as binary bit strmgs. How could we get the system to explain what was 
meant under these circumstances? 
On the other hand, any conceivable problem of inter-connectmg two 
information systems would take place in the context of a single natural 
language or at worst, two natural languages that were thoroughly in t e r  
translatable. Thus, the translation problem should never really arise. 
However, i t  does. I t  does because in typical ~nformation system applica- 
tions we are dealrng at a level of semantic detail and precision that sel- 
dom arises in natural language discourse. 
Consider a familiar topic like family relationships. We talk about 
families and relatives all the time with no apparent difficulty. Now con- 
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sider the design of a census database. We want to count the number of 
families. We begin by developing a concept of a NUCLEAR-FAMILY. (The 
term is capitalized to indicate that we are developing a technical term to 
be used within the database). We begin with a notion that a NUCLEAR- 
FAMILY consists of parents and children living together in a common 
dwellmg. Which parents? Multiple generations may be livlng together. 
Living together when? Suppose one parent travels frequently, or workmg 
abroad for a time or in the military service. Must the parents be mar- 
ried? What about co-habitating adults with or without children. (For this 
particular case, the US census bureau invented a special term, POSSLQ, 
pronounced 'possel-queue', abbreviating 'Persons of Opposite Sex Sharing 
Living Quarters'. 
And then there is the problem of what counts as a dwe-. Must the 
dwellmg be physically connected? Is it individuated by a single purchase 
or rental contract? What about families who have more than one 
residence? What about itinerant workers? 
Suppose, to meet its purposes and interests, each national census 
bureau works out a suitable set of definitions tor all the relevant con- 
cepts. Then some years or decades later the United Nations undertakes 
to combine these various databases to produce a world census. It would 
be an extraordinary coincidence if the various national databases were 
semantically compatible. 
The census example is useful tor the general familiarity of its sub- 
ject. With regard to co&ercial organizations and other gcvernmental 
agencies, the subject matter is often more specialized, but analogous 
problems arise when they must inter-communicate data. 
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It seems from this discussion that what we need to do in each of 
these cases of semantic incompatibility is arrange our terminology in a 
hierarchy of logical definitions, wbch reduce down, eventually, to some 
primitive terms that the parties involved agree on. An example of a logi- 
cal definition might be: 
(The symbol ::= is logically like the bi-conditional, w, but carries the 
extra-logical aspect of definition; i.e. the left-hand term is defined in 
terms of the rlght-hand expressions.) That is, a bachelor is defined as an 
unmarried male. ' h s  might be too simple. We might want to further 
include that a bachelor is a person who is male and unmarried; or we may 
need to specify marriage as a two-place predicate, etc. These are logical 
refinements that would depend on the purposes of the information sys- 
tem applications involved. 
As long as what  we are doing is d e p i n g  the concept, BACHELOR, i.e., 
declaring it by fiat to be male and not married, this is perfectly adequate. 
It 1s presumably somet- along these lines that each national census 
bureau would do for its applications. This works fine as long as there is a 
single authority behnd the definition malang. 
But the problem we have been elaborating is one where there has 
been more than one defining authority, and we are trying to reconcile the 
various definitions. For example, suppose that there are two databases. 
In the first, the term BACHELORl appears and in the second, the terms 
MAU2 and MARRIED2 appear. The translation we are inclined to make is: 
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BACHELOR, (x) ++ MALE2(x) & "MARRIED2(x). 
That is, wherever the left 'hand expression appears in the first database 
we translate that as the right hand conjunct in the second database. The 
problem is, how d o  we know? Supposing that these are primitive terms in 
the respecbve databases, further definitions won't help. But this is surely 
a case where the correspondent e is indisputable. Winograd suggests 
some room for doubt: 
The word "bachelor" has been used in many discussions of 
semantics, since (save for obscure meanings involving aquatic 
mammals and medieval chivalry) it seems to have a formally 
tractable meaning which can be paraphrased "an adult human 
male who has never been married. Traditional theories of 
semantics deal with tasks such as determining whether the sen- 
tence "my bachelor uncle is unmarried" is analytic. In the real- 
istic use of the word, there are many problems which are not as 
simply stated and formalized. Consider the following exchange: 
Host: I'm having a big party next weekend. Do you know any 
nice bachelors I could invite? 
Friend: Yes, I know this fellow X . .. 
The problem is to decide, given the facts below, for whch values 
of X the response would be a reasonable answer in light of the 
normal meaning of the word "bachelor". A simple test is to ask 
for which ones the host might fairly complain 'You lied. You said 
X was a bachelor. ": 
A. Arthur has been livlng happily with Alice for the last five 
years. They have a two year old daughter, and have never 
officially married. 
B. Bruce was going to be drafted, so he arranged with his 
friend Barbara to have a justice of the peace marry them so 
he would be exempt. They have never lived together. He 
dates a number of women, and plans to have the marriage 
annulled as soon as he finds someone he wants to marry. 
C. Charlie is 17 years old. He lives at home with his parents 
and is in h ~ h  school. 
D. David is 17 years old. He left home at 13, started a small 
business, and is now a successful young entrepreneur lead- 
ing a playboy's life style in this penthouse apartment. 
E. Eli and Edgar are homosexual lovers who have been living 
together for many years. 
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F. Faisal is allowed by the law of his native Abu Dhabi to have 
three wives. He currently has two and is interested in 
meeting another potential fiancee. 
G. Father Gregory is the bishop of the Catholic cathedral at 
Groton upon Thames. 
"Bachelor" was chosen here because it is the classic example of a 
logical (or analytic) definition. Winograd's remarks point out that even in 
this supposedly indisputable case, the sense depends on the interests and 
intentions of the parties involved. In cases of database translation, multi- 
ple organizations, hence multiple sets of interest, are typically involved. 
Each is likely to have attached its own specialized sense to its terms, rela- 
tive to those interests and each organization's own internally developed 
technology. Of course not all the terminology in each organization's voca- 
bulary is can&date for database translation. A n  important research issue 
is to determine in which areas inter-translatability is most needed, and to 
focus on the semantic foundations in these cases. (The comments in 
chapter [6], on the semantics of accounting, apply to this.) 
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The database translation problem is the one typically cited to 
motivate semantic issues. This reflects the underlying operational orien- 
tation of database management, which concentrates largely on produc- 
tion and/or sales related transactions. However, a deeper and more 
important problem exists, namely semantic change within the organiza- 
tion itself. 
It is a commonplace to observe that the world is changing rapidly. 
Organizations, to survive, must keep pace, and to succeed, must inno- 
vate. ' h s  entails not just a recombination of old concepts, but changes 
in the concepts themselves. Thus the concept of automobile changes 
year by year as new models come out. The term 'computer' originally 
referred to a person whc computes (which is why ACM abbreviates Associ- 
ation of Computing Machinery, to avoid confusion with human comput- 
ers). Then 'computer' came to mean a b ~ g  machine filled with vacuum 
tubes. Now we think of Apples and wristwatches. Television ads con- 
stantly press us to consider new conceptions of soapsuds, breakfast food, 
toothpaste; fashion changes our conception of apparel; etc. Managers 
participate in these changes in their understanding of the markets, 
changing technology, social trends, politics, etc. Given that management 
behavior is almost entirely lmguistic, conceptual change involves seman- 
tic change. 
However, computational inference generally entails an assumption of 
stable semantics. For instance, a logic programming rule, 
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is valid or invalid depending on the semantic extension of P and Q. For 
example, i! P is lemon and Q is fruit, the conclusion is correct, since any- 
thmg that is a lemon is also a fruit. If P is interpreted as 'elephant', how- 
ever, the rule is invalid. The problem created by semantic change is that 
the inierences made by the system, once correct, become invalid as the 
extension of the symbol changes. For instance, the rule 
was once valid but is no longer. This has deep consequences for the use of 
intormation systems in organizations in dynamic environments. As will be 
developed in later chapters, the problem is closely associated with the 
more general issue of rationalization in organizations. 
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Database management arose from data processing concerns about 
storing large amounts of data on magnetic devices. As such, the atten- 
tion was on the data itself as an object, rather Tn than what it meant. 
I t  is i n t e r e s t q  to note how the usage of the very term "data" has 
changed. "Data" was originally the plural of "datum", hence taking a 
plural verb ("the data are ..."). Now we use "data" more as a mass noun, 
("the data is ...") suggesting that we have come to view data more like a 
fluid that flows, is stored, processed, etc. 
To view data as objects, or perhaps even in fluid terms, is key to the 
engineering of the data processing. As a highly automated industry, data 
processing shares many of the efficiency problems of other process 
industries, e.g., oil refinkg, food processing. 
But here we tend to lose sight of our basic product, data as facts. 
Lmguists refer to this as a contusion between use and nadion, e.g., 
snow is white 
VS 
'!snow" is a four letter word. 
In mentioning a term, as in the second case, we are concerned only with 
its form, not in its use as a symbol for sornethmg else. 
The position taken here is that the role of information technology in 
organizations can be better understood if we avoid discussion of 'data' 
entirely and focus rather on the content of databases as assertions in a 
la4zuag e. 
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Another aspect of databases that tends to conIuse these semantic 
aspects is that they are intimately tied to the programs that process the 
data or, in the terminology here, that provide inferences on the elemen- 
tary assertions in the database. 
With respect to programming languages (i.e. LC in chapter [I]) there 
is a well developed concept of semantics, but it is quite different from the 
one sought here. 
This merits a brief explanation. programming languages are used to 
issue commands, hence imperative statements, to the computer. The 
semantics of an arbitrary imperative Like, 
Shut the door! 
depend on understanding what objects are involved (e.g., door) and the 
change of state requested (the door is open, then the door is closed). In 
programming languages, the objects involved are data structures, ulti- 
mately memory locations, and the changes of state are the bit status i n .  
these locations. Thus the semantics of a programming language depends 
only on these computational objects. 
To discuss the semantics of these data structures in the organiza- 
tional environment, we have to regard them as symbolic expressions, 
representing objects in the external environment, rather than objects in 
themselves, r e t u .  once again to the uselmention distinction. 
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D. FORMAL LANGUAGES 
In the last chapter, relational databases were re-formulated as Brst 
order logical assertions. This had on the one hand the advantage of link- 
ing databases with logical theorem proving apparatus, enabling database 
inferencing. On the other hand, this reformulation also presents data- 
bases in a perspective that hghlights their semantic aspects in a way 
that can benefit from a large background literature on semantics as it 
relates to logical Languages. 
Whereas database management is only now beginning to clarify its 
semantic problems, many of these have already arisen in the study of 
logic and formal linguistics. A fundamental concept is that of formal 
language. A formal language is one who's use is controlled by explicit 
rules. This contrasts with natural languages (e.g., English) who's use is a 
matter of evolving, implicit consensus. The aspects of a formal language 
are typically divided into the following categories: 
a. thesynfazofthelanguage, consistingof 
i. a vocabulary of basic symbols (i.e., its words and punctua- 
tion) 
ii. fowmtion rules, which determine permissible ('well- 
formed') combinations of the vocabulary. 
Lii. kamsftnmution or i n f e r m e  rules: these provide a m a p  
ping between true sentences in the language; i.e.. they are 
truth preserving transformations of the form: if Ale . . . , & 
are true sentences, then B1, . . . , B, will also be true sen- 
tences. 
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b. semantic ru les :  these are rules mappiw expressions in the 
language to the objects they denote. These rules follow the so- 
called 'Principle of Compositionality': the semantic rules deter- 
mine the denotation of more complex expressions as a composi- 
tion of their syntactic components, based ultimately on the 
denotation of the basic vocabulary. The structure of the seman- 
tic rules therefore follows that of the syntactic rules. 
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E. PROOF THM)FZY VS IG3DEL THEOW 
Of special interest is how formal languages are used to reason about 
the world. Proof theory and model theory present dual explanations of 
this process. These might be characterized respectively as syntactic vs. 
semantic reasoning. 
Proof theory is the mode of reasoning generally associated with logic. 
I t  is concerned with deductions based solely on the syntactic form of 
expressions and, in particular, does not make use of any semantic infor- 
mation. 
Model theory, by contrast, is concerned with reasoning in the formal 
language based on the denotations of their expressions. For instance if, 
by observation, we discover that the class of boys is a subset of the class 
of males, we might infer in the formal language that if BOY(x) then 
m ( x ) .  
In terms of the three components of formal languages just dmcussed, 
the duality between proof theory and model theory mght  be diagrammed 
as in Figure [3.l]. 
A theory in a formal language is a collection of statements asserted 
to be true about some discipline or subject area. Importantly, databases 
constitute a theory of a (first order) formal language. Tarski, the princi- 
ple developer of this dual view of proofs and models, sets forth the basic 
strategy of proof theory as follows: 
... if within logic or mathematics we establish one statement on 
the basis of others, we refer to this process as a d d a t i o n  or 
deduction, and the statement established in this way is said to 
be d h e d  or deduced from the other statements or to be their 
consequence. 
Chapter 3 
Syntax 
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... The method of constructing a discipline in strict accordance 
with the principles laid down above is known as the deductive 
method and the disciplines constructed in t h s  manner are 
called deductive t h e d s .  [Tarski, 1941 / 1989:118-1191. 
The problem with proof theory is that it is rather dogmatic about the 
concept of truth. The contention is that if the axioms are true, then the 
theorems deduced from them will also be true. However, in proof theory 
by itself there is no independent way of verifying this claim. Model theory 
is an effort to provide t h s  independent verification, particularly in the 
case of first order languages. As it turns out, the method of truth tables 
is a special case of model theory for verifying the semantics conditions of 
propositional (zero order) languages. Here, the denotation of a proposi- 
tion (sentence) is taken to be a truth value ( h e ,  fake). The concept of a 
tautology, for instance, could be demonstrated as a compound sentence 
that remained true under all possible assignments of truth values t o  its 
components. Ths  illustrates the basic concept of a model of a formal 
language: it is one unique interpretation of the language that makes an 
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assignment of denotations to its basic vocabulary. 
In the case of first order languages, an assignment of denotations is 
more complex since the basic vocabulary consists not just of whole propo- 
sitions but rather of individual constants and predicates. The view here is 
that these denotations should all be definable in terms of a set of indivi- 
dual objects, called the d o m a i n  o f i n d i u i d u d s ,  D. 
a. Individual constants in the language denote elements of D. 
b. One place predicates denote subsets of D. 
c. n-place predicates denote n-ary relations defined on D. 
Clearly, the denotation of individual constants depends on the choice 
of D. However, once D is defined, the denotation of predicates further 
depends on the way one decides to define subsets and relations on D. 
Hence, a model, M, of a first order language has two components: first, 
the choice of a set D; but also an assignment function, F, which maps indi- 
vidual constants to elements of D, and predicates to subsets and relations 
on D. A small example may help. Consider a mini-language, L, with the 
foIlowQ basic vocabulary, 
Individual constants: A, B, C, D. 
Predicates: 1 place: P, Q 
2 place: R 
Let D = IJohn, Mary, Ted, Alice] 
One assignment might be: 
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den(A) = John 
den(B) = Ted 
den(C) = Mary 
den(D) = Alice 
den(P) = {John, Tedj 
den(Q) = IMary, Alicej 
den(R) = t<John, Mary>, <Ted, Alice>] 
'.LP 
Consider that we interpret P as 'male,' Q as 'female,' and R as 'married.' 
Suppose that it is the case that John is married to Mary and Ted is mar- 
ried to Alice. Then in this particular assignment, the assertion 
is true: However. clearly we could have made other assignments of the 
basic vocabulary where t b s  would not be true. 
The import of thrs for logic is that it provides a clear and exacting 
distinction between contingent vs logical truth. A contingent truth is one 
that holds for a particular choice of D and F - what Tarski termed true in 
a model. A logical truth (the analogue to a tautology in the propositional 
case) is one that is true for all choices of D and F, i.e., in all possible 
models. What model theory does, basically, is define the semantics of 
first order languages in terms 01 sets. Further enrichment of model 
theory continues with the interplay between the syntactic complexity of 
The reader mag be canfused between the notation of predicates sometimes with srgu- 
mmts, sometimes without. An intermedisting logical device is provided by Church's lambda 
operator, where, for example, P abbreviates (h) P(x), R abbreviates (b)(Ay) R(x,y). Lambda 
abstractians denote the sets far which the predicate is true. 
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the language and its corresponding set theoretical mathematics. 
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P'. MODELS OF DATABASES 
As observed- earlier, a database can be construed as a theory (coltec- 
tion of sentences) in a first order language. Coupled with the earlier 
remarks about theorem proving on databases, the relevance of model 
theory emerges as a means of semantically verifying database inferences. 
This gives a tantalizing insight to that old DP adage: Garbage-In-Garbage- 
Out. In the terminology just presented, computers can provide proof 
theoretic deduction but lack a model theoretic verification. (Even with 
the addition of robotic sensors this situation may not change very much - 
see next chapter.) 
However, if one examines the literature on model theory since Tarski 
(e.g., Chang and Keisler, 1973), one finds that it is almost entirely 
mathematical, that is, the sets that form the denotations of various for- 
mal languages are characterized as discrete, continuous, finite, infinite, 
etc., but little more is said about their 'real world' character. In keeping 
with t h s  mathematical orientahon, the composition of these sets is 
presumed to be entirely known when the language semantics are defined. 
In database contexts, this would correspond to the situation of a 
static or 'snapshot database', e.g. a census database where once the data 
is collected it is no longer updated. That is, the population of individual 
objects, their properties and relationships are entirely fixed. In these 
cases, the denotation of terms like ADULT or HEAD-OF-HOUSEHOLD is 
determined by the population of the known universe or nation at the time 
the database 'snapshot' was taken. 
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However, the difficult aspects about databases arise from the fact 
that they are more often dynamic, undergoing continual updates. The 
denotation of a predicate like EMPLOYEE changes from week to week. We 
cannot define the semantics to be for example the set of employees at  a 
given time, or even the set of employees during the entire history of the 
firm, for that still would not include the very important class of future 
employees. 
This presents important problems if we are seeking a semantic justif- 
ication for some generalization like 'all employees are people'; 'all 
salaried employees have health insurance'; 'all executives drive automo- 
biles'. The point is, we would like to make these generalizations now, but 
be able to draw inferences about health insurance, etc., later.  That is, we 
want our generalizations to apply to the database at  present, its past 
states, but also its future states. Stated slightly differently; we want to 
generalize not only about what is 'true, but about what can be true or 
what must be true. The technical term for these are the so-called &ethic 
modalities of possibility (can) and necessity (must). These are commonly 
regarded as dual concepts: 
necessarily p - not possibly not p 
possibly p - not necessarily not p 
impossibly p - necessarilynotp 
not necessarily p - possibly not p 
But now compare the statement 
all ravens are black 
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to the statement: 
necessarily, all ravens are black. 
What does the word 'necessarily' add? The generally accepted response 
to this was given by Kripke (1963) that an assertion 'p' is a claim about 
the actual world, i.e., within empirical experience, whereas 'necessarily p' 
is an assertion about all possible worlds. 
Whether an assertion is true in all possible worlds depends both on 
our current scientific theories about the world as well as the definitions 
we assign to terms. This point will be elaborated at more length in the 
next chapter. For the moment consider the concept of a possible world 
to be like a gedanken experiment - i.e., it is a world (or state of the 
world) in our imagination. Hence, 'necessarily, ravens are black' is true if 
the set of ravens is a subset of the set of black things in all the world 
states we can conjure up. However, if we can imagine, for instance, an 
albino raven in one of these states, then we would deny ravens are neces- 
sarily black. 
The concepts of necessity and possible worlds interact with that of 
time. We can imagine alternative versions of the present world, alterna- 
tive histories, as well as multiple scenarios of the future. In databases, 
however, we are in the main only concerned with the actual past and 
present. However, fortune telling and economic forecasting both belug 
somewhat dubious, we have no corresponding concept of the actual 
future. 
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The inter-relationship between possible worlds and times can be pic- 
tured graphically as follows. Assume an elementary vocabulary of propo- 
sitions PI, P2, ..., P,, which describe all relevant aspects of the world. We 
assume these to be logically independent, that is, the truth value of one 
does not dfect the truth value of any other. Then we can invent the con- 
cept of a state of the world as a conjunct of these propositions (von 
Wright, 1968). By assigning different truth values, we thus generate Zn 
possible states. 
Presuming that different states can be true at different times, we 
arrive at a state/time grid as in Figure [3.2]. The actual world will 
presumably be reflected as one sequence of states, i.e. the solid line on 
the grid. Other possible worlds will be the other paths that can be drawn 
connecting states progressively through time, e.g, the dashed line in Fig- 
ure [3.2]. 
In the business world, where the past is regarded as a sunk cost, 
alternative histories are of little interest. Thus, for example if we take T5 
to be the present time, what  is of interest are those possible worlds whose 
history conforms to the actual world, but diverge in different directions 
towards the future (see Figure [3.3]). By re-drawing the graph so that 
possible worlds, rather than states, are indicated by the horizontal lines, 
this conception of time and possible worlds is characterized as 'back- 
wards linear and forward b r anchq '  (Rescher and Urquhart, 1971, ch. 8), 
see Figure [3.4]. The relationship between time and possible worlds just 
described is over-simplified in that it assumes the elementary vocabulary 
to be whole propositions rather than predicates applylng to individuals. 
Thus in generating possible states, we would need not only to make 
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assignments of truth values, but also assignments of individuals to logical 
names, to predicates, and so on. This is exactly the definition of a Tar- 
skian model. That is, a model is a possible state of affairs. A possible 
world, as we have defined it, is a sequence of such states over time. 
This raises one nit-picking little point that ends up being the cause of 
enormous amounts of philosophical debate. The Tarskian concept of a 
model assumes we have some domain of individuals, D, whch are the 
extension of names, predicates, etc. We describe states of the world as 
different arrangements of properties on these individuals. But how do we 
know they're the same individuals from one state to the next if they have 
diiferent properties? Are there certain properties that are essential to 
the identification of the individual while others are accidental, varying 
over time? If so, whch ones? "Ihs is known in the literature as the prob- 
lem of 'trans-world identification of indwiduals', discussed in more detail 
in chapter [4]. 
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G. DATABASE OhTOLOGIES 
The question of the identity of individuals through different states of 
affairs presumes that we know what an individual is in the first place. 
This is the issue of ontology. To elaborate this in terms of databases, 
recall that Chen, in his Entity Relationship interpretation of the Relational 
Model (see Chapter Z ) ,  proposes that database relations are essentially of 
two types -those that apply to single entities, e.g. 
DEPARTMENT (?DEPT-NUM, . . .) 
and those that assert a relationshp between entities, e.g. 
(?E-NUM and ?DEPT-NUM are unique identifiers for employees and depart- 
ments, respectively.) In reformulating this in terms of a first order 
language, this distinction translates to the fairly etraightforward distinc- 
tion between slngle and multiple place predicates. But the question then 
arises, 'what is an entity'? People are entities, but are colors? are 
numbers? Recast as a first order language, the issue focuses on the com- 
position of the domain of individuals, D. The choice of D is called the 
ontology of the theory being formalized. It represents the key founda- 
tional assumption of the theory. (See Quine 1953/1961.) For instance, 
one theory might assume D to be the set of positive integers. Another 
might take D to be the set of discrete physical objects. Thus the ontologi- 
cal question, from the standpoint of formal languages, is moot. It is an 
assumption of the theory, thus taken for granted. If we were considering 
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databases only in isolation, t h s  would be satisfactory. The database 
designer decides what to regard as entities, and the semantics of the 
database follows from that choice. 
However, to make use 3 f  these data resources in decision support 
applications involves their combinabon with analytical routines, often in 
ad hoc ways. We would like the system to know which t w s  can, semant- 
ically, go with which. But this requires that they have a compatible ontol- 
ogy. If, for example, the ontology of one system recognizes consumer 
tastes as the only elementary entity while another recognizes only physi- 
cal objects (e.g. parts for furniture), it will be difficult to reconcile the 
two for, say, aidmg marketing decisions. 
One ontological issue can be fairly easily dismissed at this point. 
Thls relates to the use/mention distinction introduced earlier. Most data 
models regard their ontology to consist of symbolic constructs, e.g., char- 
acter strings and (real, integer) numbers. Thls is appropriate for 
software research, where the attention is confined to the information sys- 
tem itseU. It does not serve, however, tor applications of the technology 
to the organizabon's problems. Here character strings and numbers are 
parts of the language used to describe the organization and are not in 
themselves of interest. 
Thus, in the discussion of logic programmmg in the last chapter, 
numbers were introduced as a special type of individual. Tlvs is more of a 
syntactic convenience than an ontological issue. For instance, the two 
place predicate. AGE(x, n), could just as well have been regarded as a 
family of predicates, e.g. 
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AGE3 1 (x) 
etc. A similar case can be made for character strings. For example, in 
most PROLOG implementations character strings are designated as an 
arbitrary sequence of characters between double quotes, e.g.. 
"THIS STRING." 
These might be used in database applications to accommodate alterna- 
tive (and not necessarily unique) identifiers or labels for individuals. For 
example, employees typically have an employee identification code 
assigned to them by the organization. They might also have a social secu- 
rity number, a driver's license number, etc. The employee's first and last 
names are non-unique identifiers. Thus, to record these various identify- 
ing references, we might introduce character strings as a different type 
of individual, serving to distinguish the labels used externally from the 
internal logical name. For example, 
LAST-NAME(JOHN, "SMITH"). 
indicate that for the individual known internally as JOHN, external labels 
for this individual are bis social security number, 521-37-5126, and last 
name, SMITH. Again, this is more a syntactic convenience thsn an onto- 
logical issue. The role of character strings in t h s  case is simply to medi- 
ate between internal and external naming schemes. 
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H. INTENSIONAL EXTITIES 
There is one other body of work that should be mentioned in thls 
connection - so-called 'Montague semantics', after the original work of 
Richard Montague (see for example, Thomason, 1981, Dowty, et. al., 1981). 
Ths work has become of great interest in linguistics as promising a 
mathematically tractable theory of natural language semantics (thus 
complementary to the formal syntactic theories of Chomsky, etc.). Mon- 
tague, a one time student of Tarski, attempts to provide a model 
theoretic explanation of r e a s o w  in natural language discourse. 
Of particular interest to Montague are inferences relating to so- 
called intensional contexts* including aspects of belief, expectation, 
intention, etc. For instance, from "John believes the world is flat" we do 
not infer that the world is flat. More subtle cases also arise, tor example 
"the temperature is 90 and rising" does not entail that the number 90 is 
rising. 
These problems often seem rather esoteric to non-lmguists. One 
aspect however has bearlng on the issue of database ontologies. Thls is 
Montague's conception of intensional entities. It often happens in ordi- 
nary language that we speak of properties, such as red, as i f  they were 
entities in their own right, e.g., 'Red is my favorite color.' 
Th.~s cannot be waved aside as a matter of ontological choice since 
people tend to mix these references in the same discourse - e.g., when 
shopplng for a dress or a shirt one regards color as a property of these 
objects, but also expresses preferences for colors independently of the 
* note the two spelliqs: 'inten8ia1 vs 'intention'. 
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objects that have these colors. 
The essence of a property, e.g., redness, has historically been 
termed its intension, as opposed to the eztatsion of the property, which 
is the set  of objects for which the property holds. (The historical develop- 
ment of t h s  distinction is due mainly to Carnap; see for example Hin- 
takka, 1975.) Montague, in observing how we apparently reify properties 
to the status of entities, wanted a mechanism to make these intensional 
aspects extensional. 
Earlier, (in a footnote) we mentioned Church's lambda operator as a 
device that mapped a predicate to the set of entities in the domain D that 
it satisfies. For example, 
denotes the subset of red objects in D. This however refers only to' the 
current population of red objects and is insufficient to explain 'redness' 
in the abstract. Montague's claim was that the intension of a property is 
its extension not only in the actual world but in all possible worlds at  all 
times. 
To express thls he proposed the intension operator, ! m e  effect of 
this (see Dowty, et. al., 1981, ch. 6) is to repeat the lambda abstraction 
not just on the domain D, but also across the domain of times and the 
domain of possible worlds. Hence, the expression 
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denotes the set of red objects in all possible worlds and times. 
Ths helps to clar~fy our think~ng about database ontologies. Even 
with a basic ontology of, say, physical objects, properties such as red can 
be regarded as entities by this semantic device. Indeed, t h s  is the sort of 
thing that seems to occur in many scientific discussions. For example, 
the farmer says, 'the cat is lazy,' referring to h s  particular cat. The biol- 
ogist says, 'the cat is warm-blooded', referring to an intensional concept 
of cat. 
On the other hand, whle the preceding explications of necessity and 
intensions offer a pristine, mathematical elegance, we are left with a cer- 
tain discomfort that reference to Infinite sets of possible worlds just will 
not sell very well in the earthy, mundane world of management. Much of 
the problem, it seems. has been waved away in the facile assumption of 
possible worlds. Bringing these back down to the ordinary reality where 
we actually live is the subject of the next chapter. 
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A REFERENCE 
I t  is not only with respect to databases that one can find &ssatisfac- 
tion with model theoretic semantics. There is also a movement within 
analytic philosophy to bring these semantic theories more into accord 
with the mundane mechanisms of language use. 'Rus movement focuses 
particularly on aspects of re fmmce ,  how a symbol is l~nked to its denota- 
tion. Tlus pertains both to the naming of individuals and the naming of 
classes. 
Of particular interest here are the categories we use for our every- 
day objects, so-called nutural kinds, such as lemon, bottle, chair. When 
examined through the pe~spective of model theoretic semantics 
described in the last chapter, the existence of such kinds is puzzhg. 
Thls puzzlement arise; largely as a result of adopting set theory as the 
principle device for explain~ng how real world objects are organized. 
The problem is essentially that any collection of objects can consti- 
tute a set - e.g., the set consisting of my toothbrush, the Eiffell Tower, 
and the planet Saturn. Given all the possible sets of things, why are 
some, e.g., lemons, chairs, given a special status and assigned a name? 
The problem becomes all the more complicated if the dimensions of time 
and possible worlds are added. (E.g.. an arbitrary set mght  then include 
hypothetical individuals such as Abraham h c o l n ' s  automobile, the 
present Kmg of France and the city of Atlantis). 
An early reply to this problem was that natural kmds were sets 
defined intensionally. That is, there were certain 'critical properties' that 
selected the members of these sets. An obvious problem with thls view is 
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that, from the standpoint of model theoretic semantics, this involves a 
circular. argument: One cannot explain properties by their set denota- 
tions and then turn around and explain the sets denoted by their inten- 
sional properties. However, this merely casts doubt on the denotational 
approach to semantics and suggests that perhaps intensions should be 
taken as primary after all. 
However, the criterial properties approach also quickly runs into dif- 
ficulties. Consider the concept of a chair. What are its criterial proper- 
ties? 
a. that it has four legs? No, there are chairs without four legs. 
b. that it has a horizontal surface and a vertical back? No, for 
instance a bean bag chair has neither of these. 
c. that it is somet-. to sit on? We can sit on many t-s that 
aren't chairs. 
'Rm view is conjunctive - it requires that each element of the intended 
set satisfy the several criterial properties simultaneously. 
An alternative view is disjunctive: that there are no single properties 
that run throughout the set  of thmgs we call chairs, but it is rather the 
disjunction of several properties that define this set. For example, a 
chair is: 
four-legged o r  
has vertical and horizontal surfaces, or 
is used to sit on, etc. 
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The problem here is that it tends to include too many things -e.g., tables 
would count as c h r s  by t b s  definition. Wittgenstein (1953/1958) is a 
classic philosophical discussion of the shortcomings of the criteria1 pro- 
perties (or essentialist) view of semantics. 
More recently, attempts have been made to get around this problem 
by saying that the denotation of natural kind types of predicates is a 
fuzzy set. Without debating the adequacy of fuzzy set theory, we observe 
merely that t b s  misses the basic point. The problem is not whether the 
boundaries of these sets are sharp or fuzzy, but rather why they are 
selected and named in the first place. 
Providing more pragmahc motivations for these sorts of semantic 
issues, Kent (1978) cites numerous examples arising in data processing 
applications. Far exampie, consider the natural kind, street: 
What is one street? Sometimes the name changes; that is, dif- 
ferent segments alodg the same straight path have different 
names. Based on a comparison of addresses, we would probably 
surmise that people on those various segments lived on different 
streets. On the other hand, different streets in the same town 
may have the same name. Now what does an address com- 
parison imply? 
Sometimes a street is made up of discontinuous segments, 
perhaps because intervening sections just haven't been built 
yet. They may not even be on a straight h e ,  because the ulti- 
mate street on somebody's master plan curves and wiggles all 
around. And sometimes I can make a right turn, then after 
some distance make a left turn an be back on a street with the 
same name as the first. Is that one street with a jog? When do 
we start thdu.ng of these as different streets having the same 
name? 
Problems of t b s  sort have recently come to focus in the works of 
such philosophers as Kripke (1971, 1972) and Putnam (1970, 1978) 
Schwartz (1977), a collected edition on t h s  subject, dubs it 'the new 
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theory of reference'. 
The discussion in this chapter will therefore focus initially on indivi- 
duals and the epistemic aspects of proper names. Buildmg on that, the 
recognition and narnlng of natural kinds is considered. These depend on 
social conventions that, particularly for economic goods, change over 
time. Social movements and economic innovation are reflected in hguis -  
tic changes. Organizational adaptation likewise depends on linguistic 
evolvability. Structured information systems, relying on a fixed, stable 
semantics, constrain this evolution. 
In the last chapter, ontology was discussed as the choice of the 
domain of individuals, D. The elements of this set are called simply indivi- 
duals. In database management, the term 'entity' is more frequently 
used, but this has the drawback that it tends toward a certain contusion 
between a particular entity or the generic class (e.g., EMPLOYEE as an 
entity). 
Understanding natural kinds, it turns out, depends on understandmg 
the conventions for recognizing and naming the individual entities 
included in the land. The recognition of a single individual is called indi- 
M i o n .  This has a static and dynamic aspect: recognizing the indivi- 
dual a t  a point in time, and recognizing that individual as it undergoes 
change. The importance of individuation is that i t  is the criteria by which 
we assign names or identiiiers to an individual. To use a name (in a for- 
mal language or a database) presupposes that all of the users of the 
language/database agree on the object desgnated by that name. Thus, 
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the problem of individuation has its dual in the problem of sameness. If a 
and b are names, a = b asserts that these name the same object* 
A thorough study of the various aspects of individuation is Strawson 
(1959). He claims that our basic criteria for individuation is the object's 
location in a spatial/temporal framework. Hence, the objects easiest to 
individuate with reasonable consensus are e.g.. physical objects and 
events somehow related to physical objects. 'Rus is a very important 
observation since it gives us some insight into areas where individuation 
is likely to be difficult, namely abstract objects not involvmg space/time 
locatability . 
Consider for example Beethoven's 5th Symphony. What is the deslg- 
nation of this term? Is it the event of Beethoven's composing t h s  piece? 
Is it the paper it was 01-lginally written on? Is it the collection of all paper 
reproductions, etc. of this original? Is  it .a musical performance of this 
piece? Is it all musical performances, past and future of t h s  piece? We 
would like to say that it is none of these. Beethoven's 5th Symphony is an 
idea, and these examples are all mere conveyances of this idea. 
A more modern example, coming into increasing economic impor 
tame is the individuation of computer programs. Like the symphony, 
computer programs have static representations on disk, in core, etc. as 
well as performances -in the execution of the program. Yet, again we 
would like to claim that the computer program is actually an idea. 
Two samenesr problems are sometimes -uished: sameness of individuals w sameness 
of kind. For example, "John and Bill drive the same cai' may mean they drive the same par- 
kcular car, or that they each drive distinct cars that are of the same type (satisfy the same 
predioates). Lnsofar as the extension of a predicate is a set of individuals, sameness of kind 
also relies on individuation. 
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Consider the problem of software theft. Typically when something is 
stolen, the owner suffers its loss. In the case of stolen software, however, 
the owner often can't even detect the loss. Theft is probably the wrong 
word here -it is actually more Like plagiarism. However, the point is the 
same: if we want to talk about particular symphonies or computer pro- 
grams, it i s  very hard to do so without relating them somehow to a 
spatio-temporal framework. 
C. SPATIAL EXTENT OF INDMDUALS 
The world, says Quine (1964:4), consists of middle-sized objects. This 
is certainly true of the individuals typically identified in databases. One 
aspect of this problem relates to parts decompositions. For instance, a 
car consists of a body, motor, tires, etc. The motor in turn consists of 
engine block, crankshaft, pistons, carburetor, etc. The carburetor in 
turn consists of valves, etc. In this example, each of the parts is detach- 
able and replaceable in the whole. This is generally the basis for our 
interest in parts in the context of database applications (though one may 
equally well talk about non-detachable parts -e.g. the front of a house). 
If sets are used as the basic construct for organizing reality in these 
cases, one encounters what seem to be unnecessary complications - 
e.g., regarding a car as a third order set. A useful approach to this prob- 
lem is provided by Goodman (1951/1977) in his calcuius of individuals 
(sometimes called part /whole  theory). The basic idea here is to discard 
the set  theoretic distinction between 'element-of' and 'subsat-of' and 
replace them by the single predicate. 'part-of.' In this view, collections of 
individuals simply constitute another first order individual. This concept 
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of individual, to Goodman, is intended to be equally general as the con- 
cept of a set. For example, the collection of all people, past and future, 
can be regarded as a single individual. 
It is debatable whether part/whole theory has advantages over set 
theory generally (e.g. as an alternative basis for mathematics). However 
in certain contexts, Like those just mentioned, it seems to correspond 
much more closely to our intuitions. 
Another problem with spatial extent involves tiny objects that are too 
numerous or too cheap to bother naming individually. Examples are 
grains of all types, nails, light bulbs, etc. Here, the individuating device is 
typically a container - e.g. a box, inventory bin, whose collective contents 
are big and/or valuable enough to name individually. Similar comments 
apply to Liquids. 
D. TEMPORAL EXTENT OF INDrYlDUAIS 
Even when an object can be individuated spatially, its individuation 
across time is sometimes problematic. A classic example in philosophy is 
the so-called boat of Theseus. Imagine a wooden boat. We replace a plank 
of the boat, setting the old plank aside. Is it the same boat? We replace 
other planks, one by one, until all the planks have been replaced. Is it 
st~U the same boat? If not, whlch replacement caused it to be a different 
boat? But now, we take the planks we have set aside and build a new boat. 
Is this not the original boat since it is composed of all and only those 
parts in the original? (To aggravate the argument, we can iterate t h s  
process to create an entire navy of apparently identical boats.) 
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Many other examples can be found from database applications, e.g. 
replacement of parts, phases of manufacture, remodehug of buildmgs, 
reorganizations, mergers of corporations. In many of these cases, there 
eeems to be no essential criterion that determines the temporal extent of 
the entity*. 
Fortunately, the problem for databases does not depend on an abso- 
lute answer, only on a consensual one. The important issue is the 
correspondence between the name we have for the individual as it under- 
goes transformations throughout time. In particular, if we have an indivi- 
dual which today we name X, how will we recognize that individual tomor- 
row? 
In the case of (middle-sized) physical objects, the problem is often 
resolved by imprinting or tagging the individual with an identification 
number, e.g., serial numbers on vehicles, inventory codes on office equip- 
ment, room numbers, street addresses or buildtngs. 
In the case of persons, the continuity of naming is generally main- 
tained in the person's own memory. For example, a baby is named 'John 
Doe' by hls parents. In his baby years he learns that name as his designa- 
tor. As an adult, when I first meet him, he tells me, 'Uy name is John 
Doe". When he phones me a month later he says, "Hello, thls is John Doe", 
and so on. 
Note: living things seem to be the one major exception here. We take the ongoing process 
of life to mark the continuity of the individual, even though, like the boat, all of its cells rrlay 
eventually be replaced. However, even here difficulties are beginning to arise, particularly 
xurrouading the morality of abortion. Does the human individual begin at conception or at 
birth? 
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People can change their names. They typically provide the con- 
tinuity of identification by t e l h  you - e.g., "My name is Mary Doe - I 
used to be Mary Adams before I was married". 
There are, generally spealang, social incentives for a person to con- 
sistently report his name through time. It is principally through t h s  con- 
vention that the person is known to the various social institutions. Also, 
because of the dependence on this convention, criminals can sometimes 
'change their identity' by altering their physical appearance, but most 
importantly, by reporting a different name when asked. 
For data processing efficiency, and to avoid the problems where ordi- 
nary names are accidentally duplicated, organizations often provide their 
employees, clients, etc. with identifymg codes - e.g., .an employee 
number, social security number. Normally, these identlfylng codes are 
connected to the individual in a way similar to ordinary names, i.e., the 
person consistently reports the same code. 
In other cases, where there might be incentives for mis-reporting, a 
further device is required to perpetuate the association of the code with 
the individual. A common example currently is credit cards. Here the 
perpetuating device is the physical possession of the card. 
A macabre example from the past was in concentration camps. Pris- 
oners were physically tattooed with their identification number. Not only 
&d this prevent them from misrepresenting their identity, they could 
also be identified after death. 
In the philosophcal literature, these social mechanisms by whch a 
name continues to be associated with the thing it designates are called 
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'causal chains.' These have been used to explain philosophcal puzzles in 
such sentences as: 
'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' 
'The Morning Star is the Evening Star.' 
Normally if two names uniquely designate a common object, they should 
be interchangeable in any context. If that were true, the above sentences 
would be tautologies. The fact that they indeed convey. information is a 
result of having different causal chains associating each name with its 
referent. 
Our acquaintance with a particulv individual is typically not contmu- 
ous across time. We see a friend one day, again a week later, etc. 
Further, the sense data we have of that person is often incomplete and 
U h l y  varied -we see the person with different dress, in different lights, 
different angles, distances, etc. That is, our sense data of that person 
amounts to sahplmgs of different aspects of hs /her  physipal appear- 
ance, voice, manners, etc. However, we need very little of this data to 
l d e r  the continuity of that person through time. Lacking anything else, 
the consistent reporting of a name is often sufficient evidence for us 
especially if 'we' are an organization or Institution. A college story goes 
that a fraternity enrolled their mascot dog in the university, put- his 
name on exams, etc., until he was tinally graduated with a bachelor's 
degree. The story may be false, but it makes the point: an institution's 
acquaintance to individuals is based heavily on the reporting of names. 
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E. NATURALKINDS 
The preceding explication of identity assertions perhaps does not 
seem very surprising to anyone ex;?erienced in data processing. For 
example, the assertion, 
CUSTOMER #12 = SUPPLIER #57 
connects the causal chains between the way we learn about customers 
and the way we learn about suppliers. 
What may seem surprising is that this same mechanism of causal 
chains is used to explain the naming not only of inhviduals, but also of 
natural kinds. Earlier in the discussion of Goodman's calculus of individu- 
als, we observed that a set of objects could alternatively be viewed as 
another (collective) individual. m s  should not seem very surprising - 
e.g., we often regard football teams, departments, or forests as individu- 
als composed of other individuals. 
Now consider the case with water. Normally we do not deal with 
water individuals a t  the molecular level, but rather with water indivi- 
duated in collective units or containers, e.g., water droplets, a cup of 
water, a puddle of water, a lake, an ocean. Mentally, we can easily con- 
ceive of emptylng smaller containers into larger ones to form a larger 
water individual. Now if we consider that most of the oceans and seas are 
interconnected, we can fairly easily come to imagine the world as a very 
large water container. Further, our concept of the water it contains is a 
fairly permanent one. We think of the water in the world as going through 
various transformations (snow, ice, vapor, steam), but its sum total on 
the planet is basically fixed through time (ignoring molecular 
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transformations). Is there then a sharp difference between a water indi- 
vidual and the natural kind, water? One might object that the. kind, 
water, would also include water on other planets, etc. However, that only 
requires us to imagine a larger water container. 
At the close of the last section, it was noted that we come to know 
the features of an individual (person, etc.) through a series of occasional 
glimpses, each conveying certain aspects of that individual. However, 
where our own sense impressions are not sufficient for us to formulate a 
(spatially/temporally) cohesive image, we rely heavily on the social con- 
ventions (causal chains) by which proper names are conveyed as the basis 
for our knowledge of the individual. 
The new theory of reference argues that our knowledge of natural 
kinds has a similar basis. We encounter individuals of a natural kind, e.g . , 
lemons, as glimpses or aspects of the entire kind. However, the 
knowledge we obtain by this direct experience would not, in general, suf- 
fice for us to know the absolute extent of the kind and/or distinguish its 
criteria1 properties. 
How many people can distinguish a lemon from a yellow lime? Con- 
trariwise, there are some green lemons growing in Brazil. Unless told 
otherwise, most people, even after detailed inspection, would probably 
mis-jdentify these as Limes that simply have a somewhat different taste. 
If I go to the store to buy lemons I rely heavily on their being labeled 
as such. On the other hand, even when the lemons aren't labeled. I usu- 
ally get it right since it's the only small yellow object in the fruit section 
(since yellow limes and green lemons are rarely sold). Here I am using 
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one of the characteristic (but not criterial) properties of lemons to select 
it from a limited range of alternatives. Further, the limitation to a few 
alternatives has been socially determined by the institution of super- 
market, and the fruit section. I might not be so successful in the open 
jungle. 
Putnam suggests that semantics, ultimately, depends on socio- 
linguistic considerations. In particular, the references of natural kind 
terms are seldom completely understood by people individually, but 
rather as a cooperative effort. He proposes a 
Hypothes is  of the  V h w e r s a l i t y  of the Division of Linguist ic  
Labor: Every linguistic community exemplifies the sort of divi- 
sion of linguistic labor just described; that is, it possesses at  
least some terms whose associated 'criteria' are known only to a 
subset of the speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by 
the other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation 
between them and che speakers in the relevant subsets. 
... We may summarize this discussion by pointing out that there 
are two sorts of tools in the world: ... there are tools like a ham- 
mer or screwdriver which can be used by one person; and there 
are tools like a steamship which require the cooperative activity 
of a number of persons to use. Words have been thought of too 
much on the model of the first sort of tool. [Putnam, 
1970 / 1977: 126-1 271 
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F. NATURAL VS SOCIAL KLNDS IN ORGANIZATIONAL VOCABULARY 
In the philosophical literature, the term 'natural kinds' is used to 
indicate the (referents of) a wide range of natural language substantives, 
e.g., water, lemon, chair, house. Quine (1969) points out that for some 
natural kinds, e.g., water, lemons, there exists a scientifically accepted 
procedure of identification. For instance, chemistry defines water as the 
molecular compound H20, botany (I think) has a criteria1 definition for 
lemons or a t  least for lemon trees. 
I t  is generally recognized that scientific explanation is ultimately a 
matter of social convention that changes as new theories are proposed 
(Kuhn 1862). We no longer accept the 'ether' as the basic substance of 
the universe. Likewise, it's conceivable (though not likely) that the scien- 
tific conception of water might change with further discoveries in particle 
physics. 
But scientific explanation is a unique type of social convention in 
that it is authoritatwe. What science accepts, the world accepts. H20 is 
accepted as the definition of water because chemistry says so. Our infor- 
mal conception of water includes water plus other impurities, though if 
disagreements arise, we generally accept the chemistry explanation as 
the criteria1 definition of 'pure' water. 
This is not to say that all people who use the term 'water' understand 
its chemistry. Obviously, only a few do. Rather the semantics of this 
term rely on a social cooperation that leads ultimately to certain scientu- 
ically qualified individuals. A similar semantic cooperation exists in the 
common understanding of 'lemon,' which leads backwards from consu- 
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mer, to supermarket, to farmer, to botanist. 
The above remarks need quahfication. Not all scientific paradigms 
are international in scope. Physics is, economics isn't. Further, even 
within a given society, the various scieatific disciplines have differing 
epistemological status. For example, physics and chemistry seem to 
have more social credibility than psychology and sociology. This has 
important linguistic consequences for without this credibility our infor- 
mal usage of terminology can have a different denotation than the scien- 
tific usage. For example, we accept as (pure) water exactly that which a 
chemist analyzes as HzO However, we do not for instance accept the 
meaning of 'anxiety' as what psychometrics measures using Galvanic s h n  
response. 
Very roughly, there seems to be an hierarchy of epistemological con- 
fidence w i t h  the physical sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, astronomy) 
in uppermost status followed by the biological sciences (biology, botany, 
medicine), followed perhaps by psychology and then the social sciences 
(sociology, economics, political science). 
The difiiculty (Thom 1975, Berlinski 1976) is in the structural stabil- 
ity that can be assumed of the phenomena under study. We are comfort- 
able with the assumption that physical phenomena are time/space invari- 
ant. Water is water whether on earth or on moon, in the eons past or 
those to come. Biological sciences have to consider evolutionary factors: 
fruit flies vary from one continent to another, bacterial diseases can 
evolve in a matter of months. The social sciences have an ever weaker 
claim to structural stability. Culture and social organizations obviously 
have enormous geographic and temporal variation. Psychology, 
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acknowledging the effect of social context, suffers similar epistemological 
uncertainties. Indeed, even the presumed constancy of cerebral speciali- 
zation may be culturally dependent (Sibatani 1980). 
The importance cf these observations here is in their linguistic 
consequences. The semantics of a given term is clearly a matter of social 
convention. However, that doesn't take us very far unless we can get 
some insight into the relevant socio-linguistic mechanisms. One of these 
mechanisms is the authority granted to scientific theories as defining the 
referents to certain of our terms. 
As was suggested, the semantic problems of database translation and 
the verification of inference are Likely to be least difficult for predicate 
terms that have a basis in the natural (physical, biological) sciences. 
More semantic instability is to be expected for t,erms sigdying social 
. . 
artifacts. Consider again the term 'chair'. It seems doubtful that there 
can ever be a scientific explanation for this concept. Indeed, there are 
furniture design companies whose marketing strategy is to change our 
current conception of this term. 
With respect to organizational databases, the vocabulary we are con- 
cerned about might relate to any of the scientific areas just mentioned. 
For example, databases relating to engineermg, production or inventories 
may include terms based in chemistry (e.g., petroleum derivatives), phy- 
sics (e.g., electronics engineering), and botany (e.g., agricultural inven- 
tories). 
With respect to the vocabulary originating in these scientific discip- 
lines, there is fairly wide semantic consensus and stability. The rate of 
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linguistic change is likely to be slow relative to the time frame of the 
organization. Then consider the terminology relating to technological 
applications. In these areas the rate of hguistic change is much more 
rapid. It is, nonetheless, a fairly organized evolution. For example, trade 
journals and industry wide meetings and exhibitions help to standardize 
usage. To enable compatibility between products and processes, industry 
standards are eventually developed. This too helps to standardize usage. 
However, a great deal of the vocabulary in organizational databases 
relates to socially defined phenomena. The relevant factor here is the 
social scope of the organization's interactions. An example is the rela- 
tionship 'marriage.' In most cases, t h s  can be accepted as a stable con- 
cept, relative to the interests of the organization. In other cases, e.g., the 
census bureau or crosa-cultural organizations, Linguistic variations have 
to be considered. 
A more fundamental point is that the organization itself defines a 
social context and creates its own social artifacts. Prominent among 
these is its product offering, which, to be successful, is intentionally dif- 
ferentiated from related products in the marketplace. This product 
offering is furthermore dynamic, the effect of product development and 
marketmg efforts. While the attendant lmguistic change is managed 
within the organization, serious difficulties arise for e.g., regulatory, taxa- 
tion, and consumer protection agencies. 
The structure of the orgmzation is itself a social artifact. Ths 
includes the identification of organizational substructures (divisions, 
departments, committees), organizational roles (manager, clerk), pro- 
cedures., rules, standard documents, etc. These are described in a rich, 
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locally defined, organizational vocabulary 
As the organizational structure and processes evolve in response to 
changes in the environment, t h s  vocabulary must correspondingly 
evolve. If this vocabulary is used only for informal communications within 
the organization, this evolution continues naturally. However, as more 
and more of t h s  vocabulary becomes embedded in the organization's 
structured intormation system, this linguistic evolution, hence the 
organization's adaptability, becomes restrained. 
The ditiiculty follows from the remarks on the semantics of formal 
languages made in the last chapter. The design of a formal language 
depends on Frege's 'Principle of Compositionality'. That is, the semantics 
of a compound expression are constructed from the semantics of its syn- 
tactic constituents., Database queries and higher level inferences depend 
on this consistency for their validity. If the assumption of semantic sta- 
bility is removed, the deductions provided by the information system can 
no longer be trusted. This issue 'is re-considered in the final chapter. 
This  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared under t h e  t i t l e  "Modelling 
f o r  Management" f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  a  Nate r  Research Cent re  
(U.K. ) Conference on "River  P o l l u t i o n  Con t ro l " ,  Oxford, 
9 - 1 1  A s r i l ,  1979. 
CHAlTEX 5: THE SEXANTICS OF 
CONTENTS 
A. NUMBERS IN DATABASES 
B. MEASUREMENT THEORY 
C. MEASUREMENT SEMANTICS 
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A NUMBEX? IN Dk';1ABASF.S 
A large part of administrative data is numeric. Numbers differ from 
other types of data (e.g., character strings) in that we can perform arith- 
metic on them. Who says? On what basis do certain numbers convert 
into others (using e.g., ad&tion, subtraction) with the supposition that 
these new numbers are meaningful? Thls is essentially the same type of 
question we have been asking with regard to the names of individuals and 
properties: what are the semantics of our use and manipulation of 
numbers? 
The interface between mathematics and reality is measurement .  
Whereas a central issue in our &scussion of individuals and natural hnds 
was equdi ty  (identity), the basic relationship reflected in numeric meas- 
urement is ordm or magnitude. An orderlug relationshp is any that can 
be described using the terms 'greater than,' 'less than,' and as well, 
'equal to.' Examples &e 'longer than,' 'heavier than,' 'more intelligent 
than,' 'prettier than,' etc. The objective of measurement is to translate 
these real world (empirical, observed) relationshps into mathematical 
relationships that can be manipulated arithmetically. 
The problem can be stated mathematically as establishmg a 
correspondence between two systems of relationshps, or re la t iona l  sys- 
tems, one applying to real world objects, the other to numbers. 'Rus is 
the subject of the emergent field of rneasu7-ement theory*, which is now 
briefly described. 
* Not to be confused with mncuws throw, a topic in abstract a e b r a .  Background r e f e ~  
ences in measurement theory are Ellis (lQM), Krantz, et. al. (lQ?l), Adams (1 WQ), Roberts 
(lQ79), Ghiselli, e+ al., (1981). 
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B. YEASURZ;=EiTWT THEORY 
Measurement theory is based on the theory of relations, which in 
turn is based on set theory. Suppose A,, . . . ,A, are sets. The Cartesian 
product 
is the set of all ordered n-tuples (al ,  a2, .... %) such that al E Al, a2 E 
A2, ...,a, E A,. The notation An denotes the Cartesian product of A with 
itself n times. An n- ary relation on the set A is a subset of An. The 
number n is called the arity of the relation. A binary relation is thus a 
subset of A x A, i.e., with an arity of 2. . 
Recall from the discussion on model theory in chapter [3] that a one 
place predicate denoted a subset of D, whereas a two place predicate 
denoted a binary relation on D, an n-place predicate denoted an n-ary 
relation on D. While, in the language, these are all represented as predi- 
cates, the difference between one and many place predicates is substan- 
tial from an inferential standpoint. The deductions one makes from the 
manipulation of simple subsets tend to be fairly obvious. However, the 
interplay between relations becomes increasingly more complicated as 
the arity increases. Even the characteristics of binary relations can be 
quite varied, as shown in TaMe45.11. 
Orders are special types of binary relations. Various types of orders 
can be defined, depending on their relational characteristics. See Table 
[5.2]. 
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A Binary Relation (A, R) Is: 
Reflexive 
Nonreflexive 
Irref lexive 
Symmetric 
Nonsymmetric 
Asymmetric 
Antisymnietric 
Transitive 
Nontransitive 
Negatively transitive 
Strongly complete 
Complete 
Equivalence relation 
Provided That: 
aRa, for all a E A 
it is not reflexive 
"aRa, for all a E A 
a R b  4 bRa ,  for all a, b E A 
it is not symmetric 
a R b  -+ "bRa,  for all a, b E A 
a R b  & bRa  4 a = b,  for all a, b € A  
a R b  & bRc -4 aRc ,  for all a,  b ,  c E A 
it is not transitive 
"aRb & bRc "aRc, for all a,  b ,  c E A; 
for a l l a ,  b € A ,  aRb  or b R a  
for all a # b E A, aRb  or b R a  
it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive 
Table [5 .1] .  Properties of Relations (from Roberts, 1979:lS) 
Property 
Relation Type 
Strict Strict Strict 
Quasi Weak Simple Simple Weak Partial Partial 
Order Order Order Order Order Order Order 
Reflexive X X 
Symmetric 
Tr ansitwe X X X X X X 
Asymmetric X X X 
Antisymmetric X X 
Negatively transitive X 
Strongly complete X X 
Complete X 
Table [5 .2] .  Order Relations (from Roberts. 1979: 15) 
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Relations may be defined eztensionally, by listlng each of its n- 
tuples, or intensionally, by indicatq an n-place predicate that selects 
the n-tuples. The'latter method obviously requires the specification of 
the domain, called its underlying set, to determine its extension. For 
example, (Roberts 1979: 16) let A be the set of all people in the world, and 
B be the set of all males in the world. Then. 
R = 1 (x, y) E A x A: BROTHER(x, y) j 
is different from 
For instance R' is symmetric whereas R is not. 
In some discussions, the term 'relation' is used to indicate the inten- 
sional predicate used to define it. The term 'relational system' is then 
used to indicate a relation in the extensional sense, and it is designated 
as a pair (A,R), where A is the underlying set and R is the dehmg predi- 
cate. 
Af inc t ia  is of course a special type of relation, typically expressed 
as an (n+ 1)ary relation, denoted f:An+A such that 
Functions of the form f:AxA-*A are called b i n a y  qperafiuns, or just 
operafiaLs. A relational system can be more generally defined as a set 
with various binary or lugher arity relations (predicates) and operations 
(functions) defined over it. 1l there are p such relations and q operations, 
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the relational system is a p+q- 1 tuple: 
The type of a relational system is a sequence (rl,rz, . . . ,rp.q) where ri is 
the arity of Ri (i.e., ri = m if Ri is m-ary). 
For example, consider the measurement of mass. Let A be a set of 
discrete objects whose mass we want to measure. Let H be a relation on 
A, where H(x,y) indicates that x is heavier than y. Let $ be an operation 
on A that yields the logical sum of two objects in A, e.g., x $ y = z. This is 
summation in the sense of Goodman's calculus of individuals where z is a 
third indmidual that has x and y as parts (though possibly geographically 
separated). Then (A,H,$) form a relational system of types (2,l). Note 
that t h s  is a relational system defined over physical objects. 
Consider the relational system RS = (Re.>,+). This is a numerical 
relational system, where Re is the set of real numbers, > is the numerical 
ordering relationship, and + is arithmetic addition. 
As indicated earlier, the goal in measurement theory is to examine 
the correspondence between relational systems defined on real world 
phenomena such as (A, H, @) and numerical relational systems like 
(Re,>,+) for the real numbers. A mapping f from one relational system 
(RSo) to another (RSl) which preserves all the relations and operations of 
the first system is called a homomorphism. More precisely, let 
RSA = (A,Rl,R2. . . . . Rp,0,,02. . . . , oq) 
RSB = (B,R11,R2', . . . , Rp', ol', 02', . . . , o ~ ' ) ,  
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and we assume RSA and RSB are of the same type. A function f:A--rB is a 
homomorphism from RSA into RSB if for all al, a2, . . . , +,€A 
Ri(al,a2. . . . , prr,) - Rl1[f(al).f(aZ),.. ,f(+,)], i=1,2 ..... p 
and for all a,b E A 
In general, a fundamental meaSIL~ernenf is recognized as a 
homomorphism from a real world (observed, empirical) relational system 
to some specified numerical relational system. This is distinguished from 
derived r n e u s u ~ d s ,  which are computations based on fundamental 
measurements. (Table [5.4], for example, lists 63 derived measurements 
common in the physical sciences, and the six fundamental measurements 
on which they are based.) A fundamental measurement is M y  described 
as the triple (RSo,RSl,f), called a scale. This functional characterization 
of measurement is a relatively recent innovation over more conventional 
views. Adams ([1979, p. 2101) remarks: 
I t  is important to stress to students unfamiliar with the modern 
jbzctiond representation of measurement that fundamental 
.measurement theory adopts this representation, and in so doing 
'paraphrases' or 'translates' more traditional metrical language 
which is still widely prevalent in the sciences) into unfamiliar 
and initially unintuitive forms. In particular, metrical data are 
traditionally reported in denominate number form, e.g. as 'x 
weighs 5 lbs' (where '5 lbs' is a denominate number distinct 
from the 'pure number' 5), whereas the functional representa- 
tion would paraphrase these reports into pure number form, e.g. 
as 'Ib(x) = 5', where lb(x) is the weightin-pounds function whose 
values are pure real numbers. In banishing denominate number 
ontological categories, the functional representation accom- 
plishes an atoLogicd T e d ~ c t h n  which is conceptually irnpor- 
taut. 
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Two basic issues that measurement theory investigates are the 
representation and uniqueness problems. 
The representation problem is the following: for a particular rela- 
tional system, RS1, what are the necessary and sufficient requirements of 
the real world system RSo, to guarantee the existence of a homomor- 
phism, f? These requirements are called the azioms of the representa- 
tion. Roberts comments: 
The axioms for a representation give conditions under whch 
measurement can be performed. The axioms can be thought of 
as giving a foundation on which 'the process of measurement is 
based. In a less global sense, the axioms can also be thought of 
as conditions that must be satisfied in order for us to organize 
data in a certain way. In any case, it is important to be able to 
state such foundational axioms, at  least tor measurement in the 
social sciences. For we must know under what circumstances 
certain kinds of scales of measurement can be produced. In the 
physical sciences, the situation is different. We by now have 
well-developed scales of measurement, and writing down a 
representation theorem for these scales is often more a theoret- 
ical exercise than a significant practical development. (Roberts 
197955) 
The other basic issue of measurement theory pertains to the unique- 
ness  of the homomorphism f .  Suppose f is one homomorphism from a 
relational system RSA into a relational system RSB, and suppose A is the 
set underlying RSA, and B underlies RSB. Hence f:A-dB. Also suppose 9 to 
be another function mapping the range of f ,  i.e., the set 
into the set B. Hence @:B-+B. Thus the composition @(f(A)) is a function 
mapping A into B into B.. If @(f(A)) is also a homomorphism from RSo into 
RS1, then @ is an admissible ktmsfcrrmution of scale.  It is the admissible 
transformations that distingish the various scale types, e.g. nominal, 
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ordinal, interval, ratio, absolute, as illustrated in Table [5.3]. Roberts 
( 1Q79:55) remarks: 
... a uniqueness theorem tells us what kind of scale f is, and 
gives rise to a theory of meaningfulness of statements involmng 
scales. In particular, a uniqueness theorem puts limitations on 
the mathematical manipulations that can be performed on the 
numbers arising as scale values. ... [One] can always perform 
mathematical operations on numbers (add them, average them, 
take logarithms etc.). However, the key question is whether, 
after having performed such operations, one can still deduce 
true (or better, meaningful) statements about the objects being 
measured. 
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Admissible Transformations Scale Type Example 
@(z) = z (identity) Absolute Counting 
@(z) = az, a > 0 Ratio Mass 
Similarity transformation Temperature on the 
Kelvin scale 
Time (intervals) 
Loudness (sones) 
Brightness (brils) 
@(z) = az + 8,  a > 0 
Positive linear 
transformation 
Interval Temperature 
(Fahrenheit, 
centgrade, etc.) 
Time (calendar) 
Intehgence tests, 
"standard scores"? 
z 2 y iff  @ (z) 2 @(y) Ordinal Preference? 
(Strictly) monotone Hardness 
increasing transformation Air quality 
Grades of leader 
lumber, wool, etc. 
Intelligence tests, 
raw scores 
Any one-to-one iP . Nominal Number uniforms 
Label alternative plans 
Curricular codes 
Table [5.3]. Some Common Scale Types (from Roberts, 19?9:64) 
The topic of measurement was introduced as the interface between 
mathematics and the world. Yet the theory of measurement, as sug- 
gested by the preceding sketch of its basic definitions and principles, is 
purely mathematical: it is the correspondence (functional mapping) 
between two relational, hence mathematical, systems. WMe the discus- 
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sion of measurement theory generally presumes that one of these rela- 
tional systems has an underlying set of real objects while the other 
underlying set is numbers, this is not required in its mathematical struc- 
ture. Both could be real objects or both could be numbers. Measurement 
theory only recognizes them as sets. Elaborating this point, Adams 
( 1970:211) remarks: 
several empirical systems associated with different types of fun- 
damental measurement are often supposed to be representable 
in the same numerical system, and in such circumstances fun- 
damental measurement theory commonly abstracts and consid- 
ers the axioms which any empirical system must satisfy in 
order to be representable in the given numerical system, 
independently of the particular characteristics of the systems 
being represented. ... This abstraction from the special charac- 
teristics of, say, length addition as against weight addition 
(which is u n . u n a t e  in soma ways in d ~ a h g  a t t m i b z  away 
j'rcr?n poteniially iwapottant ma t t e~s  of empirical detail) leads to 
what can by now be called the 'traditional' fundamental meas- 
urement categories: extensive, ordinal, interval, and so on, each 
of which is characterized by a particular numerical system in 
which varieties of empirical systems may be represented. 
Accepting this sort of abstraction, contributions to Rzndamental 
measurement theory commonly take the form of 'axiomatiza- 
tions of extensive (ordinal, interval, etc.) measurement', rather 
than of weight, or temperature, or time measurement, etc. 
[emphasis added]. 
Here some of the same disappointments as with model theory are 
encountered. Assuming these underlying sets to be well defined a 
seems to wave away the key issues: how do we go about defining these 
sets, relations and operations? Whereas measurement theory concerns 
itsell with mathematical requirements, here we are see- somethmg 
more, i.e.. an epistemology of measurement. It is this epistemological 
aspect that gives us more confidence in for example physical measure- 
ment as opposed to psychological measurement (hence more confidence 
in physics than psychology as sciences). 
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Following the line of inqury suggested by the 'new theory of refer- 
ence' as an epistemological extension to model theory, an analogous 
approach might be tried here. Central to the new theory of reference was 
the notion of 'causal chains,' explaining the social mechanisms for the 
propagation of names of inhviduals and natural kinds through a linguistic 
population, both geographically and temporally dispersed. Consider how 
the various measurement concepts are propagated. Krantz et al. 
( 1971:Ch. 10) identify six fundamental measures from which nearly all the 
physical attributes that have ratio scale measures can be derived as sim- 
ple monomials (see Table [5.4]). These are length, mass, time, tempera- 
ture, electric charge and plane angle. As they point out, each of these is 
defined in terms of some natural phenomena or some standard object. 
Length, for instanca, is measured in terms of a certain meter length 
rod in Paris. Reproductions of this rod, subject to certain quality control 
requirements, propagate the measure 'meter' throughout the culture. 
Similarly, the gradations on the rod convey the concept of millimeter, 
centimeter, etc. These gradations convey a concept of c m c a t m a t i a  of 
these smaller measures to the larger intervals. Length is measured by 
comparing an object to such reproductions of the standard rod. When the 
extent of the object is more than one rod, we can concatenate several 
such rods to form larger measures. Indeed, we may consider length to be 
defined by these operations. 
Concepts of mass and time, also involve some standard object -i.e., 
standard kilograms (etc.) and the standard interval of a certain pendu- 
lum in Washington, D.C. Here too there is an analogous concept of con- 
catenation: for instance. concatenation of two pendulum swings doubles 
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our measurement. 
Measured phenomena that include a concept of concatenation are 
called ez tahs ive  a t t r ibu tes .  They have the following properties (where x 
and y are objects, a and b are numbers): 
a) of ordering x R y - f(a) > f(b) 
b)ofadditivity f (xOy)=f (a )+f (b )  
The ordering relation, R, is assumed in all types of measurement. In the 
second additivity assumption, the concatenation operation, 0, has its 
counterpart in arithmetic addition. 
Phenomena where the concatenation operation may not be inter- 
preted as arithmetic addition are called in t ens ive  atb-ibutas. Examples 
are density and temperature. Here the arithmetic concept of additivity 
is constructed by means of a more complex experimental operation. 
This illustrates that the scale type employed is to a certain extent a 
matter of the state of scientific experimentation and Instrumentation. 
Roberts notes from Stevens (1959:124) in the case of temperature: early 
man probably only distinguished hot and cold. Later, comparative terms 
were probably introduced, e.g., hotter, colder. The invention of thermom- 
eters led to internal scales of temperature. Finally, the development of 
thermodynamics led to a ratio scale of temperature, the Kelvin scale. 
But, what is it that leads us to more epistemic confidence in, say, 
length measures than intehgence measures. If we can accept length to 
be defined operationally as what we measure with a meter stick, why are 
we less satisfied with the psychologists' explanation that 'intelhgence is 
w h a t  an IQ test measures'. The argument sometimes given is that 
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physical measures are 'tirne-space invariant' whereas e.g., psychological 
measures are not. But what is it that is supposed to be time-space invari- 
ant? If I measure Ronald Reagan's height in summer 1982 in Rome and 
you measure Ronald Reagan's height in Helsinki during winter 1984, the 
two measures would roughly agree, modulo random measurement error 
plus perhaps a minor downward bias due to the cold and the slouch of 
increased age. However, it instead of measuring height we gave RR an IQ 
test at each of these two places and times couldn't we also expect a rough 
accordance of results, modulo random error plus perhaps a minor down- 
ward bias due to aging? Why is it that we object to certain IQ tests havlng 
racial, cultural, etc. biases and hence not 'really' measuring intelhgence? 
Consider our measures of time. We have various objective measures 
based on our assumed regularity in the behavior of such objects as sundi- 
als, hour glasses, mechanical and d~gital clocks. Yet we also have a rub- 
jectwe sense of time that does not always accord with the objective one - 
e.g., 15 minutes in a dentist c h a r  may seem much longer than an hour at 
an exciting party. We seem to put more confidence in the objective meas- 
ure of time -why? 
What we call 'confidence' here appears to be more social pragma- 
tism. We need to coordinate temporally with other people, e.g., trains, 
buses, school and w0rkm.g hours, TV programs, doctor's appointments. 
We (apparently) have different subjective measures of time, so we need 
some non-human process that we can all agree on. Originally it was the 
passage of the sun in the sky, then a certain pendulum, now it's molecu- 
lar vibrations. However, in these cases it is not the fact that time is 
mechamcally computed that makes it objective, but rather that we have a 
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criterion of sameness (similarity) in the computation. When two bank 
robbers synchronize their watches, they don't so much care that they 
indicate the correct time as the same time. One could imagine a primi- 
tive, isolated, cloudy-skied village where one individual was selected as 
the official time maker: the pronouncements of his subjective sense of 
time passing would serve as the local standard. 
Note the similarities here with the social view of semantics developed 
in the last chapter. Whereas in medieval times everyone could individu- 
ally watch the sun and recognize for example Q h  noon, our current per- 
ceptions of time require a much richer complex of technology and scien- 
tific expertise. Like the way 1 understand the concept of 'lemon,' my 
understanding of time depends as well on social cooperation. That is, the 
basis of our objective agreement is no longer somethmg we all know 
directly (i.e., the sun), but somethmg we rely on other people (scientists, 
production engineers in the manufacture of watches) to know. 
, 
Similarly with other physical- measures such as length, mass and 
temperature, our concept of what these are has come to rely heavily if  
not entirely on scientific measurement as the definitional authority. For 
example, if we feel a chill but the weather broadcast announces 75°F (or 
20°C) we tend to doubt our health rather than the weather reporting sys- 
tem. That is, our internal or subjective sense of temperature doesn't 
count for much epistemologically in comparison to the external, objective 
measure. 
But the authority of a particular measurement standard relies also 
an its means of communication throughout the society. Thle depends on 
the technology for reproducing, operationally, similar imitations of the 
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original standard. If for example everyone's watch went arbitrarily faster 
or slower than the standard, these mechanical measurements would be 
no better than our subjective senses of time. 
But what about, for instance, intelhgence measures? Why do we have 
less epistemic confidence in these cases? Isn't it that our own subjective 
sense of intelhgence counts more heavily? For instance, we may have our 
own internal r h n g  of the intelligence of those we know. If we hear the 
IQ scores of those people, and they disagree strongly with our subjective 
measures, we in this case doubt the IQ test as a measure of intelligence. 
We can't doubt the weather bureau because the scientific measure of 
temperature is our concept of temperature. We accept science's au thor  
ity in defining the concept of temperature, and we have confidence in the 
technological reproduction of temperature measurement devices. The 
problem in social science measurement (psychometrics, sociometrics, 
econometrics) is that there are intuitive, subjective concepts of the attri- 
butes being measured, whch we take as epistemologically stronger than 
objective measures. Consider, for instance, psycho physics: objective 
measures such as perspiration are used as proxy measures for subjective 
states, e.g., anxiety. 
The problem in social science measurement is that we have two com- 
p e w  standards, what we have called subjective and objective. Since our 
subjective sense seems to us the more sound, we expect objective meas- 
ures to conform to it. In the case of physical measurement, we no longer 
attach t h ~  importance to subjective measures. Consider for example the 
lack of scientific interest in building a clock or a thermometer that meas- 
ured our subjective senses of time or temperature. 
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Tabfe [5.4]. Dimensions and Units of Physical Quantities. 
(from Krantz, e t  al. 1971:539-544) 
Exponents of 
Quality Q 0 M L T A  
Base qvantities 
Charge (electric) 
Temperature 
Mass 
Length 
Time 
Plane angle 
1 
Kinsmcrtic (L, T, A) quantities 
1 
C w a t u r e  
Wave number 
Angular acceleration 
Time constant 
Angular velocity 
Frequency 
Plane angle 
Solid angle 
Period 
Time 
Acceleration 
Acceleration of gravity 
Velocity, speed 
Velocity of light 
Wave length 
Length 
Diffusion coefficient 
Kinematic viscosity 
Area . 
Volume velocity 
Volume 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
Mechanical (M, L, T,  A) quant i t i e s  
1 
-2 
- 1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
Rotational compliance 
Rectilinear 
Specific refraction 
Acoustic capacitance 
Acoustic impedance 
Acoustic resistance 
Acoustic reactance 
Inert anc e 
Density 
1 
-1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
-4 
-3 
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Table [5.4] continued. 
Exponents of 
Quantity 
Energy density 
Pressure 
Stress 
Modules of elasticity 
(Young's) 
Bulk modules 
Tensile strength 
Shear modules 
Shear strength 
Viscosity 
Sound intensity 
Poynting vector 
Surface tension 
Mechanical rectilinear 
resistance 
Mass 
Force 
Momentum 
Impulse 
Radiation intensity 
Power 
Energy, work 
Quantity of heat 
Moment, torque 
Mechanical rotational 
resistance 
Action 
Angular momentum; 
moment of momentum 
Moment of inertia 
Thermal (D, M, L, T) quantities 
2 
-1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Heat capacity 
(mass) 
Heat capacity 
(volume) 
Thermal conductivity 
Entropy 
Molar gas constant 
Temperature gradient 
Temperature 
Q e M L T A  
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
1 
1 
1 2 - 3  
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 2  
- 1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
1 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-3 
-3 
-2 
-1 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-3 
-2 
-2 
-2 
1 
-1 
-1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
-1 
1 
2 
2 
-1 
-2 
-2 
-3 
-2 
-2 
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Table [5.4] continued. 
Exponents of 
Quantity Q 0 M L T  
Electrical and magnetic (Q, 
Perme ability 
Impedence (electric) 
Resistance (electric) 
Reactance (electric) 
Coefficient of inductance 
Perme ance 
Resistivity 
Magnetic induction; 
magnetic flux density 
Electric field intensity 
Vector potential 
Potential (electric) 
Electromotive force 
Magnetic flux 
Quantity of magnetism 
Flux linkage 
Magnetic moment 
Charge density 
(volume) 
Current density 
Pole density 
Electric displacement 
Polarization 
Magnetic field intensity 
Magnetization 
Sheet current density 
Linear charge density 
Current 
Magneto-motive force 
Charge 
Flux (electric) 
Pole strength 
Dipole moment 
Magnetic (dipole) 
moment 
Conductivity 
Permittivity 
Reluctance 
Admittance (electric) 
Conductance 
Susceptance 
Capacitance 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
M, L, 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-1 
- 1 
-1 
-1 
- 1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
T, A) quantitiss 
1 1  
2 
2 
2 
1 2  
1 2  
3 
1 1 2  
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
-3 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
1 
2 
-3 
-3 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 1 
-1 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
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Chapter 6 
k THE O B J E M S  OF A C Z O U h ? G  
Accounting has long been a major source of management mforma- 
tion. Indeed, it is often called the 'language of business'. The history of 
financial record keeping probably dates from the first uses of currency. 
Our 'modern' double entry system of accounting itself has a respectably 
long tradition. The first text on double-entry bookkeeping was published 
by Pacioli in 1494, though Mattessich points out that the Genoese were 
using a similar system as early as 1340. 
Ijiri (1975177) points out that "the basic double-entry scheme of 
bookkeepmg has remained unchanged over the past 500 years. Consider- 
ing the enormous changes in economic systems during these years, the 
stability of the double entry system is truly astonishmg." 
Recognizmg the phenomenological point that we tend to perceive the 
world through our representations of it, he points out that t h s  framework 
is largely responsible for our present conception of profit and indeed 
perhaps of capitalism itself. He quotes (1967:109) Sombart (1928): 
One can scarcely conceive of capitalism without double entry 
book-keeping: they are related as are form and content. It is 
dlificult to decide, however, whether in double-entry bookkeep- 
ing capitalism provided itself with a tool to make it more effec- 
tive, or whether capitalism derives from the 'spirit' of double- 
entry bookkeeping. 
Hence, simply by the weight of its historical acceptance, accounting 
is clearly more than an arbitrary choice for representing business 
activity. Yet, in recent years, this same tradition has been criticized by 
economics and other decision sciences as being overly dogmatic and ritu- 
alized, "based on empty identities, as being concerned with trivial prob- 
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lems, as propagating unscientific methods, as hampering progress in 
business administration and economics" (Mattessich 1964:104). 
Why should this long success suddenly come into doubt? There are 
several interrelated factors. Accounting's primary function traditionally 
has been a custodial one, based on a separation of capital ownership from 
the management of operations. This has two aspects 
a. documentation: maintaining detail records of each 
legal/ economic transaction 
b. evaluation: summarizing these transactions into an overall con- 
cept of wealth and profitability. 
Thus accounting's primary function, historically, has been reporting to 
external audiences having a financial claim on the firm: investors, 
lenders and tax agencies. For this reason, accounting standards are esta- 
blished by independent agencies (e.g. the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board in the US) and the organization's accounting reports prepared for 
these external parties are verified by externally certified public accoun- 
tants. 
Yet, apart from these external audiences, accounting is also the pri- 
mary information source for internal management. It is here, for pur- 
poses of managerial decision malung, that criticism has been sharpest. 
One line of criticism Ls that accountixq does not adequately dishnguish 
the needs of internal management from external investors. Hence inter- 
nal management reports tend to be more detailed variants of the exter- 
nal report~ng model. 
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The question, then, is why should management accept inadequate 
reporting given that they can direct resources to produce reports as they 
want them? The answer, probably, is that since external reports are the 
basis for evaluating the firm's performance, these measures become the 
proxy goals that management seeks to optimize. 
A t  present, a t  least in western countries, the principal external 
reports are the balance sheet, funds flow (sources and uses of funds), and 
income statement. For private firms, the income statement, particularly 
the profit calculation, receives the most attention, for this is regarded as 
the best index of the firm's progress. Thus, accounting has a central role 
in directing the efforts of private enterprise. 
A key requirement, from the investor standpoint, is the comparabil- 
i f y  of financial accounting reports between firms. Hence, there is strong 
pressure to develop a standardized structure in these reports. However, 
the advantage of any particular firm is Likely to be found in its differen- 
thtion from other firms. The knowledge or craft that a firm develops for 
its production and administration is called its technology (Woodward 
1978). The internal reporting of the firm needs to reflect this technology 
in the types of entities that are recognized, basic organizing concepts and 
types of measures. The correspondence between the U h l y  differen- 
tiated information of internal operations and the standardized structures 
required for external reporting present dialectical pulls on accounting 
theory and practice. 
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B. ACCOUNTING PKIhTCIPLES 
The objectives of accounting were summarized as twofold: custodial 
and decision oriented. This raises the issue of the form that accounting 
theory should take to support these objectives. 
For its custodial objectives, the emphasis is on verifiable evidence, 
protection from fraud, and the arbitration of potential conflict. Here the 
orientation is leg ahstic, stressing the detailed and organized recording of 
transactions with external parties (bookkeeping) and their verification 
and comparability (auditing). The concern is with the interpretation and 
objective summarization of past events. 
This leads to the development of reporting standards, so-called 'Gen- 
errally Accepted Accounting Principles'. The difficulty 1s to develop rules 
that present the wide variation of different organizations' activities in a 
uniform reporting structure. While it is the 'custodi'al function that is 
most hlghly developed in accounting, there is nonetheless dissatisfaction 
with current *%ory in this area. Chambers(1973:48) notes: 
There was a time when people debated the character of 
'accounting principles'. The debate was not particularly fruitful. 
It did not lead to a definite body of self-consistent rules. 
Grady's Inventory 01 Generally  Accepted Accowatzng A i n c i p l e s  
[ 19651 and exercises of a similar kind in other cow-tries have all 
left open a variety of optional methods of accounting for the 
aame kinds of assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses. The 
directors and managers of companies are free to choose, from 
the options, such particular rules as will serve their purposes. 
Companies have switched from FIFO to LIFO and back again, 
from straight-line to accelerated depreciation ancl back again. 
If there were a firm body of rules, switchmg of these and other 
kinds would long since have been outlawed. 
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The problem here, perhaps, is that increasing rates of technological 
change and innovation lead to increased variation in organizational struc- 
tures and activities. Accounting must continually revise its standards to 
accommodate innovative forms of organization. 
Accounting principles are generally decided by national committees 
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the U.S. 
However, these typically do not have legislative power, but rather attempt 
to summarize and codify trends in accounting practice. Independent 
auditing firms accept these pronouncements as advisory, but exercise 
their own judgement in particular circumstances. 
Focusing then on the auditing firm as the leading edge in the evolu- 
tion of accounting standards, the question arises as to how practice 
'amongst these companies is influenced, in particular the role of thoereti- 
cal research. Watts and Zimmerman (1976) remark: 
... it is generaly concluded that financial accounting theory has 
had little substantive, direct impact on accounting practice or 
policy formulation despite half a century of research. [273] 
... Understandmg why accounting theories are as they are 
requires a theory of the political process. [275] 
Somewhat cynically, they continue: 
Most theorists probably believe that an objective of their 
research and the reason they supply theories is to provide 
knowledge which wil l  ultimately improve accounting practice. 
They would not regard themselves as supplying "excuses". But 
we suggest that the predominant contemporary demand for 
accounting theories (the demand for accounting in a regulated 
economy) is the demand for justifications -"excuses". [285] 
... Thus, research and consulting b d s  will tend to flow to the 
most eloquent and consistent advocates of accountlng practices 
where there are vested interests who benefit by the adoption or 
rejection of these accountlng practices. [287] 
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However, the term 'theory' merits examination. Theories are not 
simply academic pronouncements. Theories are sets of propositions 
about (some aspect of) the world that are claimed to be true. Descriptive 
theories describe and predict actual phenomena. Normative theories 
prescribe behavior relative to some performance criterion. Accounting, 
as practiced, is not a theory in either of these senses. I t  is rather a doc- 
trine. representing a particular value structure. 
But what of the other, decision oriented role of accounting? Though 
separate, this is not independent of accounting's custodial and legalistic 
functions, as these provide the ultimate criteria of managerial perfor- 
mance. Unlike the custodial role, which is oriented to the documentation 
of past activities, the decision oriented role of accounting is necessarily 
future oriented. We don't decide the past, though we may have varying 
interpretations of it. Managerial decisions are rather decisions between 
alternative possible futures. However the link between these two roles of 
accounting is that the future that eventually occurs will be reported 
according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Managers may 
have other goals and values not reflected by these reporting methods. 
However the prominence of accounting reports makes the goals and 
values they embody a t  least an important component in directing organi- 
zational performance. 
On the other hand managers are concerned with more than the data 
in accounting reports. Their responsibilities are to direct the allocation 
of material resources and labor, to gauge the marketplace and the com- 
petition, and so on. In short, they deal with the realities behind the 
numeric valuations, i.e. the real world phenomena described in the 
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language, LRW. But here a theoretical gap is encountered: how are actual 
entities and activities in the organization related to accounting's evalua- 
tion of them? llus is e v l o r e d  in the sections to follow. 
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C. ACCOUNTING ahEASUREKENT'AND VALUATION 
As noted, the custodial role of accounting is concerned primarily 
with documenting and interpreting past activities, whereas for decision 
makmg the concern is to evaluate h ture  possibilities. 
The word 'evaluate' is key. In its decision support role, accounting is 
not concerned with the identification of future alternatives, but rather in 
assessing their financial impact. 
The decision makers involved are typically taken to be internal 
managers or external investors. Other interested parties might also be 
trade unions, regulatory agencies, economic analysts, etc. These various 
parties obviously have differing interests with respect to the 
organization's activities. The manager is concerned with internal opera- 
tions, departmental performance, product sales, etc. The investor is con- 
cerned with aggregate profitability of the firm with respect to others in 
hidher portfolio. 
The point is that evaluation differs from objective description in that 
it comprises a value structure. In science, the domin;rnt form of descrip- 
tion is measurement, i.e. the mapping from a real world (objective, 
observable) relational system to a numeric one. It is intended that the 
measurement process be time/space invariant, i.e. that any two parties 
describing like phenomena should arrive at identical measurements. 
Evaluation is however interest relative. Two parties may evaluate the 
same phenomena differently. This is closely related to the economic con- 
cept of utility. With respect to the pragmatic purposes of decision mak- 
ers, however, utility theory is inferentially too weak. This is due to its 
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measurement theoretic foundations. Utility theory offers only ordinal 
measurement*. That is to say, several items might be ordered in terms 
of their utility, e.g. A @ B @ C 
indicates that C has more utility than B which has more utility than A. 
However, there is no corresponding concept of additivity, e.g. we have no . 
basis for inferring that A and B together have more (or less) utility than 
C. Utility theory is therefore not an extensive measurement. The diffi- 
culty this creates is that it has no concept correspondmg to arithmetic 
addition, hence does not permit numeric summarization. 
Accounting, by contrast, might be viewed as a compromise between 
the ideals of utility theory and the interential capabilities of extensive 
measurement.** Recall that in extensive measurement, the form of the 
numeric relational systzm had the form: 
RS1 = (Re, >, +) 
i.e. arithmetic operations on the real numbers. The base relahonal sys- 
tem, what is being modeled in the arithmetic system, must therefore 
have the form, 
where D is the set of phenomena being measured, @ is an ordering on 
these phenomena, and $ is a concatenation operation. Here @would be a 
preference ordering, whereas $ would be an aggregation operation, analo- 
This is a complicated insue that in fact motivates much of the interest in measurement 
theory. See for example Krantz et. al. (1871), chapter 8 and Roberta (1879), chapters 5 
through 8. 
** See for example Ijiri (1967), Ijiri (1 Wl), Chambers (1972), Ijiri (1875), Ashton (1W7). 
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gous to that suggested in Goodman's calculus of individuals (discussed in 
chapter [3]). Thus, two objects taken together are always considered to 
be worth more than each one separately. 
As noted, preference orderings are interest relative. One person's or 
organizations's preferences do not match another's; otherwise there 
would be no commercial exchange. For instance in a sales transaction, 
the money received by the seller is valued more than the good sold; like- 
wise the purchaser values the good more than the money paid. Insofar as 
the currency is a stable and widely used medium of exchange, the price 
paid for an object is a conservative estimate of that object's worth to the 
purchaser. 
Recall that in ordinary extensive measurement, the function map- 
ping from RS, to RS1 had only one argument, indicating the object being 
measured. In the case of accounting valuation, an additional argument is 
needed to indicate the eptity for which the valuation is made. Thus the 
function, V$, which accounting adopts to map between these two rela- 
tional systems, has the form: 
VB (d, e) = n 
where d is an element of D, i.e. the set of objects (services, etc.) being 
valuated, and e is the accounting entity. VB is assumed to be specific to a 
particular currency, e.g. U.S. dollars. Accounting theory amounts to an 
elaboration of the nature of the valuation function, VB. For instance, for 
monetary objects (cash, negotiable securities), the value n is gillen as the 
face value of the object. Inventory items are valued at cost (i.e., face 
value of the money paid for them) on either a FIFO or LIFO basis. Capital 
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equipment is valued at historical cost reduced periodically through a 
time dependent depreciation algorithm. 
Reflecting the parallels to extensive measurement, Ijiri (1967) notes 
that balance sheets need not be restricted to the typical asset and equity 
classification but for instance could have additional columns classifying 
assets by their geographical location or age (see Figure [6.1]). 
Asset Equity Locabon b e  
Cash $10 Payables $20 Head Office 830 Under 6 mo. $40 
Receivables 20 Accruals 10 Factory 40 Under 1 yr 10 
Inventories 20 Loans 40 Warehouse 30 Under 2 yr 10 
Buildings 40 Capital 30 Over 2 yr 40 
Equipment 10 
- 
$100 
-
8100 
-
$100 
-
$100 
P i g m e  [6. I]. (source: Ijiri 1967:105) 
Clearly, the assets could be grouped and measured under any 
number of, such classifications schemes. Accounting transactions would 
thus be 'multi-entry' rather than just double entry. 
It would seem a rather obvious extension to have alternative asset 
classifications according to managements interests and decision needs. 
Why then have accounting systems been so uniformly dedicated to the 
double-entry view? 
The explanation Ijiri offers is that the double-entry method reflects a 
causal relabonship: 
what makes the double-entry system double is not the double 
classification (Assets, = Equity) that is often described in 
accounting literature but rather the cost principle, which recog- 
nizes the causal relationship between an asset acquired and an 
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asset foregone. In t h s  sense, the double-entry system and the 
historical cost principle ... have a logical connection since one is 
a form developed to express the other. (Ijiri 186?:10?-108). 
Rather than explain the dual balance sheet classification, these 
remarks focus more on the relationship between revenues and costs, 
what m textbooks is sometimes called the 'matclung concept'. 
Accounting may therefore be viewed as having two dualities: assets 
vs claims on assets (equities); and the causal matclung of revenues to the 
costs incurred in generating those revenues. 
The two distinctions are orthogonal: assets vs equities reflects the 
ditrerence between objects (collectively, wealth) and their ownership; the 
revenue vs cost distinction reflects efforts to increase wealth. 
This double duality is reflected in the basic financial accounting 
reports, namely the balance sheet and income statement. The balance 
sheet portrays the financial position of the firm at a point in time 
whereas the income statement reflects changes in financial position over 
the interval of time between balance sheets. Actually this is only partially 
true, for the income statement reflects changes due to sales ( i . .  the 
normal operations of the firm) and so is conceptually a sub-account of 
stock-holders equity (retained earnings). Other financial changes, e.g., 
acquisition of capital assets, new issues of bonds or stocks, are not 
included in the income statement and so motivate additional reports on 
the sources and uses of funds or workmg capital. 
What this structure does, however, is impose one particular interpre- 
tation of the states and changes of the firm. This interpretation has come 
to be authoritative in specifying the claims of lenders and investors. 
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This links back to accounting's custodial role and its consequent 
adherence to historical cost measurement. Economics has long ago &s- 
carded historical costs as relevant for decision making. Critics of 
accounting, believing that accounting should adapt its practices to recog- 
nize decision makmg needs, have suggested price-level revaluations, 
replacement cost, market value, and other alternatives. Yet accounting 
theory reacts wi th  austere conservatism. Indeed, conservatism is 
another of the textbook principles of accounting. An example of this 
would be the accounkng principle to value inventories at  the lower of 
their hstorical cost or their current market price. The point is that in 
q e c i f y i n g  the claims of various stakeholders on the firm and its assets, 
conservatism reduces potential conflict. Good fences make good neigh- 
bors. 
Thus, in its custodial role documenting the organization's activities, 
accounting not only describes but as well evaluates these activities. Thls 
evaluation serves a legal function in arbitrating the interests of 
claimants, say, in cases of liquidation. Accounting differs from simple 
measurement, therefore, in that it comprises a value structure. Through 
the weight of historical tradition, investors and managers alike have come 
to accept accounting as a (the?) principal criterion of corporate perfor- 
mance. 
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D. ACCmTTING ONTOLOGY 
Since the 1950s, there has been a scmethat intermittent line of 
research to discover tht basic logical foundations of accounting.+ 
More recently, the heavy impact of automated data processing on 
accounting systems has renewed interest in this foundational research to 
formalize accounting theory for computational inference. Importantly, as 
database management has developed, another line of research has 
developed relating accounting theory to the emerging data models*+. 
Preceding chapters have repeatedly argued that databases, ignoring their 
mechanical aspects, art essentially formal languages. It is here that the 
theoretical connection between accounting and information technol-ogy is 
to be found. 
In the last section it was argued that valuation was a fundamental 
aspect of accounting. Of central concern was the valuation function, 
which mapped a domain of objects, D, dependmg on the interests of the 
accounting entity, el to a number, n. It is instructive to consider the 
domain of this function, that is the sorts of things subjected to account- 
ing valuations. This leads us to an ontology of accountmg, that is, the fun- 
damental objects recognized in the theory. *** 
Far example, Chamben (1855), Mattwsich (1857), Moanitz (lWl), Mattesaich (1084/1877), 
Chamban (1eee/i975), Ijm (1ee7/197?), Sorter (iw~), ~obpeon (1875), Ijin (IW~), Caspnri 
(1876). Hughen (1918), Carlaon and Lamb (1961). Mattessich (1080) provides a histurical r e  
vier. 
** Far example, Lieberman and Whhton 1975, Hareman and Whaton, 1078, Everest and 
Weber, 19'77, McCarthy, 1978, McCarthy, 1982. 
*** This b in the mpirit of h n e ' s  remark (1853/1861) "+.o be is to be the value of a bound 
variable." Ontlogy, it will be recalled from Chapter [I], asb the question "what is there?"; 
i.e., it ir the nature of the entities forming the domain of individuals. Semantics, by con- 
trast, is the nlappiq from apmmiona of the language into this domain. 
- 16- Chapter 6 
The mportance of ontology is to provide a compatible basis for vari- 
ous formalizations of accounting inference. Diifer~ng views of accounting 
can only be reconciled ii they agree on what are the fundamental objects 
of the theories. What follows is to be regarded as an initial proposal. 
(This ontology formed the basis for the representation language, CANDID, 
presented in Lee, 1981.) 
The concern here is to  identiiy the types of individuals subject to 
accounting valuation. Closely related is the problem of individuating 
these entities, i.e., of consensual recognition and naming (discussed in 
chapter [4]). 
Reviewing briefly, the view offered by Strawson (1959) was that the 
general basis for such identification is the locatability of these entities in 
a spatial/temporal framework. 
The problem of individuation becomes especially important when we 
consider contractual objects like notes, bonds, stocks, options, licenses, 
insurance policies, etc. Clearly it is of critical importance for a company 
to know if it has a certain right or obligation. Indeed it is precisely 
because of this problem of identification that slgned documents play such 
an important role in contractual transactions: the signed document 
represents the agreement in a form locatable in space and time. (This 
point is elaborated in the next chapter.) 
Referring back to the accounting function, -(d, e) = n, the entities 
in the ranges of d and e are designated, respectively, as economic objects 
and economic objects. If we consider only physical objects as economic 
objects and persons as economic actors, the ontological problem is 
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trivial: both types of entities are locatable in space and time. 
However, another common type of economic actor (at least in 
western societies) is a corporation. A corporation is more problematic 
from this perspective since it has no essential physical reality: no one of 
its assets, including its buildings, nor any one of its employees nor any of 
its executives or board members nor any one of its stockholders is essen- 
tial to the identification of the corporation. Any one of these may change 
or be removed from the corporation, and the identity oi the corporation 
can still continue. 
The objects of economic activity, i.e., the thugs that are traded, 
present analogous ontological problems. Money for instance is a key 
object of exchamge. Yet money is no longer uniquely represented by phy- 
sical objects such as co'ns and bills, but often appears merely as mag- 
netic records in bank accounts. These, like computer programs, lose the 
easy location in a unique place a t  a given time. 
Information objects, such as recorded music, printed texts and com- 
puter programs were already mentioned. as presenting a problem for 
identification. Such objects present an interest~ng legal problem in that 
they can be "stolen" (copied) without removal of the original. (Our notion 
of theft is basically a physical one.) Computer. communications and pho- 
tocopy technology are bringing the characteristics of this type oi object 
to prime economic importance. 
One other type of non-physical economic object was also already 
cited: contractual objects. Signed documents have historically provided 
these types of objects with an easy physical identifiability. However, in 
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most centers of trade in contractual objects, namely commodity, bond 
and stock market exchanges, there is a definite move towards automation 
of records and transactions, so that here too the identifiability of such 
objects becomes problematic. 
Underlying the accounting valuation function V8 is a concept of own- 
ership. To indicate that what we are exploring here might be a special- 
ized version of ownership, somewhat different in accounting than in other 
language contexts, we denote it as a predicate: 
meaning that e ,  an economic actor, o m  d, an economic object. The 
wealth of an organization, i.e., its assets, are the thmgs that it owns. The 
accounting valuation function, W, applies to just these thugs. 
Another relationship between economic actors and objects is that of 
possession, written 
in&cating that actor e possesses object d. Again. we recognize that the 
understanding of this concept may be specialized in acco&ting. 
Intuitively speaking, ownership constitutes a set of rights granted by 
the legal system of an actor towards an object. Possession on the other 
hand refers to physical custody. Usually, an actor possesses what it owns, 
but not always, as in the case of loans and rentals. 
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E ECONOMIC ACTOPS 
Persons, Proprietorships 
The most obvious type of economic actor is an individual person, 
designated as: 
PERSON ( x) . 
However, in U.S. law, not all persons qualify as legitimate economic actors 
-minors and the insane are excluded. This more restricted set is desig- 
nated LPERSON (legal person), defined as: 
LPERSON(x) :: = PERSON(x) & AGE(x,YR) r 18 & SANE(x). 
Personal businesses, owned by a single individual, are called prvprie- 
torsh@s. .In US law they are not distinguished from their owner, hence 
Joint Ownership. partnerships 
Joint ownership is where one or more parties share equally in the 
ownership of an object. Essentially, the group of owners form a set that, 
as a unit, owns the object. For instance, for joint owners xl, . . . , x, 
In US law, a partnership is an economic actor consisting of such a set 
of equally participating persons. Hence, 
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Private Corporations 
It is at this level that the concept of an economic actor becomes phi- 
losophically challenging. A corporation is an artifact of the legal system. 
In the US, it is a 'legal entity', entirely separate from and independent of 
its owners. Unlike proprietorships and partnerships, which are formed 
eimply by the volition of the parties involved and have no separate legal 
status, a corporation is formed by a specially granted permission from 
the state. 
Informally, this process is as follows. The group of people who want 
to start the corporation, called its promofe~s ,  submit registration infor- 
mation, called incorporation. papers, and a prospscius, whch describes 
the capital structure and intended function of the corporation to the 
governing state. If the zorporation is to engage in interstate commerce, 
the prospectus must also be approved by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
In addition, a carfificafe of i n c o 7 p a a f i a  is filed by the'promotors, 
whch, if approved, is maintained by the office of the secretary of the 
state of incorporation. Th~s  certificate lists the corporation's principal 
offices, names of-directors and incorporators, the total number of stock 
shares (each at a common value called the par value) and the name and 
number of shares held by each stockholder. The corporation cannot sell 
more than this initial number of shares without obtalninrJ additional per- 
mission from the state. On acceptance by the state, this certificate 
becomes the corporation's charfer. 
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This charter is a contractual permission by the state which, in gross 
terms, says the following: Stockholders have a right to vote members of 
the board of directors (at least three people) of the firm and to partici- 
pate in the division of residual assets on the dissolution of the firm. 
The board of director's main responsibility is to  appoint officms of 
the corporation, who sewe as the agents of the corporation in legal tran- 
sactions (e.g., engaging the corporation in contracts, hiring and manage- 
ment of employees). 
Only the officers, and the people they employ, can engage in the 
dhect operation of the iirm. Note that being a stockholder does not 
carry the right to participate in the management of the corporation nor 
to act as its agent in contracts. 
To summarize, a corporation is essentially a locus of ownership, on 
one hand, and a locus of contractual commitment on the other. (These 
wil l  define the two sides of the corporate balance sheet: its w e t s  and its 
liabilities; including stockholder equity.) Chauges in the thtDgs owned by 
the corporation and its commitments to other parties are made by the 
corporate officers and their employees, acting as agents. Corporate off- 
icers are appointed by the Board of Directors, who in turn are elected by 
the stockholders. 
A crucial issue from a formal standpoint, however, is the identifica- 
tion of this locus of ownership and commitment. If we simply dismiss it 
as an 'abstract object' having no spatial/temporal location, we are left 
with the theoretical as well as very pragmatic problem of determining 
when the corporation exists and the boundaries of its rights and obliga- 
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tions. 
However, as noted above, the critical event in the formation of a cor- 
poration is the granting, by the secretary of the state of jurisdiction, of 
the corporate charter. Thls provides the creation of the corporation with 
a unique locabon in space and time. Furthermore, the corporate charter 
provides the corporation with a unique corpmate name (within that  
state). 'Rus provides any subsequent contracts and titles of ownersbp 
with a reference to  the corporate charter, and hence to a unique 
spatial/temporal location. 
Though this provides the means to identify a corporation, we have 
still not explained what a corporation is. Clearly, it is not in itself some- 
thmg physical. Rather it is a complex of contingent rights and privileges 
as established by the corporate laws of the state. 
Let us refer to t b s  complex as CORP-RIGHTS. These are granted by a 
particular state, and associated to a unique (within the state) corporate 
name. 
We would like to say that the corporation is simply this permission. 
However, if we are speaking of a certain time, t, the corporation is not 
simply this permission a t  time t but, to account for the corporation's 
ownership of assets, it  must also include permission a t  previous times 
when the assets were acquired. Further, whde the corporation is in 
operation it will presumably have contractual obhgations to other parties. 
These involve evaluation of these corporate rights not only in future times 
but under alternative circumstances, i.e., in other possible worlds: 
In h e  (1981) the formal semantics of this is regarded using the Mantsgue intensionopera- 
tar applied to the deontic permisdan. 
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The preceding discussion has dealt with priuate cqmations, i .e. ,  
those that are profit oriented and have stockholders who ultimately 
receive these profits either through dividend distribution'or dissolution of 
the corporation and sale of its assets. 
Other types of corporations might also be described similarly. For 
imtance, m- profit  cqwaCiOlLS do not have stockholders nor do they 
pay income tax. Quasi public corporations are private corporations that 
provide certain public services (e.g., certain utilities, toll roads) and that 
are supervised by public authorities. Public c o r p o m t i m ,  such as cities 
and certain departments of #local and state governments, also provide 
publlc services but are financed by the state. Each of these present cer- 
tain variants on the concept of corporation we have just described. 
Additionally, the concepts of state and federal governments them- 
selves present a challenge to ontology. Indeed, they appear to be 
corporate-like entities, having no essential physical existence. However, 
in ,these cases one cannot appeal to a larger deontic framework as the 
basis for their definition. for they are this framework. Instead, at least in 
democratic societies, one would appeal to the consensus of the voting 
population (present and past) as a deontic basis. However, since the 
objectives here are primarily concerned with commercial and financial 
activities, discussion is confined only to the three classes of economic 
actors described above: proprietorships, partnerships, and private cor- 
porations. Hence, 
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F. ECONOMIC OBJECL'S 
Physical Objects 
The most obvious type of economic objects are physical (having 
mass). A s  before, to individuate these types of entities we usually locate 
them in the spatial/temporal framework. For most types of physical 
objects we think of-e.g., tables, chairs, automobiles, real estate, this is 
unproblematic. However, when granular substances such as corn and 
wheat, or liquids or gases are involved, problems of identification arise 
because of the fluid movement of these materials. For instance consider 
a contract to buy a certain volume of ocean water located at  a certain 
latitude and longtitude at  a given depth, etc. Though the geographical 
coordinates may be certain, the particular volume of ocean water at  this 
location is not. 
The practical device that .resolves this logical problem in nearly any 
reasonable commercial context is that of a container. Liquids, gases and 
grains are always handled in a container of some sort, and the container 
provides the fluid substance with a unique and stable spatial/temporal 
location and with that discrete identifiability. 
Thus, our attention here is confined to what we call discrete- 
physical- objects, which have distinct spatial/temporal coordinates (for 
instance a t  their center of gravity) and can be uniquely identified and 
named. Liquids, gases and grains are assumed always to appear within 
discrete containers so that the filled container is itself a discrete physical 
object. 
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Accounting is however only concerned with those types of objects 
that can be owned. Normally, any discrete physical object can be owned; 
however most current legal systems specifically exclude one type, per- 
sona (slavery having been abolished). Hence, we introduce a concept of 
LPHYS-OBJ (legal physical object), which are those that can be owned: 
Promissory Objects 
If one examines the asset side of the balance sheet of a company 
(categories of what the company owns) one of course finds a number of 
categories that are types of physical objects, e.g., land, plant and equip- 
ment, inventory. However, beyond these there are typically other 
categories that do not comprise physical objects-e.g., accounts receiv- 
able, negotiable securities, patents, licenses. , 
These are what we call cant7actud objects. They arise as the result 
of a contractual pamisston of which the company is the beneficiary, i.e., 
they are 'rights' permitting the company to do something (as with 
licenses) or ob l iga t ions  of other parties to the company (as with accounts 
receivables, and negotiable securities). 
The equity side of the balance sheet (claims on assets) also has a 
contractual character, e.g. accounts payables, notes, bonds, preferred 
and common stock all entail contractual obligations. The logical struc- 
ture of these contractual objects is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Monetary Objects 
Money is obviously an important type of object in the description of 
commercial and financial phenomena. If we consider money only in the 
form of 'hard cash,' i.e., coins and bills, money is simply a type of physi- 
cal object: 
Coins and bills are obviously of a particular national currency and have a 
face value'. Thus for instance in the US., predicates indicating common 
types of bills and coins are 
ONE-CENT-COIN (x) 
FTVE-CENT-COIN(x) 
TEN-CENT-COIN(x) 
ONE-DOLLAR-BILL(x) 
TEN-DOLLAR-BILL(X) 
etc. 
However, in commercial transactions, money is seldom handled at 
t h s  detail level, but rather as sums of money. In this case we add up the 
face values of the various coins and bills, and convert them to a common 
currency unit-e.g., cents or dollars. 
Thus, suppose that y is a set of coins and bills, xl, ...,%. Then the 
monetary value of y, say n, would be given by a measurement function: 
y = ixl ,..., %{ & MONEX-VALUE(y, Dollar, US) = n 
Note here that the measurement function has a third place indicating the 
nationality of the currency, for instance to &stinguish measurement, in 
U.S. dollars versus Canahan dollars. (~xchange rates between currencies 
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are described as the tabulated face value of one currency exchangeable 
for a unit tabulated face value in another currency.) 
Most of the examples here assume a US environment. As a notational 
convenience, the following abbreviation for money in U.S. dollars is intro- 
duced: 
S(y)=n ::= MONEX-VALUE(y, Dollar, US) =n 
This measurement function is tor tabulating face values of a sum of 
currency in a given nationality. Measuring one nation's currency in terms 
of another with t h s  function would thus evaluate to zero. 
So far we have regarded money as a special type of physical object. 
However, the services provided by lending institutions in most countries 
have extended this concept of money. 
In the U.S., it is quite common that a bank check is given and 
accepted in Lieu of cash money. These checks are made against 'demand 
deposit' accounts in a bank, which promises to pay the payee named on 
the check a sum of money whose tabulated value equals the amount 
specified on the check. 
Demand deposits are thus contractual objects, indicating the obhga- 
tion of the bank to the party named on the check the specified amount of 
money. 
Because checking accounts are used so often, accounting seldom dis- 
tinguishes this form of money from actual currency (though they are dis- 
tinguished in the economic calculation of the money supply, viz. Ml is 
currency only, M2 includes demand deposits). 
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The similar function of currency and demand deposits leads us to 
recognize that currency too has a contractual character. Originally it 
was a promise by the government to deliver a certain amount of gold or 
silver on demand. However, it was later recognized that there was noth- 
ing unique about these substances as a medium of exchange except their 
scarcity (and non-reproducibility). 
Now however currency (US at least) is no longer backed by gold and 
silver. Scarcity is maintained through limited printlng by the federal 
treasury. Another important aspect of currency is its relative difficulty 
of reproduction. 'Rus is of course essential to its continued scarcity. 
Difficulty in reproduction, it turns out, is a desired feature for con- 
tractual objects generally. Thls is contrary to the aspects of information 
objects, where reproduzibility is desirable. This is further developed in 
chapter [E l .  
Information Objects 
Another type of owned object might be called an injormatiaL object. 
Informally, an information object is some meaningful arrangement of 
symbolic patterns on a representational medium, e.g., ink on paper or 
electronic codes on a magnetic tape or disk. 
The concept of information object here corresponds to what Thomp- 
son (1981) calls 'ethereal goods'. He makes the excellent observation 
that what is distinct about this type of object is the technology of its 
reproduction. Thus, to him, an ethereal good is one that can be repro- 
duced more cheaply than it can be purchased. 
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Thus, up until the time of the photocopy machine, a book was not an 
ethereal good. Now there are certain books that are cheaper to photo- 
copy than purchase from the publisher (especially low volume technical 
books). 
Similarly, home stereo tape recorders made it cheaper to copy musi- 
cal recordlqs than buy them. 
However, the innovation that really expanded the class of ethereal 
goods was the electronic computer. A fundamental concept in this tech- 
nology is that data is easily and instantly copyable. Hence any idorma- 
tion converted for computer storage (or indeed programs directing the 
processing of data) can be instantaneously reproduced (copied to another 
magnetic medium or sent over communication lines) at practically no 
cost. 
Since considerable labor is often expended in the original creation of 
such information objects, the legal problem this presents is how to pro- 
tect the developer trom having hisiher work "stolen," i.e., reproduced, 
without compensation. 
The use of such terms as 'information object' or 'ethereal goods' may 
make them sound u~ecessar i ly  mysterious. These are only physical 
objects (media) whose structure or pattern is easily reproduced on other 
physical objects. Before the printing press, books were less ephemeral in 
that they had to be manually rewritten If automobiles could be cheaply 
reproduced, they too would be ephemeral. 
In owning such an information object, therefore, one of course o m  
the physical representation medium, but more importantly, one owns 
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rights controll~ng the reproduction of the object. (Thus, the copyright 
laws for textual material prescribe the "copy rights" of the author and 
publisher.) 
Thus, the important features of an information object for accounting 
purposes are similar to that of a license, i.e., a contractual permission 
from one party to another. In the case of information objects, the per- 
mitted action is a certain limited range of reproduction. In acquiring an 
information object, one therefore acquires a physical representation of 
the information object plus certain rights of limited reproduction. 
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G. AN 0BLF.m ORIEhTTED BALANCE SHEET 
From this ontology of economic objects we may sketch a view of 
accounting prior to the application of monetary valuation. To illustrate, 
consider the form of a balance sheet containing direct referpnces to 
objects, as opposed to indirect references in the form of monetary valua- 
tions. 
On the assets side are various classes of economic objects. These are 
connected to the accounting entity by means of the OWN predicate. 
As  a convenience, the graphical notation of Chen (1976) is used to 
illustrate. Here entity types are drawn as a box, while relationships are 
shown as a diamond (see Figure [6.1]). (Note that entity types 
correspond to one place predicates, while relationships are n-place predi- 
cates. Arcs correspond to variables in a conjunctive expression.) So for 
instance an accounting entity, A, might OWN cash, h e n t o r y ,  equipment, 
etc. (Flgure [6.2]). 
W h a t  is interest~ng is the role of contractual objects. A contract is 
between two parties. Accounting only recognizes contracts that are par- 
tially executed, i.e., where either additional action is due from the other 
party, or the firm being accounted. In the first case these are classified 
as assets, where the OWN relationship applies. In the second case, they 
are classified as liabilities. We will call the relationship in this case, 
where x is an economic actor and y is a contractual object. The balance 
sheet of organization A then takes the form as shown in Figure [6.3]. 
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ENTITIES RELATIONSHIPS 
But here we note that an accounts payable to A is an accounts 
receivable to some other firm, say B. Likewise the bank note is an asset 
to the bank, the bond is an asset to the bond holder, etc. Thus the 
broader economy has the form of a chain of contractual objects, as illus- 
trated in Figure 6.4. 
Chapter 6 
, 
Accounts Bank 
Receivable Sote 
8 
INVENTORY 
Accounts 
payable 
Common 

CHlrPrW 7: 
TIIE IDGICAL SIXUCTURE OF CONTRACTS 
CONTENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
B. DEONTIC LOGIC 
1. TheStandardSystern 
2. Deontic Paradoxes 
3. The Semantics of Deontic Operators 
C. TIME, CHANGE AND ACTION 
1. Temporal Logic 
2. A Logic of Change 
3. A Logic of Action 
D. CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 
Chapter 7 
In the last chapter, the fundamental role of contractual relationships 
was observed in accounting theory. Contracts are also of increasing 
interest in the economic theory of the firm (e.g. Williamson, 1973). In this 
chapter we explore the underlying logical characteristics of contractual 
commitment. This involves a branch of logic called deuntic logic. 
In this chapter an overview of deontic logic is given, evaluating its 
relevance for inference based decision support systems. Application 
domains would include interpretation of accounting data and the manage- 
ment of the firm's financial and commercial contracts. In the next 
chapter, deontic logic is also observed to underly the structure of 
bureaucratic rules and regulations. Decision aiclmg systems to interpret 
complex bureaucratic rule systems as well as to manage  the^ modifica- 
tion will also be a suggested application. 
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1. The Standad System 
Deontic logic has its origin in the classical philosophy of ethics. The 
modern development of deontic logic was initiated in the early 1950's by 
G. H. von Wright who coined the term, based on the Greek bedvro~ mean- 
ing 'as it should be' or 'duly'. Deontic logic is a logic of normative con- 
cepts. Its major application, outside of ethics, has been to the philosophy 
of law. I t  is here that the connections to contract law, and eventually to 
bureaucratic regulation, might be made. 
The basic structure of deontic logic is given by the three deontic 
operators proposed by von Wright (1951). If q is some arbitrary type of 
action, then: 
0 q means q is obhgatory 
P q means q is permitted 
F q means q is forbidden 
The sense of these operators obviously relies on what is meant by an 
lac tion'. Von Wright (1968: 16) comments: 
A few words should be said about the reading of the formulae. In 
my first construction of a system of deontic logic the variables 
were treated as schematic names of actions. ... Accordmg to 
this conception. 'Tp" could be read "It is permitted to p". 'Rus 
conception. however, is connected with difficulties and incon- 
veniences. It is, first of all, not clear whether the use of truth- 
connectives for f o r m  compound names of actions is logically 
legitimate. It is, furthermore, obvious that, on this view of the 
variables, u h e r  order expressions become senseless. "Pp" 
itself cannot be the name of an action; therefore it cannot occur 
within the scope of another deontic operator either. 
It now seems to be better to treat the variables as schematic 
sentences which express propositions. Ths  agrees with the 
course taken by most subsequent authors on deontic logic. 
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Instead of "proposition" we can also say "possible state of 
&fairsw. According to this conception, "Pp" may be read "it is 
permitted that (it is the case that) p". 
Against this reading, however, it may be objected that it does 
not accord very well with ordinary usage. Only seldom do we say 
of a state of affairs that i t  is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden. 
Usually we say this of actions. But it is plausible to t h k  that, 
when an action is permitted, et., then a certain state of affairs 
is, in a 'secondary' sense, permitted, etc. too. This is the state 
which, in a technical sense ... can be called the result of the 
action in question. 
We can take account of this combination of action and resulting 
state of affairs in our reading deontic formulae. Instead of say- 
ing simply "to p" or "that p" we employ the phrase "see to it that 
p". The formula "Pp" is thus read "it is permitted to see to it 
that (it is the case that) p" or "one may see to it that p". I t  
should be noted, however, that this reading, though convenient 
and natural, is somewhat restrictive since it applies only to 
norms which are rules of action. 
The above three operators reduce to the single operator, 0, through 
the following definitions: 
reading; that q is permitted means it is not obhgatory not to q. 
reading: q is forbidden means it is obligatory not to q. 
Discussion typically focuses on the interplay between obligation and 
permission. (However, in legal and bureaucratic contexts, prohibition - 
i.e. forbidding - has a n  important background role. We return to t b s  
later.) 
The practical relevance of deontic logic in administrative contexts is 
to provide automatic inference in, say, contract arbitration or the 
interpretation of bureaucratic regulation Such applications are useful in 
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complex cases where the chain of connections would otherwise be diffi- 
cult to follow. Thus the axioms and inference rules of deontic logic take 
on pragmatic importance that the system draws the correct and intended 
conclusions. 
Various axiomatic systems have been proposed. In an introductory 
survey, Fbllesdal and Hilpinen (1971) present what they call the 'stan- 
dard' system of deontic logic. Based on propositional logic this serves as 
a more or less consensually accepted core on which to base further dis- 
cussion. The standard system assumes elementary generic actions (in 
the sense of von Wright, above). Assuming p and q to be actions of this 
type, the standard system begins with the earlier definition: 
Three axioms follow: 
This is the 'principle of permission': for any act p, either p or " p is p e p  
mitted. 
This is the 'principle of deontic distribution': that p or q is permitted if 
and only if p is permitted or q is permitted. 
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(A3) " p (P & - P). 
This axiom,' not included in von Wrlght's original formulation, says that it 
is not the case that  both p and " p are permitted. Using definition Dl, 
these axioms can be re-stated in terms of obligation: 
reading: if p is obligatory, then it is not obligatory not to p. 
reading: if p and q are together obhgatory, then, separately, p is obliga- 
tory and q is obligatory. 
reading: either p or not p is obligatory 
Added to  this system (either set  of axioms) are the inference rules of 
propositional logic (substitution, modus ponens) plus the rule: 
(Rl) If 'p' and 'q' are logically equivalent, then 'Pp' and 'Pq' are logically 
equivalent . 
Here, p and q are regarded as propositional variables. However, they are 
not exactly propositions in the usual sense of referring to a static state of 
affairs, e.g. the window is closed. Rather, as names for generic actions, 
they refer to  someone's causing a certain state to occur, e.g., closing the 
window. Thus, in this form of deontic logic, the concept of truth value is 
replaced by one of performance value, i.e. whereas a proposition is either 
true or  false, an action is either performed or not performed. Further, 
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the actions controlled by these deontic operators presume an aspect of 
human agency. We don't obhgate or permit natural phenomena such as 
the sun rising. 
The propositional form of deontic logic could be refined to distin- 
guish individual agents and the objects they act upon. This is in particu- 
lar necessary for applications to contractual relationships and bureau- 
cratic regulation. These refinements, and the complications they entail, 
will be considered later. A t  the moment however the concern is with the 
interactions and interpretation of the deontic operators themselves, and 
so we remain with an undecomposed concept of action. 
2. Dsontic Paradoxes 
Computer applications of deontic logic to organizational and 
economic contexts would be most useful in cases where a complex system 
of rules and regulations was kvolved. Here, the machine would assist in 
tracing through the various implications of a contract or the regulations 
pertinent to a proposed action. In such cases, where we begin to rely on 
the machine to follow a long deductive maze that we ourselves have diffi- 
culty following, i t  is vital that we have an absolutely solid confidence in 
the types of deductions that the machine makes (as we have for instance 
in the arithmetic deductions made by machines). 
In this regard, various apparent paradoxes that arise from the stan- 
dard system of deontic logic are disturbing and require attention. Well 
known among these is one first noted by Ross (1941), hence known as 
Ross's paradox. It centers on the interpretation of the theorem: 
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whch can be derived from the above axioms. This says that if a certain 
action p is obhgatory, then p or q is obligatory. Thus, if I ought to mail a 
letter, than I also ought to mail or burn it. 
A related paradox, based on permission, is given by the theorem: 
whch says that if p is permitted, so too is p or q. Hence, if I am permit- 
ted to smoke, I am also permitted to smoke and kill. Fdllesdal and Hil- 
pinen (1971) observe that  these are problems due not to the deontic 
operatdrs, but to the interpretation of the propositional connectives, 'V' 
and '+ I .  
Logic, in formalizing ordinary reasoning processes, tends to draw 
from terms in ordinary language, but use them in more specialized ways. 
In the case of the propositional connectives, their usage is rigorously 
determined by truth tables, whereas in natural language, the correspond- 
ing terms 'and'. 'or' 'implies', etc. is less rigid. Thus in logic, the state- 
ment: 
I walk to work V I carry my lunch 
follows from 
I walk to work 
This seems anomalous because the logical disjunction, V, is inclusive 
whereas the ordinary English 'or' is typically used exclusively. Fb llesdal 
and Hilpinen explain: 
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The paradoxes mentioned above may perhaps be explained by 
reference to very general conventions regarding the use of 
language. For instance, it is generally assumed that a person 
makes as strong statements as he is in a position to make. If 
someone wants another person to mail a letter, it is surely very 
odd for him to say that the letter ought to be mailed or burned, 
especially it the latter alternative is forbidden. Similar remarks 
apply to [b. above]. If we want to explain the actual uses of 
deontic expressions in ordinary language, such general conven- 
tions must be taken into account, but they need not be incor- 
porated into deontic logic. 
In the case of the 'paradox' involved in [b. above], it is impor- 
tant to observe that in ordinary language, the logical force of 
the word 'or' is in some cases the same as that of 'and'. For 
instance, in many cases the sentence 'a may do p or q' is used 
t o  express the same statement as 'a may do p and a may do q'. 
This fact has led some philosophers to assume that these cases 
involve a special notion of permission, termed p e e  choice pe7- 
mission. G .  H. von Wright (1968) has suggested that a free 
choice permission and the permission concept defined by the 
standard system of deontic logic have different logics; the 
former concept does not satisfy the distribution principle [A2], 
but instead the law 
P ( P  v q) - P P  & P q  
The 'paradoxical' theorem [b.] is not valid for this notion of per- 
mission. According to von Wright, the notion of free choice per- 
mission cannot be formalized in the standard system. I t  seems 
to us, however, that a free choice permission c a r  be expressed 
in the standard system in a pertectly adequate way: P p & P q. 
If 'a is permitted to  smoke or kill' is a free choice permission, it 
should be formalized as P p & P q, and t h s  is not, of course. 
implied by P p (according to the standard system). Il the word 
'or' is interpreted in this way (as it often is in ordinary 
language), 'a is permitted to smoke' does n o t  imply 'a is permit- 
ted to smoke or kill'. There is no need to invent special notions 
of permission or construct special logics of permission and obli- 
gation on the basis of this accidental interchangeability of the 
words 'or' and 'and' in ordinary language. 
For a more extensive discussion ot deontic paradoxes arising from 
varying interpretations in natural language, see Castef'reda (1981). 
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3. The Semantics of Deontic Operators 
The remarks in the preceding section about the Mfering interpreta- 
tions of the logical connectives and their natural language counterparts 
leads to similar issues in the interpretation of the deontic operators 
themselves. This has pragmatic importance in computational applica- 
tions for, even if the system's deontic deductions are logically correct, 
they may nonetheless be mis-interpreted by users of the system*. 
On this point, Fbllesdal and Hilpinen (1971: 15) observe: 
Deontic formulae are normally interpreted simply by translating 
them to sentences of ordinary language. The plausibility of 
putative theorems is judged on the basis of the intuitive plausi- 
bility of their ordmary-language counterparts. . . . 
The formulation of our intuitions concerning deonhc notions in 
ordinary language often involves ambiguous expressions such as 
'implies', 'requires', etc. In many cases it is difficult to see what 
are the exact formal counterparts of these intuitions, that is, 
what our intuitions really pertain to. ... Moreover, a 'literal' 
translation of formulae such as 0 p - 0 0 p, P 0 p, etc., to ordi- 
nary language yields sentences which are hardly ever used at  
all. It is almost impossible to decide whether iuch sentences 
are acceptable as principles of deontic logic or not. 
Formal semantical aspects are therefore especially important in the 
case of deontic logics. Useful insights are provided by von Wright (1968). 
Here, deontic logic is viewed as a branch of modal logic. In model logic, 
the central issue is an explication of contingent vs absolute truth of 
assertions. The two basic concepts are therefore possibility and neces- 
sity. For u an arbitrary assertion. these are typically denoted as: 
An application scenario might be that the machine maintains an internal representation of 
contracts or bureaucratic regulations in some extended form of a deontic logic. In respond- 
ing to user queries, theme are translated to an appropriate English form by means of a tcxt 
generating grammar. Automatic text generation from formalized representations is d i s  
cusad in Lee and Wgman (1976) and McDonald (1877). 
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0 u (u is necessarily true) 
0 u (u is possibly true) 
As for permission and obligation, possibility and necessity are inter- 
definable: 
That is, possibly u is equivalent to not necessarily not u. 
Kripke (1963) provided a formal semantics for modal logics based on 
possible worlds. Necessarily u meant that u was true in aU possible 
worlds. Possibly u meant that u was true in some possible world. 
Semantically, von Wright viewed the deontic operators as qualifica- 
tions of these modal concepts. Permission is regarded as deontic possi- 
bility, obligation is deontic necessity, The extension of these concepts 
ranges over a subset of all possible worlds, namely those that are 'deonti- 
cally perfect', conforming to the normative (legal, ethical) system under 
study. That is to say, if q is obligatory, (0 q), the q will'be true in aU 
deontically perfect worlds. If q is permitted, then q will be true in some 
deontically perfect world. Note however that since 0 q does not imply q 
(not all obligations are fultffled), the actual world may not be included in 
the set of deontically perfect worlds. 
Recallmg the discussions in chapters [3] and [4 ] ,  it may again seem 
that all this talk of possible worlds is getting too mystical soundmg if  we 
eventually intend to get down to such mundane realities as contracts and 
bureaucratic regulations. We don't expect that sales contracts or income 
tax forms will ever contain clauses referring to deontically perfect worlds. 
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However, the  elaboration of the logics underlying these documents may 
depend on them. 
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C. m. CHANGE A I q i  ACX'ION 
As noted, the deontic operators apply to generic actions that are 
regarded as propositions. However these are not propositions in the 
usual sense on describing some static state of affairs. Rather, actions 
involve two additional components: 
a) a change of state 
b) due tosorne humanintervention 
As these are non-trivial differences, actions themselves have been the 
object of philosophical study, resulting in proposals for various 'logics of 
action'. 
It is typical to separate the two aspects and regard the logic of 
action as buildug upon a logic of change. Since change is a temporal 
concept, t h s  relates to concerns of temporal logic. 
1. Temporal Logic 
Propositional logic normally involves statements like: 
snow is white 
In these cases, the truth of the sentence does not depend on time, i.e., 
the irnplicit claim is that snow is always white in this and any possible 
world. However, statements Like 
it is raining 
have a more restricted claim, i.e. that it is raining now, a t  some specific 
time and place. Rescher and Urquhart (1971) for example make this tem- 
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poral aspect explicit with an operator R for 'realization'. Thus a proposi- 
tion 
has the reading that p 'is realized' at  time t. Assuming time to be a linear 
dimension along which propositions are true over certain intervals, false 
over others, this is relatively straightforward. 
Rescher and Urquhart in tact note the parallel to a positional logic 
inhcatmg the geographical dependence of certain propositions. For 
instance, analogous to the R operator for temporal realization, another 
operator R' might be defined, 
with the reading that proposition p is realized at location p. For instance, 
the proposition 'there is oil here' is true of some places, not of others. 
Realization op'erators of this sort do not however differ markedly 
from ordinary predicates. For instance if the ontology includes places. 
and/or times 
might be used to express that location 1 has oil or that it is raining at 
location 1 a t  time t .  Distinguishmg places and times from other types of 
inhviduals for separate treatment seems to be little more than syntactic 
* A complicating factor is whether time is viewed as discrete units or a continuum. In this 
~ection a discrete view of time is adopted. In Lee ( IWa,  1981), a continuous time dimension 
is assumed. 
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engineering. The motivation would be if the aspects of location or time 
are sufficiently subtle and complex to warrant separate study and 
axiomatization. In this regard time does seem to have epistemological 
prominence. 
In chapter [4], situating an object in the spatial/temporal framework 
was observed to be a useful basis for consensual individuation. We have 
strong social agreement on the typology of space and time. These are not 
the scientific concepts of space held by the astronomer, nor the view of 
time of the physicist, but are more mundane. What matters is not what 
apace and time 'really' are, but how we think about them, e.g, in adminis- 
trative transactions. 
For these purposes, the world is basically two dimensional. We think 
normally about geographical location using east-west and 'north-south 
dimensions and only on special occasions, e.g. tall buildings, airplane 
landings, do we worry about the vertical dimension. Moreover, for the 
purposes of ordinary discourse, the world is still flat. We may know scien- 
tifically that the planet is spherical, but in our transactions we treat it as 
a plane. 
Time is often regarded as simply another dimension to this geo- 
graphical framework. It is however a dimension with a special epistemo- 
logical status for management. Business transactions for instance are 
careful to note the identity of the buyer and seller but their geographical 
location at the time of the sale is usually of minor importance. As 
telecommunications increase (leading to such concepts as 'telework') 
geographical position becomes even less consequential. On the other 
hand, temporal relationships are extremely important in all types of 
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economic activity. In accounting, every transaction is dated. The 
accounting conception of cost is time dependent. Contracts specify due 
dates and time dependent penalty clauses. Planning, often considered to 
be the most important of management functions, is a temporal concept. 
Time (our ordinary conception of it) differs from the geographical dunen- 
sions also in that it is ordmed. Time moments are 'later than', 'earlier 
than' one another. This, in itself, is no great difficulty. The complications 
arise in that we seem to maintain two perspectives of time, one historical, 
the other looking towards the future. 
Our perception in these cases is quite different. As we view the past. 
we normally regard time as a single line along which hstorical events are 
ordered. I t  is relatively easy for us to decide whether two events coin- 
cided, whether two authors were contemporary, etc. Our projection of 
t h s  time line into the future doesn't have this same neat arrangement of 
events. We don't know for instance where to temporally locate the 
company's next technical innovation or the next major sale. 
But here it is not that our conception of the time dimension is dif- 
ferent, but rather that we lack the knowledge of future events that we 
have for hstorical events. A s  discussed in chapter [4], this conception of 
time is regarded as 'backwards linear and forward branching' (e.g. 
Rescher and Urquhart, 1971, McDermott, 1982) as in Figure [7.1.]. The 
horizontal scaling of this dimension in this view is uniform. For example, 
the Gregorian calendar assigns arbitrarily distant dates for the past and 
the future. The graphical branchmg reflects contingencies in future 
events. An analogous view is reflected in such plann~ng tools as PERT 
charts and decision trees. 
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Let us return now to the remarks concerning the notation for time, 
e.g. in a predicate language. 
2. A Iagic of Change 
In the view presented above, using either a realization operator, or 
providing predicate places for time variables, we are able to express that 
certain prospectives are true of the world only at  certain times. The 
emphasis is on when certain states obtain. 
By contrast, a proposal by von Wright (1965) focuses more directly 
on changes between states. He introduces a new propositional connec- 
tive, T, read 'and next'. If p and q are propositions describing generic 
states of dfairs, 
P T q 
is read "p and next q", i.e. that q is the state following from q. For exam- 
ple, 
raining T sunshine 
expresses that it has stopped raining. Note that the arguments are gen- 
eric states of affairs, i.e. not bound to a specific time. The expression 
therefore describes a generic change. Considering only a single proposi- 
tion, q, four elementary changes can be distinguished: 
"9 T q (qbegins) 
q "q (q ends) 
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q T q (q continues) 
"q T "q (not q continues) 
It may be debated whether the last two are changes in the usual sense. In 
any case, these prove to be useful distinctions in the explication of action 
and responsibility. 
3. A b g i c  of Action 
Actions differ from simple changes in that they contain an additional 
component of human responsibility. Actions are changes that people 
bring about, such as closing a door as opposed to the wind blowing it shut. 
The implication is that the resulting state of affairs would not have 
occurred without the person's interference. Actions therefore contain a 
hypothetical aspect: what w d d  have been the case without the person's 
internention. 
Recognizing actions therefore involves not only observation, but a 
certain amount of theorizing. The sun rising is not a human act like clos- 
ing the door because our theories tell us that the sun will rise indepen- 
dently of our behavior. A dancing Indian might be seen by some people as 
causing the ensuing rainstorm while others, with different theories, will 
claim it to be a mere coincidence of events. Included here is the supposi- 
tion that the person's behavior causes the event. This might be either 
direct or indirect causality, e.g. a shop manager may cause a production 
batch to be created by giving verbal commands. 
Causality has however been a long standing philosophical thorn. 
Hume (1739) noted that causality can never be proven through empirical 
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observation alone. Causal statements are therefore theories not only 
about actual states of the world but possible states as well. 
These aspects are incorporated into the concept of action developed 
by von Wright (1967). Extending his previously mentioned concept of 
change, he adds another propositional connective, I, read 'instead of'. 
This combines with the T connective to form 'TI expressions' describing 
actions. If P, q and r are propositions for generic states of affairs, a TI 
expression is of the form, 
read that 'p and next q instead of r'. The interpretation is that p and q 
are the observed states, before gnd after, of the action. The proposition r 
describes the state that would have obtained without the agent's interier- 
ence. As might be expected, the formal semantics oi these expressions 
includes possible worlds. The propositions p and q are true of the actual 
world at successive times, say to and tl. The proposition r describes an 
alternative possible world, at  time t l ,  which otherwise would have been 
actual (see Figure [7 .2 ] ) .  The T c o ~ e c t i v e  relates two states in the 
actual world at two successive times, whereas the I connective relates 
alternative possible worlds at the same time. 
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D. CONTRACTUki COKK!TMEI;Y 
We began with the standard system of deontic logic havlng the opera- 
tors: 
0 q q is obligatory 
p q q is permitted 
F q q is forbidden 
In the onginal interpretation, q represented a proposition, i.e. a state 
description. Under von Wright's interpretation, the variable q is replaced 
by TI expressions, whose mternal structure has three state descriptions: 
the current state, the next state if the action is performed, and the alter- 
native next state if the action is not performed. An obligation, for 
instance, would therefore have the form: 
read as: it is obhgatory to change the state p to the state q instead of the 
state r. 
We would now like to sketch the extension of these concepts to 
represent contractual commitment. The discussion here is informal. A 
more rigorous treatment is provided in the appendix. 
In the preceding discussion, the agent of the actions was implicit. To 
specify the agent explicitly, we would need to add an extra place to the I 
connective, e.g., 
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where x is a variable for human individuals. Thus a statement of the form 
means that it is obligatory for x to change the world from p to q instead 
of r. This is a general concept of obligation. e.g. of legal codes or ethical 
eystems. 
Contractual obhgation, by contrast, is an obligation from one party 
to another. This requires that we mark the deontic operators with two 
places indicating the parties to the contracts. For instance, 
would mean that x is obliged to y to see to it that the state p is changed 
to the state q instead of the state r. We note that with obligation, the 
party that is obligated is also, typically, the agent of the action. (In the 
case of contracts between organizations, the agent of the action might 
also be a subordinate of the person obligated in the contract.) With per- 
mission, the matchug of arguments is reversed, e.g. 
that is, x permits y to change p to q instead of r. Here it is y who is the 
agent of the action. (Prohibition, being the simple negation of permis- 
sion, has a similar syntax.) 
Further refinements are needed. Contractual obligation and permis- 
sion usually have a time period stipulated. Using the aforementioned R 
operator, we might denote thrs as: 
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Here t is meant to indicate a time interval. That is, x is obligated to do 
the prescribed action within time. t. Similar time limitations might be 
applied to permissions. 
What we have so far described is however only half of what we nor- 
mally regard as a contract. That is, a contract normally entails a concept 
of exchange, e.g. of money for goods, services or privileges. Abbreviatmg 
an action done by x and y as p(x) and q(y), the elaboration of a typical 
sales contract would therefore look like: 
i.e., x is obligated to  y to  do p (e.g. deliver goods) and y is obligated to  x 
to  do q (e.g. pay a certain amount of money). Often, there is a certain 
inter-dependence between the two actions, for instance, y's obligation to  
pay may only apply after x has delivered the goods. 
This introduces the important aspect of contingent obligation (per- 
mission, prohibition). Other examples of contingent aspects are penalty 
clauses and insurance contracts. Indeed, the failure to execute a con- 
tractual obligation is normally governed by the more general legal obhga- 
tions of commercial law. The injured party therefore has the privilege 
(permission) to initiate legal action under these circumstances. Contrac- 
tual obligations therefore interface with general legal obhgations in their 
enforcement. 
While cont~ngency is a fundamentally important aspect of contrac- 
tual commitment, it  is - unhappily for application purposes - still an  
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unresolved area within deontic logic. Von Wright(l968) proposes a dyadic 
or conditional counterpart to the standard deontic system, where 
is read that p is oblqatory given that q. This proposal has not been 
widely accepted. even by von Wright himself. In von Wright(1971: 160-I), 
he argues that contingency requires a new conception of deontic logic, 
"not immediately as an analogue of modal logic, but as a fragment of a 
more comprehensive logical theory [to be called] the Logic of (Sufficient 
and Necessary) Conditions". 
A more recent proposal, by Thomason (1981), argues that the prob- 
lems presented by contingent oblqation are resolvable through recogni- 
tion of temporal aspects. He comments (1981:165-166): "Most of the 
recent work in deontic Logic has concentrated on problems concerning 
'conditional oblqation' ... I want to claim.that deontic logic requires a 
foundation in tense logic; the notion of obligation is so dependent on tem- 
poral considerations that a logical theory of obligation pre-supposes an 
appropriate logical theory of tense." 
The argument is that contmgency, in deontic contexts, typically 
implies temporal ordering. If I promise to give you an apple it you wash 
the dishes, my obligation is typically understood to begin after the 
I 
dishwaslung. A more detailed discussion of these aspects is provided in 
the appendix. 
hi s tory  
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Figure [7.1] Backwards Linear, Forward Branching View of Time 
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(actual  world) 
Figure [7.2] Von Wright's Concept of Action 
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A INTRODUCTION 
red tape n !so called from the red tape formerly used to tie up 
legal documents in England{: bureaucratic procedure, espe- 
cially as characterized by mechanical adherence to regulations, 
needless duplication of records, and the compilation of an 
excessive amount of extraneous information resulting in pro- 
longed delay or inaction. (Webster's 3rd International Diction- 
ary). 
Red tape is an irritation that most people accept with a certain 
amount of fatalism, like catching colds in winter. Just as medical science 
has had little impact on the common cold, management science and 
information technology seem to have had little effect on reducing bureau- 
cratic red tape. It seems to be a natural by-product of organization& and 
societal rationalization. 
Office automation, however, would seem to have as an implicit goal 
the reduction of red tape. Part of t h s  is (rightly) seen as the elimination 
of paper flows. Documents can be handled much more quickly and effi- 
ciently in electronic form than as physical paper. But there is another 
component to red tape, a sociological one, whch tends to be gnored. 
Red tape arises as authority structures become specialized and distri- 
buted across numerous organizational roles. 
Much of what we call red tape involves the processing of a particular 
request through a series of authority nodes (typically offices) in the 
organization. Thus another part of the problem, beyond speed of com- 
munications, is the resource time at these nodes -i.e., the time taken by 
the particular clerk or manager to authorize the request. Still another 
part is finding the appropriate authorities in the first place. (Another 
piece of informal terminology applies here: 'passmg the buck.') 
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The basic point is that the problem of red tape involves not merely 
information flows but also authority flows. What is meant is not the broad 
types of authority typically drawn on organization charts, but rather the 
detailed, formalized types of authority prescribed in bureaucratic rules 
and regulations. An important aspect is that otten these types of a u t h o ~  
ity have also come to be ritualized, that is, no longer relevant to the 
organization's interests. 
Authority is of course a sociological phenomenon. That is not to say 
it is not analyzable. The more specific point of this paper is to sketch an 
approach to the analysis of red tape. 
The approach is introduced through a linguistic distinction between 
perlormative vs informative documents. These are mgarded as the basic 
medium of bureaucratic authority. .These are generally recognized by the 
inclusion of a s1gmtu.e by the authorizing person or a special stamp. or 
eeal of the authorizing office. The sociological importance of the non- 
duplicatability of these documents is discussed. 
The content of authoritative documents is analyzed using the primi- 
tive operators of deontic logic (obhgation, permission, prohibition). The 
relationship of these distinctions to a broader theory of bureaucracy is 
examined, and a concept of bureaucratic sottware is suggested. 
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B. DOING THJNGS WlTIi FORDS 
The bguistic concept of a performative was first introduced by Aus- 
tin (1962) and elaborated by Searle (1969) and others. The performative 
aspects of contracts and financial instruments was discussed in Lee 
(1980, 1981). The relevance of performaives to office processes was first 
noted by Flores and Ludlow (1981). 
A performative is an utterance that not only conveys information but 
also, by its being spoken, accomplishes some socially significant act. For 
instance, the sentence "I now pronounce you man and wife" when spoken 
by a priest durmg a marriage ceremony not only describes the relation- 
ship between the couple, but actually mates it. This example brings out 
several key features of performatives. One is that the state created by 
such an utterance is generally some type of social artifact. Obviously, the 
mere s p e w  of a few words has very little physical effect. Rather, it 
places one or more people in ditierent states of social perception. Often, 
this involves a certain set of obligations, e.g., of fidelity, economic respon- 
sibility. 
The roles involved in a linguistic utterance are usually cast as 
speaker and listener. However, in the case of performatives, the listener 
role must be divided between 'addressees' and 'by-standers'. Clearly, not 
everybody attending the marriage ceremony becomes socially obhgated 
by the priest's pronouncement, only the two people specifically 
addressed. 
Also, i t  is not always the addressees of performatives who acquire t.he 
social obligation by the utterance. For instance, a major class of per for  
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matives is the class of promises, in which case it is the speaker who 
acquires, the obligation. In other cases the addressee may in fact be an 
object, e.g., a ship: "I christen thee the Queen Elizabeth.'' These latter 
are, however, fairly rare types of performatives. 
The social contract surroundipg a performative is not always institu- 
tional, as with marriage. For instance, such remarks as "I promise to do 
the dishes tomorrow," are also performatives. Here, however, attention is 
limited to performatives in institutional environments. In these cases the 
speaker and addressee must have certain social qualifications in order 
for the performative to have force. For example, only priests, ministers, 
ship captains, justices of the peace, etc., can pronounce marriages, and 
only unmarried couples of a certain age can become married. Further, 
apart from the broad social context that enables the performative to 
have force, for instance the church as an institution, there is also a nar- 
rower, 'conversational' context where the performative must appear. For 
example, the marriage pronouncement must appear at a certain point 
near the end of the marriage ceremony, not at the beg-, nor after 
wards, during the reception, etc. 
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Linguists generally refer to performatives as a type of utterance, 
that is, a spoken communication. What is sometimes overlooked is that 
written communications, too, may be performative. In these cases, how- 
ever, the execution of the performative takes on a somewhat different 
character. In a spoken performative, the person making the performa- 
tive is obviously identified as the speaker. In written performatives, the 
issue of authorship arises. Also, with spoken performatives the addressee 
hears the performative at the time it is spoken. Written communications, 
however, endure throughout time and so the addressee may receive the 
communication considerably later than when it was initially made. The 
question then arises: when during t h s  interval does the performative 
come into force? 
These issues of authorship and timing are commonly resolved by a 
very simple devlce, namely the author's handwritten signature, accom- 
panied by the date on which it was s~gned. The ritual of s i g w  one's 
name to a document is so pervasive that its fundamental role is often not 
recognized. Indeed, as a rough heuristic, one can usually distinguish 
purely informative documents from those with a performative component 
by whether or not it has a personal signature. For instance, printed 
~ o u n c e m e n t s ,  bulletins, etc., seldom have srgnatures; contracts to  pay 
money (checks, etc.) always do. The effect of the signature is roughly the 
declaration: 
"I hereby acknowledge that my beliefs and intentions are accu- 
rately described by this associated text." 
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Signed documents, as performative instruments, also acquire a unique 
feature not possessed by their purely informative counterparts: the per- 
formative effect of the original signature is not carried over to its 
mechanical duplicates. For instance, in legal documents, such as con- 
tracts, wills, etc., when several copies are made, each must be separately 
signed by the author(s) to have legal validity. 
The unique role of the orlginal in written performatives has, by the 
way, its counterpart in spoken performatives as well: repeated playbacks 
of a tape recording of a spoken promise, for instance, do not create new 
promises. With written performatives the assumption of course is that 
the signature provides a unique identification of the author. However, the 
authenticity of the signature is seldom called into question (handwriting 
analysts are seldom needed in court). A more important effect is that it 
signals the author's declarabon of personal responsibilify for the associ- 
ated statements. In the act of signing such a document the signer typi- 
cally becomes acutely aware of its language and contents (especially if 
the text has been written by someone else, as in a standardized lease or 
loan contract), since (s)he is henceforth expected to behave in acoor- 
dance with t h s  declaration. 
The social signiticance of Uus ritual, commitbng the signer to having 
the beliefs, attitudes or intentions as expressed in the document, has 
been accepted by nearly every Literate culture for centuries. I t  is an 
extremely useful historical convention. being the hallmark of honesty and 
good faith in all kinds of institutional and governmental transactions and 
agreements. I t  should be noted, however, that a signature is not the only 
way of mar- a performative document. In many cases, a special seal, 
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stamp or sticker operates similarly, especially where the effect of the 
document is standardized and commonplace. Typically, these special 
performative symbols are designed with a special, intricate pattern that 
would be hard to mimic. Often, these serve effectively as the signature of 
an institution, rather than a single individual. Common examples are 
coins, bills, and postage stamps. 
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D. DEONTIC PERFORMATWES 
In the context of organizational procedures, the 
informative/performative distinction can be refined further. One aspect 
of these procedures is certainly to transmit and store information. 
Another, however, is to control and standardize the behavior of the pel- 
sonnel involved. Procedures are thus means of standardizing the exer- 
cises of authoriky of certain individuals in the organization over others. 
Authority, of course, includes a wide variety of aspects. With regard 
to red tape, however, one particular form of authority seems prominent. 
' h s  is where a certain type of behavior is in general forbidden, except 
under special circumstances. The exercise of authority in these cases 
amounts to some person's evaluation of the circumstances, and the 
granting of pewnis& where appropriate. In many instances of red tape 
the action in question divided into a number of sub-acbons each requir- 
ing separate permission. The delay or inaction inherent in the definition 
of red tape thus results not for reasons of information collection or pro- 
cessing, but rather due to the wait times in the personal queues of these 
various permission granting individuals. 
A familiar example of t b s  is automobile registration. In general it is 
forbidden to drive an automobile on public roads. There are, however, 
several conditions that together permit this. First, the driver needs to be 
able to drive. This is demonstrated by an examination by state employ- 
ees with the authority to certify driving skills. If the driver succeeds in 
this exam, the examiner signs the examination form that permits the 
driver to obtain a specially designed (performative) card, the driver's 
license. 
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Next, one must have an automobile. In purchasing the auto, another 
special form is required -the bill of sale and/or title certificate -whch 
is signed by both the previous and new owners (another performative 
document). Next, the automobile itself must be in safe drivlng condition. 
Here, a different indmidual, e.g., a state licensed mechanic, makes the 
certification. m s  is typically signified by a special (again performative) 
sticker attached to the auto's windshield or fender, signed by the 
mechanic. Next, if not already done, the vehicle must be registered, i.e., 
recorded in the state books. Here, typically, the vehicle manufacturer's 
serial number is recorded by another state agent on another special 
form, whch (s)he signs. Thrs permits the owner to obtain a license plate 
for the auto (analogous to a performative seal). Lastly, in some places, a 
separate road tax must be paid. Here again, receipt of payment is ack- 
nowledged by a special receipt form and/or sticker (more performative 
items). 
The sum of all these procedures amounts to permission from the 
state to drive the vehicle on its public roads. Note that the component 
performatives in this case were sometimes marked by a signature, some- 
times by a special seal or sticker, and sometimes both. 
Similar types of permission structures exist w i t h  organizations. 
Here a common example is the request of some department to purchase 
a large item. Often such a request must be approved by a number of indi- 
viduals to verify for instance that the item is technicelly sound, compati- 
ble with similar items in the organization, competitively priced, etc. In 
each step along the way, the permission performance is inevitably sig- 
naled by the signature of the authorizing individual. 
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Another common type of organization performative is order giving. 
Interestingly, this seems to be a more efficient process than permission 
granting. The difference seems to be that orders are generally given by a 
single individual to a number of others. whereas permission often needs 
to be granted by a number of people together for a single person. For 
this reason, perhaps, order giving seems less tnvolved in the concept of 
red tape. 
There is, however, an interesting duality betwe en permission grant- 
ing and order giving. %s relies on the discussion of deontic logic from 
the preceding chapter. Let "q" symbolize some particular type of action. 
Then the following operators are used: 
0 q (q is obligatory) 
P q. (q is permitted) 
F q (q is forbidde.n/prohibited) 
Without going into any more logical details, two interesting points can be 
brought out. The first is that permission and prohibition are negates. 
That is, to permit some action is not to forbid it and vice versa. Symboli- 
cally, 
The more interns- insight, however, is that obligation and permission 
are logical duals. That is, to be obhged to perform some action, q, is 
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equivalent to not being permitted not to do it. Conversely, bemg permit- 
ted to do a certain action is to not be obliged not to do it. Symbolically, 
The relevance of this to the discussion a t  hand is that it suggests a family 
of what might be called 'deontic performatives' that are inter-definable. 
A deontic performative document is one that obliges, permits or forbids 
some action. These are important in that they indicate the link between 
performative documents and authority structures. 
Let x and y indicate two people or roles in the organization. Then 
the preceding notation can be modified to indicate three basic types of 
authoritative action: 
(x 0 y) q = x orders y to q 
(x P y) q = x permits y to q 
(x F y) q = x forbids y to q 
The enabling requirement in each of these cases is that x has the autharc 
ity ( w i t h  the organization) to control y's behavior in doing q. The argu- 
ment we want to make is that signed, performative documents nearly 
always signal a change in deontic status. 
Lee (1980 and 1981) analyzes the deontic structure of contractual 
relationships b e t w e m  organizations. Indeed, nearly all inter- 
organizational transactions - with the exception of cash sales - involve a 
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deontic aspect. 
For example, credit sales and bank loans, bonds, certain types of 
preferred stock, etc. create an obligation to a later payment action. 
Insurance c~ntracts  establish a contingent obhgation of the insurer to the 
insuree. Easements and licenses of various kinds establish a permission 
relationship between the parties. 
In each case, the signing of the contract creates a change in deontic 
status. For example, signing a bank note creates an obhgation to pay 
that previously did not exist. An easement creates a permission to lim- 
ited use of another's land, altering the general prohibition against 
trespassing. 
Our suggestion here is that a similar view applies to transactions 
within an organization. .The red tape within organizations shares many 
characteristics of contractual relationships between organizations. 
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E. THE IMDMDTJATION PROBI,W 
In the last couple of decades, the analysis of document processing 
and flows iri organizations has become closely coupled with efforts to 
apply computer based information technology to the task. The most sub- 
stantial change introduced when a particular document process is 
automated is that the documents themselves no longer have a fixed phy- 
sical counterpart as paper, but are instead only magnetic or electronic 
patterns. Th~s offers enormous flexibility for information transmission 
and processing; transfer of the document from one geographic location to 
another is effectively instantaneous. Likewise, several people can sirnul- 
taneously work on different parts of the document at the same time, 
since they may all access a centralized representation of it. 
While this technolody is especially well-suited to handling the infor-  
mative content of documents, it does not accommodate documents hav- 
ing a p m f m a t z v e  aspect. Ths is due to the fact that in paper form, a 
performative document has a physical uniqueness that it loses when con- 
verted to a magnetic medium. For physical representations, we have 
clearly developed concepts of individuality and uniqueness. When we 
move a physical document from one place to another, we know for 
instance, that it is the same document; whereas, if we see two duplicate 
documents, we know they are not the same since they occupy different 
physical locations at  the same time. 
The sameness problem is an old philosophical chestnut. It is often 
illustrated by the so-called ' s h p  of Theseus.' Imagine a wooden boat. Re 
replace one plank. Is it the same boat? Now systematically replace all 
the planks. Is the second boat now the original boat? (A whole navy of 
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the same ship can be built by iterating t h s  process). Clearly, where we 
draw the line between the original boat and its duplicates is a matter of 
consensus. And that is the key point about performative paper - the 
uniqueness characteristic is a matter of long developed social convention. 
Kent, (1978), discusses similar difficulties in the context of database 
design. 
In electronic form, the original recording of a document is indistin- 
guishable from any of its duplicates. Indeed, what appears as the elec- 
tronic movement of a document from one place to another is actually 
copying its information pattern from one magnetic device to another, 
then erasing the original. Thus, the concepts of individuality and unique- 
ness of an original and its copies become blurred when a document is 
converted to magnetic form. Our social conventions delineating unique- 
ness are not yet refined for electronic media. 
Strawson (1959) presents philosophical discussion of the individua- 
tion problem. He observes that the entities for which we have a clear 
concept of individuality and uniqueness are those that can be situated, 
either directly or by a unique chain of associations, in the general frame- 
work of space and time. 
Thus, hard, physical objects that undergo only minor transforma- 
tions have a unique location in the spatial temporal framework a t  any 
point in time. More diffuse objects are more difficult to individuate. An 
example might be a disease. Asserting that two patients have the same 
disease typically means that the bacteria or virus are biologically of a 
common category, or it may mean that they are of a common population. 
The latter assertion includes a conjecture of contagion. A population has 
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a spatial/temporal location whereas a generic type does not. 
Movlng into the domain of conceptual objects indmiduation becomes 
more difficult. Consider for instance a musical composition. We may 
know it through various performances or its various .representations as 
printed musical scores. But to claim that any two of these are the same 
typically reduces down to identifying a chain of reproductions back to an 
original event when the piece was composed, i.e., locating it in 
space/tirne. 
Other conceptual entities whose historical origins have been forgot- 
ten are notoriously difficult to individuate. For example, people typically 
distinguish various forms of socialism by relating them to their original 
authors, e.g., Marxism, Maoism. However, the various forms of capitalism 
are not so clearly distinguished, since the historical origins are not so 
well known. 
In database management it is common to distinguish between type 
and instance. A typical example is the generic concept EMPLOYEE vs 
individual instances of employees, John Doe, Mary Smith, etc. The point 
here is that this distinction is fairly well understood in the case of physi- 
cal objects, but becomes blurred as one considers less tangible entities. 
The above example of music compositions is an important intermedi- 
ate case. Books and other printed materials have similar individuation 
charactenstics, namely that they are easily reproducible (Thompson 
1981). Computer software and data have this feature in the extreme. 
Indeed, in virtual memory systems and distributed databases, a particu- 
lar program or data set may be automatically copied to and from hun- 
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dreds of locations without the user's awareness. It is the extremely facile 
reproducibility of computer media that presents a challenge to the 
management of performative documents, for these require non- 
reproducibility. 
But why does originality and uniqueness of representation play such 
an important role in the case of performative documents? Basically, it is 
due to the above mentioned observation that the document serves as 
social evidence of someone's personal commitment to a belief, attitude, 
or intention. In physical form this evidence is much easier to control, 
e.g., I can void a check by tearing it up. The cases where this is most sen- 
sitive are when the document serves to obligate the author (or sometimes 
another party) to the performance of some actions, tor instance, paying a 
sum of money. Here it is essential that the document have a unique, 
non-duplicable representation so that the author cannot be forced into 
further oblqations by simple mechanical reproduction. 
Note that encryption methods for producing digital signatures (e.g., 
Diifie and Hellman 1979) do not address this particular problem. They 
guarantee the identities of the sender and recipient of a communication, 
but do not block the reproducibility of the document once it has been 
received. 
The major application of computer management of performative 
documents is the case of electronic funds transfer system (EFTS), used 
for financial transfers between banks and other financial institutions. 
Here the individuation problem is controlled by a neutral thra party (the 
Federal Reserve in the US), which monitors the transactions and insures 
against illegal reproduction. This is similar to the role of a witness in 
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verbal contracts, or to the role of a notary in other types of legal transac- 
tions. The notary function, or some analogous form of social convention, 
is one way of resolving the individuation problem arising from the elec- 
tronic representation of performative communications. Unfortunately, 
this increases the amount of human overhead of the system's operation 
and so reduces its cost/effectiveness. 
The individuatron problem of performative documents is thus one 
involving the interaction between information technology and the sociol- 
ogy of organizations. Further aspects of this interaction are the subject 
of the next chapter. 
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Bureaucracy. The term .is laden with negative connotations. One 
thinks of large, rigidified organizations with baroque, ritualized pro- 
cedures incapable of adapting to changing needs and conditions in the 
environment. In mentioning the term bureaucracy one usually also 
speaks of its means of perpetuation: the professional bureaucrat. These 
1 
are usually cast as unimaginative, plodding individuals socialized into the 
rule system of the bureaucracy to the point where the rules themselves, 
and not the purposes behind the rules, become the reason and guides of 
their employ. In recent years, another force has appeared that threatens 
to spread the phenomenon of bureaucracy even further, namely, the 
implementation of these bureaucratic rules and procedures in the form 
of computer-based administrative systems. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review in somewhat more depth the 
nature and interaction of these three forces: the bureaucratic organiza- 
tion itself; the bureaucrats who populate such organizations; and the spe- 
cial impact of information technology on the organization's operation. 
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B. BUREAUCRkTIC ORGANIZATIONS 
The term 'bureaucracy', as both a popular and scientific term, has 
come to have a variety of often overlapping definitions. The definition 
used here is due to Weber (1956i1978). To Weber, the process of bureau- 
cratization is a shift from organizational management based on the 
interests and personalities of specific individuals, to one based on explicit 
NLes and procedures. These rules and procedures are identified with 
roles in the organization rather than individual people. Bureaucratic 
organizations thus take on an impersonal, mechanical character. To 
Weber, this is a positive development lea- to greater effectiveness and 
efficiency 
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehu- 
manized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber 
1956/1978:975). 
Bureaucracies are sometimes characterized as having a 'mechanis- 
tic,' form of administration based on fixed rules and procedures as 
opposed to 'organic' organizations, which rely more on individual discre- 
tion (Burns and Stalker 1961). Bureaucracies in this sense are becoming 
of increasing importance in both planned and free market economies 
though the roles are somewhat different. 
In a planned economy, the rationalization of management is central 
to the ideology. However. to Marx, bureaucracy was a major evil to be 
abolished: 
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Bureaucracy becomes an autonomous and oppressive force 
which is felt by the majority of the people as a mysterious and 
distant entity - as somethng which, although regulating their 
lives, is beyond their control and comprehension, a sort of divin- 
ity in the '  face of which one feels helpless and bewildered 
(quoted in Abrahamsson1977:38). 
Here the term 'bureaucracy' is used in a shghtly different sense from 
Weber, denoting government bureaucracies in particular. The relevance 
for Marx was that these are an important concentration of social power. 
In market economies, bureaucracy seems to be regarded more as a 
concession to inadequacies in market mechanisms. Here we need to dis- 
tinguish bureaucracy from hierarchy. Williamson (1973) discusses 'mark- 
ets vs hierarchies' as a problem of economic organization. In certain 
cases resources are allocated via market mechanisms; in other cases 
they are allocated withia an organizational hierarcy, which may be under 
either public or private control. Hierarchies become bureaucracies (in 
the sense used here) when their administration becomes rationalized, 
embodied in explicit rules. In the case of hierarchical organizations in 
the private sector. this rationalization process tends to evolve gradually, 
as the organization discovers regularity in its environment. 
Governmental luerarchies, by contrast, are typically created by 
legislation and so become bureaucracies from the outset.. Downs 
(1967:32,34) cites a number of factors for the creation of governmental 
hierarcies. One is the case of consumer goods with large 'external' costs 
or benefits. An external cost or benefit is one not reflected in the good's 
free market price--for instance. the smog created by automobile exhaust, 
or non-biodegradable detergents that pollute rivers. The point is that 
market mechamsms do not take these external costs into account in 
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selecting an equilibrium consumption level. To compensate for these 
inadequacies, a bureaucracy is often created. 
Another case where a free market mechanism does not operate well 
is with so-called 'collective goods'. These are goods with indivisible bene- 
tits; once the good exists, everyone benefits *ether or not they have 
paid their share. An example is national defense. In a tree market, each 
person is motivated to avoid paying his/her part; since everyone makes 
this assumption, the collective good is not acquired. Again, to avoid this 
pathology of the market system, control of such goods is given over to a 
bureaucracy. 
A somewhat related situation arises in certain industries such as oil 
production or telephone services where economies of scale or patent con- 
trols create strong monopolistic tendencies. In order to protect the con- 
sumer from unfair pricing, two options have been employed, both bureau- 
cratic. One, is to nationalize the entire industry into a governmental 
agency. Examples are PWM, Mexico's national oil company and the 
various F T s  in European countries. The other alternative, effectively 
only slqhtly different, is to create a governmental regulatory agency to 
control the monopoly's behavior, e.g., the FTC and FCC in the U.S. 
The rationalization of organizations, in itself, would seem to be 
inherently positive and equitable. Indeed, this is the implicit goal behind 
most of management science and operational research. 
However, there seems to be an undesirable side effect that accounts 
for much of the negative connotations we attach to the term bureeu- 
cracy, namely, that mhly  rationalized organizations apparently become 
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inflexible and unresponsive to changes in the environment. Weber com- 
ments: 
Once fully established, bureaucracy is among those social struc- 
ture which are hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of 
transforming social action into rationally organized action ... the 
ruled, for their part, cannot dispense with or replace the 
bureaucratic apparatus once it exists, for i t  rests upon expert 
training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set 
on habitual virtuosity in the mastery of single yet methodically 
integrated functions. .. 
Such an apparatus makes 'revolution', in the sense of forceful 
creation of entirely new formations ot authority, more and more 
impossible-technically, because of its control over the modem 
means of communication (telegraph, etc.), and also because of 
its increasingly rationalized inner structure (Weber 
1956 / 1978:987-989). 
One aspect - at least in market economies - for the unresponsive- 
ness of bureaucracies is that they typically have achieved a monopolistic 
or protected position where they are not forced to change by competitive 
pressures. Nonetheless, newly elected politicians and corporate 
presidents often recognize and attempt to relieve the problem, though 
typically with little success. 
Jay Galbraith (1973. 1977) offers a useful framework for analyzing 
the problem. A currently popular theory of organizations is the informa- 
tion processing view, due principally to Simon (e.g., Simon 1955, March 
and Simon 1958). The key concern is how the organization copes with the 
c o v l a z i t y  of its environment, given the bounded rationality (cognitive 
limitations) of its managers. Galbraith extends the information process- 
ing view of organizations, to a 'contingency theory' approach. He regards 
the complexity of the organizations task as only one dimension of its 
intormation processing difficulties. 
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Another dimension is added to the organizational design problem, 
what Galbraith calls uncrntainty. This refers to the degree of unpre&cta- 
bility of the tasks performed in the organization: 
Uncertainty is defined as the difference between the amount of 
information required to perform the task and the amount of 
information already possessed by the organization (19735). 
The importance of this relates to the organization's ability to plan or 
pre-program its activities: 
The greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of 
information that must be processed among tiecision makers 
during task execution in order to achieve a given level of perfor- 
mance (19?3:4). 
1 
Galbraith classifies the nature of the organization's overall cognitive 
task (as well as any of its subtasks) on a two dimensional framework of 
complexity and uncertainty. This may be viewed as a matrix (Figure 
[9.1]) characterizing tbe different types of cognitive tasks that organiza- 
tions face. In situations of h g h  complexity but low uncertainty, the 
organization is able to plan and routinize its activities. These are the con- 
ditions under which bureaucracy is most effective. In situations of low 
complexity and high uncertainty, by contrast, the organization is con- 
stantly being surprised by changes in the environment. Here, the most 
effective form of administration seems to be one that relies heavily on the 
discretion of its employees. Burns and Stalker (1961) use the terms 
'mechanical' -and 'organic' to describe these contrasting forms of 
administration. 
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The problem, of course, is deciding what form of administration is 
appropriate when the environmental demands are both .hghly complex 
and hghly uncertain. 
As observed, rationalization is the typical response to complexity. 
An apparent difficulty with rationalization, however, is that when a once 
stable environment becomes more uncertain, the organization seems to 
have difficulties de-rationaliung, that is, removing rules and procedures 
and relying more on individual discretion in order to become more adap- 
tive. One factor is likely to be that it has reached a level of internal com- 
plexity that cannot be maintained in a less rationalized type of organiza- 
tion. 
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The desired response would be to move quickly to another tughly 
rationalized configuration. However the complex of bureaucratic pro- 
cedures represents a large scale intellectual effort of many people over 
time. Bureaucracies are not built in a day. The time required to con- 
struct a new configuration may be too long compared to the rate of 
environmental change. 
Implicit here is the observation that the rationalization of adminis- 
tration and organizational adaptability seem to be conflicting principles. 
The next sections examine possible reasons why. 
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C. THE BUREAUCRATIC PEXSONALlTY 
Seldom are bureaucracies discussed without considerlug the role 
played by the people who staff them. Weber for instance remarks: 
the professional bureaucrat is chained to h s  activity in his 
entire economic and ideological existence. In the great majority 
of cases he is only a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechan- 
ism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed routine of 
march (Weber lQ50/1978:988). 
A bureaucrat, unlike many other vocations, is heavily socialized and 
hence paychologically dependent on his/her active role in the organiza- 
tion. Bureaucracies such as have been described generally only arise in 
large organizations and then usually only after a fairly long period of 
adjustment and stabilization. Thus the activities of a bureaucrat are not 
only explicitly prescribed, but their full extent and interplay with other 
parts of the organization is also complex and difficult t o  learn. The 
bureaucrat therefore becomes an expert in his/her role in the pa7 tMar  
organization. This is for instance quite different from professionals or 
trade workers whose specialities are generally transferable to other 
organizations. 
A bureaucrat's training is thus peculiar to his/her organization. This 
makes it unsurprising that these people clmg tenaciously to their posi- 
tions, building defenses and guarding informational resources to make 
their positions more secure. 
This is one of the primary reasons why bureaucracies are so per- 
sistent. Indeed, they survive even national revolutions. For instance, 
speakmg about the post-revolutionary period in Russia. Lenin complained: 
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[During the revolutionary upheavals, the bureaucrats fkom the 
Tsaristic time had been shaken up and placed in new posts. But 
they did not remain there. They tried to regain their old posi- 
tions.] The Tsarist bureaucrats began to enter the Soviet insti- 
tutions and practice their bureaucratic methods, they began to 
assume the coloring of communists and, for greater success in 
their careers, to procure membership cards of the Russian Com- 
munist Party. And so, having been thrown out of the door, they 
fly in through the window! (Lenin, Selected Wwks, Vol VIII:353, 
quoted in Abrahamsson 1977:41-42). 
These remarks relate to the complexity and specialization of the 
bureaucrat's training. But the socialization process of the bureaucrat is 
not merely cognitive, it is also epistemic. The bureaucrat does not 
merely understand and obey the organizations rules and procedures, 
(s)he also comes to believe in them with an almost patriotic or religious 
faith. This leads to a concept of 'organizational myth.' Michael (1977) 
notes that as regards the social/economic world, there are no scientific 
truths. Yet we need some coherent set  of beliefs in order to plan and act. 
We need to have 'both feet planted firmly in .mid-air.' An important 
aspect of a successful organization is to provide a certain philosophy or 
set of 'myths' that provide social unity and focus. Deal and Kennedy 
(1982) propose a similar concept in what they call 'corporate culture'. 
Here the organizational myths are enthusiastic; the image is one of 
growth. innovation. aggressive and spirited competition. 
Bureaucracies, by contrast, have typically reached a stage where 
further growth and innovation are limited. The emphasis is rather on sta- 
bility, correctness, and control. Bureaucratic commandments are 
intoned, "Thou shalt not .. .." Aspiration and inspiration are tempered by 
the guilt of transgression. This results in what Thompson (1961:365) calls 
the 'bureaupathic reaction' where, 
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strict control from above encourages employees to 'go by the 
book,' to avoid innovations and chances of errors which put 
black marks on the record. It encourages the accumulation of 
records to prove compliance ... It encourages decision by pre- 
cedent, and u n w i l ~ n e s s  to exercise initiative or take a chance. 
I t  encourages employees to wait for orders and do only what 
they are told. 
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D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN BUREAUCRACIES 
Bureaucrats are no longer the only active force in bureaucracies. 
Whereas a bureaucrat is trained and socialized to follow prescribed pro- 
cedures, a computer can likewise be programmed to follow many of these 
same procedures. 
Indeed, the computerization of a bureaucratic process is the ulti- 
mate form of organizational rationalization. The computer is the arche- 
type of Weber's dictum to eliminate "love, hatred and all purely personal, 
irrational and emotional elements" from the organization's procedures. 
Yet while computers presumably help remove the undesirable 
caprice of bureaucrats themselves, they nonetheless have become sym- 
bols of pathological bureaucratic rigidity. We are all acquainted with the 
agonies of trying to rectify a computer based b i l w  error, etc. 
But is this really because the computerization of such processes 
actually makes them less adaptive, or is it rather that computers provide 
a convenient scapegoat for organizational incompetence? Systems 
analysts will often argue that the latter is the case. While this may be 
partially true, it is also true that computerization, at least in its most 
prevalent forms, does add to inflexibility. This stems from two interre- 
lated problems. 
The first is one of organizational responsibility: The people that use 
the computer programs are very seldom the ones that write them. Thus 
the people that are close to the problem and able to recognize needed 
modiiications as they arise, must request the assistance of a program- 
mer, who typically resides in a different (data processing) department. 
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Thrs problem has been widely recognized and is often cited as a motiva- 
tion for localized (microprocessor) computing and associated hqh  level 
languages that the functional departmepts themselves can control; see 
e.g. Fick (1880). However, this is likely to be only a partial solubon, 
applicable only to those procedures that are modular and separable to 
individual departments. The problem still would remain as to the 
management of procedures that pervade large segments of the organiza- 
tion, especially where these are complex and interdependent. 
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E. ~ U ~ Y S M A C H I N ~  
A characteristic of machine intelligence is that it is 'rule based'. Ii 
we consider only this software aspect (and ignore differences in processor 
hardware), then the most ubiquitous and successful examples of mechani- 
cal cognition are bureaucracies. Yet while the projects to create various 
types of artificial intelhgence have a certain romance and intellectual 
adventure about them, the term 'bureaucracy' seems at best dreary and 
more often spiteful. 
Consider how this view compares with standard models of computa- 
tion. Recall from chapter [I.], that in automata theory (e.g., Hopcroft and 
Ullrnan 1989) a computer may be regarded abstractly as a language pro- 
cessor, transforming an input string of symbols to output symbols. In 
information systems applications these symbols comprise formal 
language, which was called h, containing assertions about the 'real 
world' (organizational environment). These assertions are normally 
stored in the organization's database and the processor is invoked by 
queries, calls to application programs, etc. Hence, what is called 'auto- 
maton' here is meant to include the entire set of application programs, 
DBMS software, query interfaces, etc. 
The automaton, as language processor, is regarded as a grammar. 
This grammar is itsell defined in a notation, which was called &. Practi- 
cally, & corresponds t o  an arbitrary programming language. Ignoring 
efficiency considerations, & may be regarded as reducing to a set of 
production rules* of the form: 
Production systems are an abstracted notation for specifyiq formal language gramman. 
Them are diecursed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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IF <condition> THEN DO <action>. 
If none of the various conditions w e  met, that is, it no rule is actuated, 
the default is inaction. The machine doesn't do anythrng it's not 
instructed to do by one of its rules. 
A currently popular view of organizational management (e.g., March 
and Simon 1958) regards managers as information processors. Takmg 
the metaphor literally, the automaton might be replaced with a person. 
The 'programminge of this person might be in another language, LB, 
expressing the various bureaucratic rules and procedures this person is 
to follow. 
But& attempting to represent LB (bureaucratic programming) 
abstractly as was done for LC (computer program-), a problem is 
encountered using only production rules. As observed repeatedly in the 
literature on organizational psychology and sociology (e.g., Maslow 1943, 
McGregor 1900, Cyert and March 1983, March and Olsen 197Q), people are 
not naturally idle. They have their own individual interests, goals, aspira- 
tions, etc., which they seek to satisfy through their participation in the 
organization. 
When these correspond to the interests and goals of the organization 
itself, we tend to regard their independent behavior as 'initiative', o the r  
wise it is considered more as the dysfunctional pursuit of 'personal 
interest'. Lg (bureaucratic programming) therefore contains another 
basic aspect. It not only orders the execution of desired behavior, but 
zestrains the performance of undesired behavior. In the last chapter it 
was suggested that the underlying logic of bureaucratic procedures would 
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require the operators of deontic logic, namely, (for q an arbitrary 
action) : 
0 q q is obhgatory 
p q q is permitted 
F q q is forbidden. 
To be adequate as a language for bureaucratic procedures, these 
operators need to include an aspect of contingency (corresponding to 'the 
conditions in production rules). Unfortunately, contingency is not 
straightforward in deontic logic, and a number of proposals appear (Hil- 
pinen 1971/1981, 1981). Note that discretionary actions are those not 
forbidden, hence permitted. A 'perfect' bureaucracy, in the sense of 
being completely rationalized and determined, would eliminate permis- 
sions entirely. Everythmg would be either (contingently) obligatory or 
forbidden. 
This is of course a macabre and unworkable design tor any human 
organization. As Norbert Wiener (1967) once argued, such extreme regi- 
mentation is an inhuman use of human beings; such activities are not 
only economically but morally better left to machines. 
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F. CORPORATE CULTURES 
The information processing views invite the comparison between 
(human) organizations and (mechanical) computers. However, people 
have a characteristic that computers (as we know them) do not have, 
namely p r e j e m c e s  (intrinsic goals, values, drives, motivations, etc.) . 
People may p r e f w  chocolate to vanilla, computers don't. 
Computer programs are composed of commands. Their behavior is 
described as a sequence of imperatives, where the default is inaction. 
However, the default behavior of people depends on their individual 
interelsts and desires. This leads to the observation that a major effect of 
bureaucratic red tape is not just to invoke action but also to constrain it. 
It is for this reason that deontic logic, rather than imperative logic, has 
been suggested as the appropriate model of bureaucratic authority. 
Subordinates are not automatons. Bureaucratic rules and procedures 
r e s t r a i n  rather than simply dictate their behavior. (Consider the' union 
strategy 'work to rule', which can be nearly as  effective as strikes in 
worker protests.) 
An important aspect of bureaucracies is the substitutability of per- 
sonnel. This is accomplished through detailed job descriptions, which 
prescribe and limit the activities of the people in these roles. It is 
through this device that the bureaucracy maintains a uniformity of 
response throughout its geographical and temporal extension. Idiosyn- 
cratic behavior of individuals is restricted in a complex of prohibitions, 
obhgations and permissions. 
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In the bureaucratic philosophy, idiosyncratic behavior is regarded as 
bad, sometbmg to be eliminated. The implicit assumption is that t h s  
behavior will not be directed towards the organization's goals, but to 
purely personal ones. However, idiosyncratic behavior that furthers the 
organization's interest is initiative. This is the source of adaptation and 
innovation. 
In the Galbraith matrix ( m u r e  [9.1]), the unexplained quadrant in 
the lower right included organizations facing environments that are both 
hghly complex and hghly uncertain. Yet such organizations exist and 
flourish - e.g., IBM, Dupont, General Electric, as well as 'Japan Inc.'. Deal 
and Kennedy (1982) introduce an additional explanatory component in 
their concept of 'corporate cultures'. From a number of case studies of 
large corporations in various industries and circumstances, they observe 
'strong culture' to be an important success factor. 
Culture is of course a difficult variable to define. They intend it in 
the anthropological sense indicating a commonality of interests, beliefs, 
and values. Further, this is not an accidental coincidence: people iden- 
tify themselves as members of the culture and accept the collective views 
and interests as major influences on their own. Thus in such multi- 
culture countries as Switzerland, Canada, or Belgium, there are few 
remaining racial differences between the cultural sub-groups. Rather 
people become members of the culture at birth and are socialized to 
accept the local norms and habits. Amongst these dialect is an especially 
important aspect of cultural identification (e.g., Swiss-German a 
Austrian-German 8s Bavarian-German). 
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Identification and socialnation are major aspects of corporate cul- 
tures as well. Initiation into the culture begins with employment inter- 
views, which are often conducted with great care. Deal and Kennedy cite 
an example from Tandem, Inc. (to them, a strong culture company) 
where an employee was interviewed four times for a position as purchas- 
ing clerk. The point is that these companies screen very carefully for cul- 
tural compatibility. 
Once accepted, the socialization in these companies is very strong. 
Aside from normal task related concerns, these companies sustain ela- 
borate structures of corporate ceremonies, mottos, heros, and legends. 
The employee, in addition to membership in the social culture, is rein- 
forced in his/her membership in the organizational culture. Thus while 
Americans, French, Germans, etc., each share certain similarities in men- 
tality, work ethics and values, so too do the IBM, the Procter and Gamble, 
the General .Electric cultures, even though they span several social cul- 
tures. 
Through membership in the organizational culture, employees do not 
necessarily come to think alike, but rather they think together. Rather 
than simply following bureaucratically defined communications channels, 
the informal communication becomes an important integrating aspect. 
Informal socidizlng is a major aspect in all organizations. The key point 
here is that in a strong corporate culture it becomes organizationally 
directed. 
Through socialization, the organization's goals are a strong influence 
on the employee's goals. Personal interest tends to correspond more 
closely with the organization's interest. On the other hand, the 
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organization's interests are more likely to be influenced by the consen- 
sual interests of Its employees as well. Since the employees maintain a 
dual cultural membership, in the organization and in the surrounding 
society, the employeese influence helps to ensure a more appropriate 
relationship between the organization and its social environment. 
G. MANAGING BUREAUCRATIC SOFTWATCE 
The concept of corporate culture is an enthusiastic one. It has some- 
thing of the flavor of a large scale football rally, complete w i t h  mottos 
such as 'progress is our most important producte (General Electric), 
'better thmgs for better living through chemistry' (Du Pont), and so on. 
However, a football team does not succeed only on team spirit. Rationali- 
zation is also important, e.g., football plays, specialized skills of the 
players. Likewise, rationalization is a vital complement to organizational 
culture. The point is that. to be effective, it mustn't supercede the cul- 
ture (this applies .on a societal level as well). Rationalization is a tool, a 
component of administration, but not the whole thing. 
This suggests that rationalization is a thing to be managed, just as 
the organization manages other assets and technology. The intormation 
processing metaphor invites a concept of 'bureaucratic software'.+ 
Bureaucratic software is the collection of rules, procedures, job descrip- 
tions, etc., in the organization. The issue is whether t h s  can be managed, 
perhaps drawing on the experiences from managing computer software. 
Indeed, the metaphor converges a t  the level of automation in the organi- 
Dohrov (1079) has a related concept he oalh 'otgcmre'. 
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zation, computerization being an extreme form of rationalization. 
The advantages of a concept of bureaucratic software would be to 
apply such concepts as program libraries and various programmer aids 
to the design and maintenance of organizational rules and procedures. 
The eventual goal would be towards improved bureaucratic software 
engineering. 
This raises the issue of language. Bureaucratic software at present is 
largely in a natural language form. However, it typically occurs in a res- 
tricted style and content, somewhat like the 'legalese' of commercial con- 
tracts or legislation. There is little poetry in job descriptions and pro- 
cedure manuals. The conjecture is that a substanbal part of t h s  could be - 
coditied in a more formal language, capable of mechanical inference. It is 
here that mechanical aids could be developed to aid in the adaptation of 
bureaucratic structures. 
The potential would be to increase the ability to easily modify 
bureaucratic rule systems in response to changing circumstances. But 
modifiability is not only a ditiicult issue for bureaucratic software but for 
computer software as well. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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A THE PROBLEM: SOFTWARE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
It is a commonplace observation that organizations, to survive, must 
adapt to changes in their environment. Those that do not are forced out 
of business, if they are companies in a competitive market; have their 
budgets canceled,in the case of government bureaucracies; or are 
overthrown, in the case of governments themselves. 
Just how an organization should be designed to accommodate change 
is, of course, a much more difficult matter, and has been the subject of 
many volumes of organizational theory. One aspect of this general prob- 
lem seems to have been neglected, namely, the effect of information 
technology on the organization's ability to adapt and change. 
Certainly, there are numerous clear cases where the installation of 
an information system adds to the organization's flexibility. For instance, 
the installation of a centralized database may allow data to be accessed 
and combined in a variety of ways that would have been practically 
impossible when that data was recorded in paper files scattered 
throughout the company. 
The flexibility of a given computer application obviously depends on 
the foresight of its designers. To this end, programming students are 
generally taught to seek the most general definition of the problems they 
are given so that the resulting program can handle not only the immedi- 
ate problem but also variants of it that might arise. 
This strategy has obvious limitations. In see- to find a general- 
ized solution. the programmer may waste undue amounts of time on con- 
ditions that will never arise. He/she must therefore make a choice as to 
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how much flexibility to encode into the program logic. We refer to the 
level of flexibility chosen as the 'designed flexibility' of the system. 
Selecting the appropriate level of designed flexibility is however diffi- 
cult and, almost certainly, new requirements will later arise that were not 
planned for originally, so that the program must be modified. This is 
where the problem arises. 
Anyone who has written even small programs will know that it is 
much easier to incorporate a given feature in the program logic in its ori- 
ginal writing rather than try to add this feature afterwards. This diffi- 
culty rises exponentially with the complexity of the original program or 
system. (By 'system' is meant a collection of programs and data files with 
interdependent functions.) Indeed, the cost and effort of modttylng such 
systems often exceeds that of their original development. For instance, 
W u U  (1977) refers to: . 
the extreme difficulty encountered in attempting to modify an 
existing program. Even though we frequently believe that we 
know what we will want a piece of software to do and will be able 
to specify it precisely, it seems to be invariably true that after 
we have it we know better and would like to change it. Examina- 
tion of the history of almost every major software system shows 
that so long as it is used it is being modified! Evolution stops 
only when the system is dead. The cost of such evolution is 
almost never measured, but, in a t  least one case, it exceeded 
the original development cost by a factor of 100. 
Altering existing computer systems is not only expensive, it is also 
risky. De Millo, e t  al. (1979) noted: 
Every programmer knows that altering a line or sometimes even 
a bit can utterly destroy a program or mutilate it in ways we do 
not understand and cannot predict ... 
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Indeed, beyond expense and risk, there seems to be an eventual limit 
to the number of modifications these systems can undergo. Winograd 
(1979) remarks 
Using current programming techniques, systems often reach a 
point at  which the accretion of changes makes their structure 
so baroque and opaque that further changes are impossible, and 
the performance of the system is irreversibly degraded. (p.392) 
To summarize, the basic problem with current application systems is 
that they are 'brittle'; i.e. they cannot easily be reformed to adapt to 
changing circumstances. This brittleness has profoundly disturbing 
consequences as more and more organizations, ranging from small and 
medium size companies to immense governmental agencies, convert 
their idormation processing to computer software. The immediate gains 
of increased efficiency. speed of processing, rapid access to centralized 
data files, etc., are clear (or the investment would not be justified). 
However, there may be a long term, possibly devastating hidden cost 
as the organization finds its ability to adapt and respond to new environ- 
mental conditions hampered by its inability to modlfy its information sys- 
tems accordingly. 
By 'application system' (or simply 'application') we refer to a com- 
puter system composed of various program and data files that together 
perform some identifiable organizational task - e.g. sales 6rder process- 
mg, inventory control. O u r  attention is therefore to the software that 
deals directly with the organization's operations and not for instance 
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operating systems etc., which service the internal operations of the com- 
puter. 
Applications software of this sort is by and large custom made for 
each organization usually by an in-house data processing (DP) depart- 
ment. More importantly, these applications are typically written 'from 
scratch'. That is, they do not make use of previously developed program 
code pertinent to the problem domain. 
The exception to this is the use of 'off the shelf' program packages 
and, occasionally pre-written subroutines which the new program can call 
a t  the appropriate point. For instance, numerous packages exist to do 
statistical analyses and quantitative algorithms and are used quite ?re- 
quently in scientific applications. Likewise, off-the-he1 packages exist to 
do such organizational tasks as  payroll processing and inventory control. 
This latter class of pre-written software has, however, been less success- 
f u l .  
The problem, once again, has to do with the 'designed flexibility1 of 
the package. In scientific applications, the contexts in which a particular 
analysis or algorithm is used is relatively well specified. For instance, in 
any application of a linear programming algorithm one must specify the 
objective function, constraints and technological co-efficients and one 
receives the values of the decision variables as a result. For most organi- 
zational applications, however, the problems are less standardized. Prob- 
ably the most regular of these is payroll processing, but even there con- 
siderable variations may exist from one firm to another as to benefits to 
be added. automatic deductions, classifications of labor, etc. 
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In order to make use of an off-the-shelf package for such applica- 
tions, the particular characteristics of the organization's problem must 
fall within the designed flexibility of the package. When this does not 
occur the DP department may sometime try to modify the package. How- 
ever, the general experience is that it is usually easier and more reliable 
to re-program the whole thmg from scratch. 
We call this aspect of application software development the problem 
of 'transportability of knowledge' from one application to another. As 
observed, this is generally an all or nothlng proposition. One may tran- 
sport chunks of knowledge from one system or program to another only 
Fn the case that the chunk corresponds to a whole program or subroutine. 
There seems to be no middle ground; that is, where one could make use of 
an arbitrary part of one program function in developing mother. 
The consequence of this is that software for organizational informa- 
tion processing is not a smooth evolution; it does not build naturally from 
previous experience. Thus, for example, after a quarter century of 
automated payroll processing, firms still often have to write new payroll 
programs. 
By contrast, knowledge in the form of human expertise is easily tran- 
sportable. For instance, when company X hires a new bookkeeper, it is 
doubtful X's accounting system exactly fits the bookkeeper's training or 
previous experiences. However, provided the new person is reasonably 
competent, he/she can adapt to the new system after a brief orientation 
period. With applications software it is as though a complete re- 
education, start= with grammar school, were necessary. 
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We summarize the arguments thus far. The basic claim is that a fun- 
damental problem exists in the basic architecture of applications sys- 
tems, namely, that they are too 'brittle' and resistant to change. l lus has 
two important consequences. One, as discussed in the last section, is that 
as an organization becomes increasingly reliant on its information sys- 
tem, it too becomes brittle and unable to adapt easily to new situations. 
The other consequence, the point of this section, applies not just to  indivi- 
dual organizations, but to  information system technology a t  large: 
current software architecture does not provide the proper tramework for 
a smooth evolution of problem solving capability. We are forced to 
repeatedly re-invent wheels. Progress (what little can be seen) has 
always been in the form of someone's coming up with a bigger wheel. 
That this is wasteful of money and effort is the smaller part of the prob- 
lem. The deeper difficulty is that when someone finds an improved 
method for some organizational task, these advances cannot easily be 
promulgated to other software for related tasks. The industry of applica- 
tions software development thus cannot build on its accomplishments, 
and must continually re-start from the ground. 
In the sections to follow, we examine the technical reasons why appli- 
cations systems are so brittle. This has two closely related aspects: the 
first arising from the way program logic is structured; the second due to 
the ways data is organized in data tiles and data bases. An alternative 
architecture for applications software will be proposed that avoids these 
problems, albeit not without certain costs. 
C. THE PROBLEM WlTH PROGRAHS: 
PROCEDURAL LANGUAGES VS PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
Statements in a programming language are in the form of commands 
to the machine - e.g. add this, move this data from here to there, print 
this on the terminal. 
A computer program is thus a segumce of such statements, e.g. 
Here, the statements have been numbered for identification pur- 
poees. Importantly, the ordering of the statements in this program indi- 
cates the sequence in which the commands are to be performed by the 
machine. 
This otherwise Linear sequence of execution can be modified by what 
are called 'control statements'. Consider, for instance, the program: 
10 LETX= 0 
20 ADD 1 TO X 
30 PRINT X 
40 IFX= 100 GOT060 
50 GO TO 20 
80 STOP 
When 'executed, this program prints t4e numbers from 1 to 100. 
Here, statements 40 and 50 are control statements. In statement 40. it X 
has reached 100, program control jumps to statement 60 where it stops. 
Otherwise, statement 50 directs the program control back to statement 
20 where X is again incremented, printed, etc. 
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Thus, the execution sequence in such computer programs normally 
follows the top to bottom ordering of the statements, except when super- 
ceded by the effects of control statements. 
Computer languages of this type are called ~ o c e d u r a l .  These are 
basically the only type used in commercial practice, and include all the 
well known languages for data processing and scientific applications - 
e.g. COBOL, FORTRAN, PLII, BASIC, ALGOL. 
In these cases, the knowledge embodied in the computer program is 
expressed as the specific steps for doing it. A key t u  to recognize is 
that this procedurality makes the statements of the program inter- 
dependent. Generally (though not always) changing the order of any two 
etatements makes a serious change to the program's operation. 
While it may not be patently obvious from the two tiny examples 
above, it is this inter-dependence that makes computer programs so diffi- 
cult to modify. 
As a result of an interesting blend of computer science and formal 
hguistics, an alternative approach has emerged over the last decade or 
so. This approach is based on so-called 'production systems' (PSs) which 
enable the knowledge of the program to be expressed in a form that is 
independent of its execution sequence. 
The concept of production systems was first proposed by the h g u i s t  
Post in 1943 to aid in the formal specification of natural language gram- 
mars. The basic idea is extremely simple. A single production is a rule of 
the form: 
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IF <pattern> THEN <action>, 
or, in the more usual notation, 
A production system consists of a 'data base' and a collection of such pro- 
duction rules. (This is a database in a fairly restricted sense, not to be 
contused with those maintained by database management systems.) 
The pattern in each rule is some condition to be matched by the 
database and the action is typically some modification to the database. 
In the purest form of a production system, the rules are arranged in a 
Linear order. Starting from the beginning the patterns are compared to 
the database until a successful match is found. The corresponding action 
is then performed and the process is repeated, starting once again from 
the beginning comparing the patterns to the database. 
Nilsson (1980:21) summarizes this as the following generalized pro- 
cedure: 
Pmcedu~e  PRODUCTION 
1. Data * initial database 
2. Until DATA satisfies the terminal condition, do: 
- -
3. begin 
-
4. select some rule, R, in the set of rules that can be applied to 
DATA 
5. DATA - result of applying R to DATA 
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6. end 
-
Consider for instance the following example for recognizing a certain 
type of English declarative sentence. 
1 THE --. DET 0 N - - . N P  
2 ON --. P R E P  g A D J N P - , N P  
3 HUNGRY --. ADJ 10 DET NP --. N P  
4 BIT --, VT 11 P R E P  N P  --. PP 
5 DOG --r N 12 V T N P  --. VP 
6 CAT --. N 13 VPPP--.VP 
7 NECK --. N 14 N P W - + S  
The production rules on the left represent a lexicon indicating the 
grammatical categories of various words. The rules on the right indicate 
the grammar proper. 
In formal grammars, a distinction is normally made between tewni- 
nd symbols, i.e., the basic symbols in the language (English words in this 
case), as opposed to n a -  tennmal symbols ,  whch indicate grammatical 
constructs. However, in a production system implementation of such a 
grammar, these are simply different elements of the database. When the 
database consists only of the symbol "S', the sentence is accepted as 
grammatical and the system halts. 
For example, suppose we have the sentence: 
"The hungry dog bit the cat on the neck." 
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the database transformations would be as follows. 
THE 
DET 
D m  
DET 
D m  
D m  
D m  
D m  
DET 
HUNGRY 
HUNGRY 
HUNGRY 
AD6 
ADJ 
ADJ 
ADJ 
ADJ 
ADJ 
DOG BIT THE CAT ON THE NECK 
DOG BIT DET CAT ON DET NECK 
DOG BIT DET CAT P R E P  DET NECK 
DOG BIT DET CAT PREP DET NECK 
DOG VT DET CAT P R E P  DET NECK 
N VT DET CAT PREP  DET NECK 
N VT DET N P R E P  DET NECK 
N VT DET N PREP DET N 
NP VT DET N P  P R E P  DET NP 
initial 
rule 1 
rule 2 
rule 3 
rule 4 
rule 5 
rule 6 
rule 7 
rule 0 
DET N P  VT DET N P  P R E P  DET N P  rule 9 
NP VT NP P R E P  N P  rule 10 
NP 
NP 
NP 
s 
halt 
rule 11 
rule 12 
rule 13 
rule 14 
rule 15 
Note that the production system would have reached the same con- 
clusion had the ordering of the rules been reversed. llus could hardly be 
done in an ordinary computer program. On the other hand, with the rules 
reversed, the system would have been much less efficient since, for 
instance, the initial translation of terminal symbols would have needlessly 
searched through the U h e r  level transformation rules. 
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The initial applications of production systems in computer science 
were in the area of compiler theory, i.e., in spec~tying the syntax and 
interpretation of programming languages (as opposed to natural 
languages). Subsequently, it has been recognized that PSs have a poten- 
tial much broader range of usefulness. For instance, one classic applica- 
tion was the Logical Theorist of Newell, Shaw and Simon (1983). Beginning 
with the initial axioms and rules of inference of Russell and Whitehead's 
M p a  Mathemntica, the Logical Theorist successfully proved all the 
theorems of this massive text. Indeed, in several cases it found original 
proofs, simpler than the original. 
Another famous example of the use of production systems was 
Shortlitfe's MYCIN system (1978). The purpose of MYCIN is to perform 
medical diagnosis. In this case, the database is the patient's symptoms, 
as revealed by various laboratory tests, etc. The production rules (some 
300 ot them) are thus the sort ot medical deductions a doctor might 
make based on these symptoms. For example: 
IF the ~ntection type is primary-bacteremia, 
the suspected entry point is the gastrointestinal tract, 
and the site ot the culture is one of the sterile sites, 
THEN there is evidence that the organism is bacteroides. 
Within the area of Artificial Intelhgence (AI) numerous other applications 
of production systems have been explored. 
Davis and King (16?5), is an excellent survey article on production 
systems. Commenting on the types of applications where PSs are best 
suited, they observe that 
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where the emphasis of a task is on recognition of large numbers 
of distinct states, PSs provide an advantage. In a procedurally- 
oriented approach, it is both difficult t o  organize and trouble- 
some to update the repeated checlang of large numbers of state 
variables and the correspondmg transfers of control .... 
[PSs are] characterized by the principle that "any rule can fire 
at any time," which emphasizes the fact that at any point in the 
computation, any rule could possibly be the next to be selected, 
dependmg only on the state of the database at the end d the 
current cycle. Compare this to the normal situation in a pro- 
cedurally oriented language, where such a principal is mani- 
festly untrue: it is simply not the case that, depending on the 
contents of the database, any procedure in the entire program 
could potentially be the next to be invoked. 
PSs therefore appear to be useful where it is important to 
detect and deal with a large number of independent states, in a 
system which requires a broad scope of attention and the capa- 
bility of reacting to small changes. 
With regard to the ease of modification of PSs, they continue (p.20): 
We can regard the rnoduLariQ of a program as the degree of 
separation of its fuzlctional units into isolatable pieces. A pro- 
gram is highly modular if any functional unit can be changed 
(added, deleted, or replaced) with no unanticipated change to 
other functional units. Thus program modularity is inversely 
related to the strength of coupling between its functional units. 
The modularity of programs written as pure production systems 
arises from the important fact that the next rule to be invoked 
is determined solely by the contents of the database, and no 
rule is ever called directly. Thus the addition (or deletion) of a 
rule does not require the modification of any other rule to pro- 
vide for (delete) a call to it. We might demonstrate this by 
repeatedly removing rules from a PS: many systems will con- 
tinue to display some sort of "reasonable" behavior, up to a 
point. By contrast, adding a procedure to an ALGOL-like pro- 
gram requires modification of other parts ot the code to insure 
that it is invoked, while removing an arbitrary procedure from 
such a program will generally cripple it ... 
Thus where the ALGOL programmer carefully chooses the order 
of procedure calls to create a selected sequence of environ- 
ments, in a production system it is the environment which 
chooses the next rule for execution. And since a rule can only 
be chosen if its criteria of relevance have been met, the choice 
will continue to be a plausible one, and system behavior remain 
"reasonable," even as rules are successively deleted. 
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As described so far, pattern matching proceeds from the beginning 
of the rule set each time until a match is found, in which case that 
correspondmg action is taken and the process is repeated. 
However, in the notion of a 'pure' PS, each rule supposedly has an 
equal chance of firing -i.e., its position in the rule set should not affect 
its chances of firing. This only causes difficulty when the patterns of 
more than one rule match the database, in which case a choice of which 
action to take must be made. A variety of approaches have been used to 
resolve such rule contention, for instance: 
rule order - use the first matclung rule. 
data order - data elements are assigned priority: pick the 
rule whose match gives the highest priority. 
generality order - use the most specific rule. 
recency order - use the most recently executed rule. 
Recall that each rule is matched against the entire database and 
that two simultaneously activated rules may have matches on completely 
eeparate parts of the database. Clearly, rule contention is only prob- 
lematic when the firing of one rule would disable the database match of 
the other candidate rule(s). 
Thus, in the pure form of a PS, aU of the rules should be tested 
against the database on each cycle, the subset of matcbmg rules 
selected, and a choice made (by some criterion) as to which of those 
should be allowed to fire. 
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However, as the database and/or number of rules gets large, the sys- 
tem degrades for lack of efficiency. In consideration of this, a number of 
production system implementations have allowed some degree of control 
structure to creep back in. Thus, various strategies or 'heuristics' have 
been employed to increase the likelihood that, for certain contexts, the 
applicable rules will be found quickly and that the entire rule set need not 
be examined without danger of ignoring an applicable rule. 
Thus, a number of PS implementations exhibit a greater or lesser 
degree of 'partial procedurality' as production systems augmented with a 
control structure mechanism. The design of such control structures, so 
as to provide efficient search without nullifying the advantages of flexibil- 
ity offered by the basic PS orientation, has become a matter of intense 
interest and debate within computer science (see for example Winograd 
1975; Kowalski 1979a). 
This is an interesting development for the context of this discussion 
since it provides a framework for exam- various styles of rule organi- 
zation and management along a c ~ u u r n  of procedurality, instead of a 
flat choice between the two extremes. 
A sign of the potential viability of production systems has been the 
rapidly increasing popularity of the language PROLOG: Originally 
developed in the early 1970's by Colmerauer at Marseille, France, it has 
since been re-implemented and extended numerous times at universities 
and research institutes in F'rance, England, Canada, Portugal. Hungary 
* The name PROLOG, standing for PROgramming m LOGic, ia now more of a historical a c r e  
nym due to the language's construction around the "resolution principle," a technique used 
in aIdomatic theorem proviPg. While theorem prwing remains as one of the application 
an- of PROLOG, its usage has since broadened cdderably to include relational databases, 
natural languqe pambq, expert syatems, etc. 
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and elsewhere. 
PROLOG is a 'backward inferencing' production system; i.e. PROLOG 
programs are written to deduce backwards from a specified goal to the 
available facts in the program's database. Partial procedurality may be 
introduced through a special device called a 'cut'. Thus, PROLOG pro- 
grams may be written as purely declarative rules, without using the cut; 
but may be made increasingly procedural through extended uses of the 
cut operator. 
Excellent texts on PROLOG are by Kowalski (1979b) and also Clocksi. 
and Mellish (1981); a wide range of PROLOG applications and example pro- 
grams are discussed in Coelho et d. (1980). A perceptive critique of the 
language for the American artificial intelligence community (which seems 
to be more committed to the language LISP), is given by McDermott 
(1080). 
D. THE PROBL&YWlTH DATA: 
MTA VS PKEDICATE CAICULUS 
Most application software used in organization centers around the 
processing of large amounts of data (as opposed to, for instance, optimi- 
zation routines that are much more computation intensive on relatively 
small amounts of data). Hence, inflexibilities introduced by the way data 
is organized in data files and databases are equally as important as (if not 
more so) those introduced in the design of procedural programs. A t  any 
rate, as will be seen shortly, the problema are highly inter-related. 
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A note on terminology. In the last section, the term database was 
used to designate the data repository of a production system. In t h s  sec- 
tion, the term database will be used more in the sense associated with 
database management (DM). Later we return to compare the two views, 
at which point they will be distinguished as PS databases and DM data- 
bases. 
For the moment, however, we consider a general view of data main- 
tained in data processing applications, whether this data is accessed 
through a database management system or not. The term 'data file'* will 
therefore be used to indicate a conventional data processing file or a logi- 
cal segment of a database (e.g. the tuples of a single relation in a rela- 
tional database; the instances of a single record type in a CODASYL data- 
base). The term 'database' will then be used to refer to a collection of 
such data files with inter-related subject matter (e.g. sales file, inventory 
file, back-order file), whether or not the access to these is coordinated by 
a DBMS. 
Data files are usually organized as a rectangular table with labeled 
columns called 'fields'. For instance, a file on employees might have 
fields for the employee's name, address, age, salary, etc. 
The term 'data file' here corresponds to 'relatian' as used in chapter 2. There, the inten- 
tion ras to link r e l a t i d  database theory to predicate logic as a bash for irrvtstigating the 
formal semantics ai databases. Here, while the caunectian to logic is also made, the con- 
c e r n ~ ~  are more practical, rdatiq to information aptern modifiability. The term 'data file' is 
therefore used to refer to actual types d iile organizatiana, whether 01. not they conform to 
the Relational Model. 
EMPLOYEE FlLE 
Sometimes data files have more complicated organizations - e.g. 
aome columns may have multiple entries tor a given data item. This tabu- 
lar view is sufficient for present purposes, however. Also, this is the basic 
view maintained by the more popular database management models (i.e., 
Network, Relational). 
Note that each data file has three levels of description: the &ta f i l e  
TIUM (e.g. EMPLOYEE), the field numas (e.g. NAME, AGE), and the data 
uduss (e.g. Smith, 37). I t  is important to note also that a data file 
represents a model of some aspect of the organization, in this case, what 
are considered to be the important features of employees. 
The structure of the data We often carries certain implicit informa- 
tion as well. Often, as in this example, each row of the data tile implies 
the existence ot some entity in the environment, in this case an employee 
associated with the company. The converse assumption is also some- 
times made, e.g. if a person's name does not appear in the file, then 
he/she is not an employee. 
. 
Name 
Adams 
Peters 
Smith 
Salary 
20,000 
18,000 
24,000 
Address 
5 Pine Street 
101 Broadway 
3 Park Place 
Age 
30 
45 
37 
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Other data files, however, might have ditferent existence assump- 
tions. Consider, for instance, a file for parts inventories: 
PART FlLE 
This file indicates the identification number (ID#), color, weight (WT) and 
quantity (QTY) on hand. of various manufactured parts. In this case, each 
row of the file does not imply the existence of a part, but only elaborates 
the features of each generic part type. The existence of actual parts is 
instead indicated by the QTY field. 
These might be called the existential assumptions associated with a 
file. Other assumptions refer to the possible data values that may appear 
in a given field, e.g. that SALARY must be less than 50,000. 
The basic point, however, is that the data file structure itself is not 
sufficient to convey all these assumptions. Instead, these appear in the 
logic of the programs that interpret these data files. Thus, the model of 
the organization represented in the application system is found not only 
in the data files but also in the code of the various application programs. 
This is a problem that has been recognized for some time in database 
management, and has led to a number of proposals for the separate 
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specification of so called 'data base constraints', conditions that the data 
in the database must always fulfill. Such constraints are maintained in a 
separate table, and verified by each updating program. However, these 
approaches do not go far enough. There is a basic problem that remains, 
which has to do with the very notion of 'data' itself. 
In all data processing files and database management systems, there 
is a distinction between d a t a  s h c f u r e  and the data itself. What we have 
called the datafile names and field names, are the data structure ele- 
ments of the view presented here. (Other views of data may have further 
structural elements.) Thus, for instance, in the above data file for parts, 
we have in the first row: COLOR = "RED, where the three character string 
"RED" is the value of the field COLOR. The point is that these data values 
are regarded as s M n g s  o j  chamct s l s  &her than as m & s  o j  objects 
irr the envinmment.  Viewed only as character strings, one is unable to 
spec* even very commonplace inter-relationships between thbse proper- 
ties: for instance, that it a thing has a color, it must be a physical object, 
hence, having weight, physical extension, geographcal location, etc. 
The basic problem is that the variables in data management models 
range over sets of c h a ~ a c t e r  s-gs (so-called 'attribute domains' in the 
relational model), rather than over objects in the environment. For 
instance, a database constraint that all parts are either red, blue or white 
would look something like: 
PART.COLOR = "RED" OR "BLUE" OR "WHITE" 
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To recognize that these are properties of objects in the environment, a 
predicate calculus notation might be used, introducing the variable x to 
range over these objects: 
1. Vx PART (x) --, RED (x) V BLUE (x) V WHITE (x) 
(the symbol "V" is read "for all"). The point is that in this form, one can 
begin to elaborate more general properties, i.e., not just of parts, but of 
anythq that has a color. 
2. Vx RED (x) V ORANGE (x) V Y E U O W  (x) V GREEN (x) 
V . . . V BLACK (x) - COLORED (x) 
3. Vx COLORED (x) PHYSICAL-OBJECT (x) 
4. Vx PHYSICAL-OBJECT (x) --. 3 n n > 0 & WEIGHT (x) = n. 
(the symbol "3 " is read,"there exists1'). 
Statement (2) is a disjunct of all color names used in the organiza- 
tion, indicating that any of these implies the general feature of being 
colored, and vice versa, that being colored implies one of these proper- 
ties. Statement (3) says that anything that is colored is also a physical 
object (though some physical objects - e.g. glass, mirrors -may not be 
colored). Statement (4) says that for any physical object there exists 
some positive number that is its weight (presuming some unit of weight 
measure). 
The direction intended by this example should begin to become 
clear. Reconsider the problem of transportability of knowledge discussed 
above. Clearly there are rnany colnmonplace connections between pro- 
perties that any organization would agree upon - e.g. the simple physics 
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of colors, weights, physical extent. These rules will hold for any physical 
object, from peanuts to box cars. Other classes of properties might be 
restricted to a particular social system - e.g. the number of spouses an 
employee might have, whether dual nationalities are recognized. Other 
classes of properties pertain to specific industries within a given social 
system -e.g. the accounting practices for banks vs. those for educational 
institutions. Lastly, there are clearly those properties that are organiza- 
tion specific, such as the ranks of personnel or the parts it manufactures. 
Ideally, the inter-relationship of properties a t  any one of these levels 
should only have to be deve.10ped once - e.g. commonplace physics by a 
national or world wide bureau of standards, accounting practices by an 
industry accounting board. Then, the task of any particular organization 
in developing its application software would only be to specify the d i f f w  
m c e s  of its local practice from that of the standardized models. 
The proposal here is, therefore, to offer a predicate calculus (PC) 
notation as a replacement for the usual data structure view, with the 
claim that i t  provides a richer framework, capable of specifying the 
inter-dependence of properties of objects, not just structured organiza- 
tions of character strings. 
I t  should be mentioned that this is not necessarily a recommenda- 
tion that facts about the environment actually be--stwed in this form - 
the underlying implementation might actually make use of a more con- 
ventional data management model - but rather that the top-most lave1 or 
visvr of the database have the PC form. 
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E. COldBINING THE APPROACHES: 
PRODUCXION SYSlXES AND PK&DICATE CALCULUS 
The point of the previous section was to recommend a predicate cal- 
culus notation as a richer form of data representation. Previously, a pro- 
duction system approach was suggested as a more flexible framework for 
specifying the potential actions of an application system. The final step 
in the proposal here is to combine these frameworks, i.e., to use the 
predicate calculus form of database as the database of the production 
system. 
This is essentially the approach used in chapter [2], based on logic 
programming. Whereas there the motivation was theoretical, to provide a 
bridge between relational database theory and formal language seman- 
tics, here the suggestion is that logic programming can be of consider- 
able practical interest as well. 
The problems initially set forth were twofold: the difficulties involved 
in modifymg applications software in response to organizational change; 
and the problem of 'transportability of knowledge', i.e., the difficulties of 
using parts of previously developed software in the development of new 
systems. 
Logic programming, by its non-procedurality and extreme modular- 
ity, offers a direction for relieving these problems. The trade-off,. how- 
ever. is that logic programming is computationally much more expensive 
than conventional methods. On the other hand, the cost of micro- 
processors continues to fall drastically. Indeed, these factors seem to 
underly the Japanese plans for developing the so-called 'fifth generation 
computer', having logic programming oriented hardware (Moto-oka, 
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1981). 
Whereas these developments ptomise improvements to the adapta- 
bility of computer software, they do not constitute a complete solution to 
the problems of organizational change. This is the subject of the next and 
final chapter. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we attempt to summarize and integrate the various 
observations made throughout the book. We believe they add up to an 
argument that the metaphor comparing managerial cognition to mechan- 
ical symbol processing, while useful, is also limited. This limitation 
centers around the dynamics of organizations: management will always 
be a human activity as long as societies, hence organizations, continue to 
change. Herein, we think, lies a theory of management decision support 
systems. It is a humanistic theory, based on what we view as complemen- 
tary advantages of human (organic) vs mechanical cognition. 
The theoretical position of DSS can perhaps best be outlined in con- 
trast to the theoretical interests of database management (DM), opera- 
tions research* (OR) bnd artificial intehgence (AI). DM is concerned 
mainly with descriphve representations. The emphasis is on simple yet 
computationally emcient data spuctures for represen- organizational 
facts. OR and AI, by contrast, are concerned mainly with inference. OR 
relies on quantitative inference whereas AI is more concerned with quali- 
tative aspects. 
The position of DSS is emphasized by distinguishmg three senses of 
the term, 'model'. 
In DM the term 'data model' is used to indicate the set of representa- 
tional constructs (vocabulary, formation rules) used to define a database. 
The US term 'operations research' used here, is somewhat mare restricted than the British 
term. 'aperationdl research'. Whereas the former focuses mainly on applied mathematics for 
industrial problew the latter includes as well human engineering and o r g d a a t i d  con- 
midaraticum. 
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An OR model, by contrast, is a mathematical algorithm whose deduc- 
tions are asserted to correspond to differences in magnitude along 
selected dimensions of a specifled real world situation. In AI the term 
model is used more in the sense of a 'psychological model'. The behavior 
of a computer program is designed to reproduce human information pro- 
cessing behavior. Thus both OR and A1 are concerned with inferential 
models, but difier in their desire to emulate human cognition. 
Besides descriptive and inferential models, another sense of model 
has been emphasized, namely a semantic model or infe7pmtation of a for- 
mal symbolic system. This sense complements the other senses of model 
in that DM, OR and AI models all depend on particular interpretations. 
The suggestion is that the theoretical foundations of DSS be distinguished 
by its concern with this third, semantic sense of model. 
In the remainder of this chapter the observations in the precedmg 
chapters are related to this formative theory of DSS. In order to help 
organize these arguments, the framework introduced in chapter [I.]., in 
which language and cognition is contrasted in humans and machines. For 
convenience, the diagram is repeated in Figure [11.1]. The diagram has 
two parts, comparing managers with an automaton. In part (a) a stan- 
dard conception of a Turing machine is drawn having an input and output. 
The symbol stream of this automaton is presumed to constitute a formal 
language, LRW, describing the real world. Lm therefore corresponds to 
the data stored, updated and retrieved In the organization's databases. 
This language is distinguished from LC, the computer language for prog- 
grammLng the automaton. 
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DIRECTIVES 
a. Mechanical cognition 
(LC) 
* 
6. Managerial cognition 
INPUT (LRw) 
x x 5  
In part (b) of Figure [11.1], the role of the automaton is substituted 
by a human manager, or perhaps a team of managers. Again there is a 
language, LRW, describing the real world, whch these managers process. 
In this case LRw is a natural language, though it may contain formal 
. w 
AUTOMATON 
o m U T  (LR~)  
0 0 0 
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language components. (Recall that formal languages have explicit and 
flxed rules controhq their syntax and semantics. Natural languages 
may evolve, dependmg on the consensus of the hguistic community.) 
Corresponding to LC, the computer language used to program the auto- 
maton, managers learn their duties in LB (for 'bureaucracy'), the 
language of their job descriptions and other directives. 
The subsequent discussion is divided into two parts. The &st part 
focuses on the language Lm and issues relating to semantic change in 
this language. The second part is concerned with fundamental 
differences between human vs mechanical cognition, reflected in 
differences in their respective command languages, LB and LC. 
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In chapter [I], the distinction was made between LC, the language 
referring to the computer and its operation, and LRw, which referred to 
the organizational environment. In current terminology this might be 
phrased as programming language semantics vs database semantics. Our 
concern here is with the latter. As before, we attempt to avoid the 
present debates (e.g. various data management models vs semantic net- 
work representations) by skipping over aspects of psychological model- 
ing, retrieval efficiency, etc. and assume that LRw can be characterized as 
a (first-order) predicate calculus language. 
The other advantage of this assumption is that it helps to focus the 
immense literature on formal semantics without computational distrac- 
tions. In the predicate calculus (data management and semantic nets as 
well) we typically make the assumption that semantics follows syntax. 
That is, the semantics of complex expressions is constructible from the 
semantics of its syntactic constituents (Dowty et al. 1981:Ch. 2). This is 
Frege's 'Principle of Compositionality': The role of the usual logical con- 
nectives and quantifiers in constructing the semantics of first order 
assertions is well studied (van Raassen 1971). What remains is the 
semantics of the open vocabulary of the logic, namely individual and 
predicate names. The approaches a t  this point divide roughly into two 
camps - what will be called the e z t g m s r h d  and intensional viewpoints. 
Here r e  are speaLing of formal, comtructad lanqutqes. The principle of cornpauitionality 
doesl't always hold in natural language, e.g. far proper nauns like 'Marilyn Monroe' or nomi- 
nal compoupds like 'md herring'. where the referrent of the expression is not canetructable 
from the referent. of it. component words. 
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1. Extendona1 Semantics 
The extensional viewpoint is dominant in formal logic, originating 
mainly from the model theory of Tarski (1956). Here, individual objects 
are regarded as primitive, leaving generic properties and relationships to 
be defined set theoretically. An interpretation or model, of a given (first 
order) predicate logic therefore begins with the assumption of a domain 
of individuals, D, and an interpretation function, F, which maps individual 
names to individuals in D, 1'-place predicates to subsets of D,. n-place 
predicates to relations on D, etc. Hence a model M of a language L has 
the form 
This is entirely satisfactory as long as the population of individuals in D 
can be clearly specified, and they.donOt change. 
However, a problem for management applications is that organiza- 
tions and their environments do change. Change is fundamental to 
economic growth; it can't be ignored. An obvious step is to extend the 
model to include a time dimension, T, so that D includes all individuals 
existing a t  different times. Models of the language are then of the form: 
This, however, encounters difficulties when we consider aspects of 
the jWu7e. Much of management is concerned with planning. Since 
there may be a variety of alternate or contingent plans, we must likewise 
consider multiple futures. This leads to another extension to the model 
including so-called possible worlds, W, hence adopting models of the form: 
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This is essentially the ontology proposed by Montague (see Dowty et 
al. 1981. Lee 1981). While thrs enables a mathematically elegant solution, 
the question is whether it is still semantics. If semantics is the 
correspondence between symbols and the world, but if the world is not 
merely the actual world (past and present) but also future and hypotheti- 
cal worlds, we have to consider how it is we know about these other 
worlds. 
Strawson (1959) points out that the principle basis for our shared 
epistemology is reference within a common spatial/temporal framework. 
Possible worlds are mental constructions, Gedanken experiments. They 
are outside the framework of external reference and so are questionable 
as a basis for mutual understandmg. We return to this problem shortly. 
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2. Intensional Semantics 
The intensional viewpoint is more characteristic of the Al paradigm 
(especially semantic net representations). Here, it is not individual 
objects that are primitive, but rather generic properties and relation- 
ships. Particular objects and events are seen as instances of these gen- 
eric concepts. For example, we postulate primitive concepts, MALE, 
FEMALE, SPOUSE, CHILD and from these are able to define the entire 
vocabulary of kinship relations. Particular cases of family trees, etc., are 
regarded as 'instantiations' of these generic concepts. 
The intensional approach is most satisfactory for what might be 
called idealized or artificial subject domains, where the scope of variation 
ia fixed theoretically or by explicit rules. However, the intensional 
approach also has difficulties, especially in describing real world domains 
where no theoretical foundation exists. For example, suppose we want to 
develop a concept, LEMON. We'then seek to elaborate the essential pro- 
perties of lemons. Ttvs might be a property list something like: 
COLOR: YELLOW 
SHAPE: OVAL 
TEXTURE: BUMPY 
TASTE: ACID 
The problem, typically, with real world domains is that we can't simply 
define what a LENON is, but rather our definition has to correspond to 
what the users of the system conceive lemons to be. Now we run into the 
so-called 'criteria1 properties' problem. We want a set of properties that 
in conjunction uniquely selects out lemons and only lemons from the 
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various objects in the environment. The problem here is twoi.old: that 
too many thmgs qualify (e.g. yellow limes) and the definition excludes 
atypical lemons (e.g. green lemons, lemons that aren't oval). Wittgen- 
stein (1853/ 1958) is a classic elaboration of these difficulties. 
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3. A Sociological View of Semantics 
Both the extensional and intensional approaches to semantics suffer 
epistemological difficulties, especially in the social/econornic domains 
typical for management. This leads to an examination of the mechanisms 
by which we come to know and use the terms of our everyday language. 
It we follow the extensional approach, then our main focus will be on 
our knowledge and identification of individuals (people and objects). This 
brings attention to the semantics of proper names and the identification 
codes we assign to machines and other objects. As Kent (1978) points out, 
these are of fundamental concern in data processing applications, map- 
ping database records to inventory, equipment, personnel, customers, 
suppliers, etc. 
How are these names associated to individuals? In the case of 
manufactured objects, quite often the identifylng name is stamped 
directly on the object. In the case of names of persons and companies, 
the identification relies heavily on honest reporting of their names by the 
entities themselves, e.g. on employment applications, sales orders, etc. 
The point is that the organization doesn't have to recognize these indivi- 
duals through some collection of identifylng properties, it is simply told, 
e.g. "I am John Doe," "Here is the XYZ company." 
The point applies much more broadly. Most of what we know about 
other individuals (people, places, things) that are temporally or geo- 
graphically distant is what we have been told. The proper name provides 
a tag to whch various characteristics are attached. The names them- 
selves are passed from one person to the next in a series of 'causal 
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chains' of reference, leading back to a direct identification of the indivi- 
dual. Sometimes, In the case of multiple names for the same individual, 
the causal chains may separate, leading to assertions like 
Mark Twain = ~ar&el  Clemens 
h a w  an informative content rather than being a tautological identity. 
Kripke (1971, 1872) applies this concept of causal chains in a forward 
faahion in characterizing possible worlds. "Possible worlds are not farc 
away planets," they are rather constnrcted, based on known, actual r e fe r  
ences. 
Consider, for instance, a scenario beginning with the supposition that 
Ronald Reagan is bald. The question arises, how do you know it's Ronald 
Reagan if, in this possible world, he has different properties. (We can 
exaggerate the case -suppose Ronald Reagan is really a robot, manufac- 
tured on Mars, etc. -this is called the problem of 'trans-world identifica-' 
tion of ind.b&duals'.) Kripke8s point is that we don't have to recognize 
Ronald Reagan in this world, we stipdafe that he is the sarne in our con- 
struction of the scenario. The proper name Ronald Reagan is a 'rigid 
designator'. 
As discussed in chapter [4], tlus leads to an explanation of our under- 
atanding of generic concepts like 'lemon' and 'chair'. What is socially 
understood by the concept 'lemon' is a cooperation between the special- 
ized understan- of cooks, bartenders, food sellers, fruit growers, agro- 
nomists, botanists, etc. In this case, biological science serves as the 
defining authority of the natural kind, 'lemon'. In the case of 'chair', the 
chain of reference leads back, not to scientific authorities, but rather to 
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certain chair manufacturing companies. But how do they know what a 
chair is? They q e h .  that their products are chairs. Thus one 
enterprising company may stuff burlap bags with shredded styrotoam and 
market it as a 'pillow chair'. Another might fold and paint pieces of card- 
board se lhg  them as 'throw-away chairs'. The success of their market- 
ing also succeeds in modify~ng the concept of chair. 
The effect of these arguments is to introduce a sociological'concep- 
tion of semantics, what Schwartz (1977) calls the 'new theory of refer- 
ence'. It gives a convincing account of why semantics is so difficult to do 
computationally: semantics isn't fuzzy, it's social. For many of our 
terms, e.g. lemon, chair, the extension of the concept is quite exacting. A 
thng is a lemon (chair) or it is not. However, the cognition that makes 
this discrimination is not an individual one, but rather a cooperation of a 
broad social network. As Putnam observes, we tend to regard words like 
hand tools that we use individually. For many words, a more fitting meta- 
phor is to compare them to a big ocean liner that requires a crew of hun- 
dreds for its operation. 
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4. Semantic Change 
Semantics is the mapping from a symbolic representation to its 
referrents. The concerns of the past section reflect not only the relation- 
ship between individual terms and their denotations (e.g. LEMON and all 
lemons), but the relationships between these individual terms to others, 
e.g. the use of lemons in cookmg, their medicinal aspects, the marketing 
and distribution c ~ E ~ I I ~ ~ s  for lemons, the growing of lemons, the genetic 
aspects of lemon varieties. It is this range of aspects that requires a 
whole social network for complete understanding. 
However, the knowledge of a concept at any particular node could 
well be formalized and subject to mechanical inference. Indeed the 
successes of computers to date reflect this possibility. 
The problems considered here are the mechanisms.by which seman- 
tic change are introduced and conveyed throughout these cognitive net- 
works, and the consequences of this for computer aids to these cognitive 
processes. To repeat an earlier observation, the role of semantics in 
computer applications is to validate computational inferences. If the 
computer has a rule 
the inference (modus ponens) that any particular lemon is also a fruit is 
true K and only if the denotation of the term LEMON is a subset of the 
denotation of the term FRUIT. If, for reasons of organizational or social 
interest, the semantics of these terms change so that the subset relation- 
ship no longer holds, the computational inference may no longer be valid. 
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We, as people, make words mean what we want .  Language is not an 
abstract entity, existing independently. It is a social artifact, a 
behavioral convention, that has been found to be pragmatically useful. 
A t  the micro-level are so-called 'baptism' events. I can name my cat 
George or Ludwig or whatever. If someone asks, I tell tham the name I 
chose. They accept that name as a matter of pragmatic convenience: it's 
hardly worth our time arguing over it. Further, since I own my pets, I 
have a social right to do the naming. Thus for instance when I get a tele- 
phone installed, the phone company telLs me the name (telephone 
number) for it. They, in this case, have the baptism right. (A computer 
might actually select the phone number in question based on an algo- 
rithm, but the system of phone number assignments is nonetheless the 
social right of the phone company.) 
NOW consider generic terminology. When a scientist makes a new 
discovery, invents a new process, etc., he/she or the research group 
assign a name to it. It is promulgated via the patent registration, 
research publications, academic conferences, etc. 
Likewise, in the economic domain, when a company markets a new 
product, they invent a name for it. If the product succeeds and is widely 
sold, it becomes a 'household word', and is incorporated into the social 
vocabulary. Sometimes, ii the product dominates competitive products, 
the brand name is used generically, e.g. Coca-cola. Xerox machines, 
Kleenex, IBM cards. 
Some people, then, invent new vocabulary. Other people choose 
whether or not to accept it. Not all novel research is accepted for publi- 
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cation; many marketing innovations fall flat. I t  is a matter of pragmatic 
consensus . 
The point is underscored by a distinction by Wittgenstein 
(1963/1958) between o b s m i n g  and deciding the meanings of words. For 
much of our vocabulary, we are passive observers of the semantics. We 
accept the dominant conventions established by traditional usage. In 
eome situations however, especially where we want to refer t o  some 
phenomenon or idea where there is no term with the designation we want, 
we need to change the language. We either do it by creating a new term 
or by moditylng the designation of an existing term. Thus, to use one of 
Wittgenstein's examples, 'What it the diviner tells us that when he holds 
the rod he feels that the water is five feet under the ground? or that he 
feels that a mixture of copper and gold is five feet under the ground?" 
(1958/1965:9). The term chosen in these cases is typically related in 
meaning. When the altered usage is temporary, limited to a specific con- 
text, we call it metaphorical. But metaphors often catch on and become 
part of the popular vocabulary. 
Thus, in deciding the semantics of terms there are the two com- 
ponents of prop0sin.g and accepting the new meaning. 
The essential point to be made here is that the mechanisms of 
semantic change rely on social pragmatism. Words change usage and new 
terms appear when people want to talk about new thugs or ideas. It 
depends on their evolving interests and needs. Correspondmgly, the 
change is accepted by others depending on their interests and needs. 
New meanings are negotiated, Like new products on the marketplace. 
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The point is that we, as humans, have the social privilege to buy and 
sell new meanings. My dog for instance growls at  automobiles. However, I 
don't for a minute consider allowing that usage into my vocabulary. Dogs 
don't count as hguist ic  innovators. However if a great social philosopher 
should growl in the same way at  automobiles (say, perhaps, accompanied 
by a convincing argument how they were the root of all evil), I might re- 
consider the usage and perhaps adopt it myself. Computers, as well, 
don't count as linguistic innovators. When a computer program bombs 
and starts printing garbage, I regard that as a mistake, not as new voca- 
bulary. 
The argument is that machines won't participate in semantic change, 
insofar as they decide it, for political reasons. (Political in the broad 
sense, e.g. the negotiation of interests and values.) 
But the question remains whether machines are able to obseme 
semantic change, and thus learn to modify their inferences accordingly. 
Certainly we humans learn the meanings of much of our vocabulary not 
ostensively (someone pointing to  an object and saying its name), but 
rather through iderring its meaning after hearlug it used or reading it in 
various contexts. We often detect semantic change in a similar way. The 
issue is whether computers would eventually be capable of detecting and 
learning changes of meaning in this way. This is essentially the issue of 
computer learning, currently regarded as the new frontier in artificial 
intelligence. Learning, in turn, relies heavily on induction, a long stand- 
ing epistemological problem. Induction is normally contrasted with 
deduction. The distinction is central not only to language learning, but 
also to the formation and verification of scientific hypotheses. It is 
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likewise central to statistical inference, which provides numerous exarn- 
ples. We may think of the difference in terms of the statistical concepts 
of population and sample. Deduction is making inferences about a sample 
based on lmown characteristics of the population as a whole. Induction is 
the reverse, making inferences about the population. based on obserped 
characteristics of a sample. For instance it we have a j a r  full of white 
beads, we deduce that any sample we draw from i t  will also contain only 
white beads. However, if we don't know the color of all the beads, and 
draw one or more samples from it, we may induce that the whole popula- 
tion is white. However, in the latter case we are not absolutely confident 
as in the former case. The concept of proof in mathematics and logic is a 
deductive one. Whereas deduction is 'truth preserving', leading from true 
premises to  true conclusions. with induction we need a weaker concept 
like 'degree of confidence', 'warranted assertability', etc. 
In our ordinary experience, we do inductions all the time, e.g. we 
induce that the sun will rise tomorrow, we induce -that a runny nose 
means a cold is coming on. we induce that so-and-so has a grouchy pel- 
sonality based on a few conversations with him. These inductions, while 
extremely useful as heuristics, are sometimes wrong and have to be 
modified: we may have allergies rather than a cold; so-and-so may not 
really be a grouch, he only had a few bad days. We induce the meanings 
of new terms and changed meanings of familiar terms in a similar way. 
We form a hypothesis about them and verify that hypothesis by its con- 
sistency with other usages. 
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The mechanisms by which we do these inductions are the research 
domain of psycho-lmguistics. I t  is for instance the central issue in 
explaining how children learn their first language. Many deep problems 
and mysteries remain. That is not to say that they couldn't eventually be 
understood in formal terms and made computational. 
These remarks lead us to consider the cognitive characteristics of 
humans a artificially intelhgent machines, the subject of the next sec- 
tion. 
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C. HUMAN YS MECHANICAL COGNITION (LB VS I.q-) 
1. ATOMISXIC VS HOLISI?C -ON 
One of the major contributions of Artificial Intelligence, perhaps, is 
to point out not only those parts of human cognition that are easily emu- 
lated by symbolic processing, but also those aspects that are difficult to 
emulate. One such aspect is that computers seem to have difficulty in 
seeing the woods for the trees. 
For example, visual pattern recognition has been an area of consid- 
erable research. In order to discriminate relevant details, visual informa- 
tion is collected in tiny discrete units that are later integrated to form a 
larger image. 
F'rom this perspective it is astounding how people, even babies, are 
able to recognize a wide number of faces despite variations in expression, 
lighting, etc. Moreover, this recognition often ignores what would seem to 
be key details, e.g. we often cannot remember whether a casual acquain- 
tance wears glasses; we sometimes do not notice when a friend shaves off 
his mustache or even his beard. 
There have been a number of AI proposals to reproduce this more 
holistic type of perception. The best knowp is the frame approach due to 
Minsky (1 975). A frame is a computational construct for unirylng sensory 
data into a conceptual whole. The sub-parts of the frame are called slots, 
correspondmg roughly to predicates and/or measurements. For pur- 
poses of recognition, certain slots may have more weight than others. 
Other slots are perhaps not necessary for recognition and may have 
default values if no sensory data is avdable (as when vision of an object is 
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partially obstructed). Thus in recognizing human faces, glasses and 
moustaches may have relatively low weight since these aspects may 
change. 
The frame concept was developed for applications to computer 
vision, but the general idea is extendable to other areas, e.g. tactile sen- 
sation, sounds. There are also analogous representations to frames for 
structuring observations that are not sensory based, e.g. the 'scripts' of 
Shank and Abelson (1977). Keeping for the moment with sensory percep- 
tion, it is important to note that frames require the translation of sense 
data into lmguistic data. It  is here that semantic issues arise, for our 
senses discriminate far more than we have vocabulary to describe it. 
Consider for instance having a portrait made of your spouse and giving 
the artist only a verbal description of his/her face. Would the result be 
recognizable? Sartre, in La Nausee, provides an apt example of the ditfi- 
culties in completely capturing sensory experience in a verbal form: 
Black? I felt the word subside, empty itself of its me- with 
an extraordinary speed. Black? The root was not black. it was 
not the black there was on that piece of wood - it was ... some- 
thmg else: black, like the circle, did not exist. I looked a t  the 
root: was it nurre t h m  black or almost black? 
It resembled a colour but also ... a bruise or again a secretion, a 
yolk - and somethmg else, a smell for example, it melted into a 
smell of wet earth, of warm, moist wood, into a black smell 
spread Like varnish over that senewy wood, into a taste of sweet, 
pulped fibre. I didn't see that black in a simple way: sight is an 
abstract invention, a cleaned-up, simplified idea, a human idea. 
That black, a weak, amorphous presence, far surpassed sight, 
smell, and taste. But that richness became contusion and finally 
ceased to be anythmg a t  all because it was too much. 
(1938/1965:186-187) 
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It is the ambiguities that arise from mapping rich sensory experi- 
ence onto a limited vocabulary that forms the basis of so-called 'fuzzy' 
logics, e.g. Zadeh e t  al. (1975). While the semantic issues motivating 
tuzzy logic are generally recognized (Wittgenstein, 1953/1958), debate 
continues as to the sufficiency of iuzzy logic to capture the inferential 
patterns that follow from our perceptions. 
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2. Rule-Baaed Inference w Expert Muddling 
Expert systems are sometimes called 'rule-based* in that they typi- 
cally rely on a knowledge base copsisting of independent rules or produc- 
tions of the form: 
IF <pattern> THEN DO <action>. 
The <pattern> is some condition to be matched in the database. The 
<action> may be inferential. i.e., updating the database, or referring to 
some external device such as printing results or moving the arm of a 
robot. 
As discussed above, expert systems have had some promising early 
successes in such application domains as medicine, chemistry and geol- 
ogy. Joseph (1882) tor example writes hopefully of the possibilities of 
(human) intelhgence amplification through the use of artificially intelli- 
gent machines. However the question remains open as to  how these 
developments will combine with human abilities to attain higher capaci- 
ties of cognition. 
Artificial Intel l .  ence research has always emphasized the similari- 
ties between the observable evidence of human cognition and the 
behavior of computer programs. The comparison has been used in two 
ways: one, as a psychological methodology, using computer programs as 
a possible model of human cognition; the other as an engineering orienta- 
tion, using human cognition as a model for building smarter computer 
sys tems. 
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However, by accepting these similarities as the basis for combining 
computers and humans in a single category of 'cognitive entities,' we are 
likewise led to focus on their differences as well. 
On the one hand, there is a fairly well developed literature (e.g. Miller 
1868, TPersky and Kahneman 1974, Simon 1981), which emphasizes the 
limitations of human cognition with respect to machines. These deal 
mainly with the limitations of short term memory, coupled with relatively 
slow sequential processing capability, which lead us (humans) to simplify 
problems by abstracting their components into larger 'chunks,' and using 
short-cut heuristics to trim down the problem's complexity. 
On the other hand, another literature is emerging (e.g. Weizenbaum 
1876, H. Dreytus 1979, S. Dreytus 1982) that emphasizes the limitations 
of computational cognition as compared to that of humans. The general 
criticism is that computational techniques rely on atomistic representa- 
tions of data and the sequential application of separate and exact infer- 
ence rules whereas human (organic) cognition appears to store holistic 
impressions and images and is capable of fuzzy pattern matching between 
them, which allows for greater flexibility of association. 
This suggests a theory of cognitive complementarity between human 
and machines. Humans for instance require a great deal of discipline and 
training to perform the types of iterative calculations most easily pro- 
grammed in machines. Contrariwise, the types of cognition that are basic 
even to human intants -e.g. recognizing faces and voices, acquisition of 
language -present deep, unsolved problems for computational theories. 
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The middle area where humans and macbnes appear to be on com- 
parable footing is in so-called 'rule-based' systems, which form the gen- 
eral architecture of expert systems applications (see Davis and Kmg, 
1975, or Nilsson, 1980, for background). 
Rather than procedural programs where the computer executes 
instruction after instruction in a pre-determined order, these are non- 
procedural programs of un-ordered rules where the machine searches 
repeatedly through the rule set for the appropriate rules pertaining to a 
given situation. The non-determinism of t h s  approach sacrifices much of 
the efficiency where the computer normally has advantage over the 
human. On the other hand, it provides considerably more flexibility and 
adaptability, which are the human's normal advantage. 
Stuart Dreyfus (1982) makes some interesting observations regard- 
ing rule-based cognition in the formation of human expertise. His claim 
is that the use of a small set of discrete rules is characteristic of the 
novice stage in the development of a particular skill. As the individual . 
becomes more experienced, these rules are gradually refined to incop 
porate numerous exceptions. Additional experience adds a context 
dependent organization to the rules as well as additional refinement so 
that the rules take on a much broader, parametric character. In the 
case of more advanced expertise, the individual rules give way to more 
holistic patterns, which are no longer processed in sequence but rather in 
a simultaneous pattern oriented manner. Dreyius suggests mundane 
examples such as learning to drive a car or playing chess. The novice 
driver learns to shift at  specified velocities, has certain fixed procedures 
for parallel parking, etc. Experienced drivers, on the other hwd, no 
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longer rely on these elementary measures but rather incorporate a wide 
variety of factors such as the sound of the engine, road incline and sur- 
face condition, weather, and anticipated trai'Hc situations. A key point is 
that at  this level, most experienced drivers can no longer specify the indi- 
vidual factors and rules they use. 
Likewise most novice chess players begin with a simple point valua- 
tion scheme for each of the players and evaluate the value of an exchange 
through this numeric comparison. Subsequent development adds con- 
sideration of the relative position of pieces and their projected positions 
through scenarios of play and countercplay. Evidence of master level 
chess play however suggests a much more holistic orientation depending 
on comparative 'field of force* in actual and potential configurations of 
the pieces. 
The general hypothesis here is that the major impact of rule-based, 
expert systems will be a t  these types of cognition characteristics of the 
early to middle level stages of human expertise development. 
These arguments are especially apt in the case of expert managers. 
Evidence for t h s  is found in the role that formal training, e.g. from a Mas- 
ters of Business Administration (MBA) program, plays in actual manage- 
ment practice. Having an MBA is certainly advantageous for advancement 
to higher management levels. However the use of this training changes 
with increased experience. 
MBAs begin with a bag of tools, e.g. inventory control methods, linear 
programming, discounted present value. regression forecasting. Their 
initial impact on the company is made as they find applications for these 
- 27 - Chapter 11 
tools. However, they are often surprised to find that the scope of these 
methods is less than they anticipated. Their frustration leads them to 
examine the additional factors not included in their initial models. They 
begin to take account of certain other variables, e.g. product integrity, 
customer satisfaction, corporate image. which may not be quantifiable 
but may be of dominating importance. The influence of the analytic dis- 
cipline of their early training remains but'comes to be applied over more 
subjective variables. With more experience, analytic habits combine with 
subjective heuristics to form more refined modes of managerial cognition 
that Golde (1978) calls 'muddling through'. Mud- through sounds 
sloppy to logicians, but it does have the important advantage that it tends 
to account for the right variables (quantifiable or not), and applies them 
to the right problems. This is contrasted with what Simon (1960/1977:59) 
calls the 'mathematicians aphasia': 
The victim abstracts the original problem until the mathemati- 
cal or computational intractibilities have been removed (and all 
semblance of reality lost), solves the new simplified problem, 
and then pretends that this was the problem he wanted to solve 
all along. He hopes the manager will be so dazzled by the 
beauty of the mathematical formulation that he will not 
remember that his practical operating problem has not been 
handled. 
Muddm through shares many of the characteristics of mature 
expertise described by Dreytus.  However, it has even less reliance on its 
origins in formal, rule-based training. The influence of that training may 
etill remain, especially for some more structured problems, but the con- 
tent of that training tends to fade away as the manager advances beyond 
the operational levels. Indeed, most of the great managers of history had 
no formal managerial training at all (Chandler, 1977). 
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3. The Hermeneutic Conjecture 
An important part of the content of Lm relates to human behavior. 
In chapter [I], the three levels of management activity described by 
Anthony (1965) emphasized this aspect in both the management control 
and strategic planning levels. Management control, concerned with coor- 
dinating the various functional activities, deals not with production tasks 
but rather with the operational managers directing those tasks. Stra- 
tegic planning is concerned with competitive behavior, product markets, 
financial markets, general economic and political trends, all of which are 
fundamentally behavioral. 
In all of these areas, the predictive value of formal models is notori- 
ously weak. Yet companies survive and prosper without them. I t  would 
appear that human managers have certain skills in these areas that for- 
mal methods do not capture. 
We all have strong subjective evidence of this on a personal level in 
our knowledge of peoples' personalities and our ability to empathize. 
Getting to know a person, we build an internal model of their personality. 
Depending on the closeness of the acquaintance, we learn their sense of 
humor, what things will make them angry, and so on. From a formal 
standpoint, these predictions are incredible. Often we make surprisingly 
accurate forecasts on apparently sparse information about the individual 
in question - e.g. a person's politics based on their haircut or clothes. 
These predictions are of course made with a great deal of background 
knowledge, e.g. about clot- fashions, cultural norms, political issues. 
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However, i f  we consider the complexity of this background 
knowledge, questions arise as to how were we able to learn it in the first 
place and how are we able to use it so effectively? Similar types of social 
skills were also available to the ancient Greeks and, no doubt, before. Yet 
knowledge about natural phenomena was then much mora primitive. 
What is it that enables us to gauge personalities, the mood at a party or 
the current political climate, while such other phenomena such as 
weather, chemical reactions and disease have taken millenia to under- 
stand and predict? 
Furthermore, our subjective ability to predict behavior seems to col- 
lapse almost entirely when it is experienced indirectly, especially when 
conveyed along a limited number of measurement dimensions.. A pros- 
pective employee's resume, for instance, is a very weak substitute for a 
job interview. One may read about a foreign country, but to get a 'feel' 
for the culture requires that one live there and know the people. 
President Carter felt the need to make random helicopter visits to vari- 
ous households to get a feel for the c u r r e ~ t  political mood. 
The conjecture here, sometimes called hsrmsnsutics* is that we have 
the additional information of our own internal experiences (emotions, 
moods) as material by whch to model the personality aspects of others. 
i.e., to empathize. 
Partial support for this conjecture might be found in the success of 
the Stanislavski method of acting. Here the actor is encouraged not sim- 
ply to quote his/her lines with certain intonations but rather to 
r e  for example Gad- (1078), Ape1 (1079), H a b e m  (1981), Fergusan (1961). K l e h  and 
H h d b i m  (1982) apply hrmeneutica to  the analysis of oiiice proceaaea 
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empathize, indeed to become the character. Our models of other per- 
sonalities are perhaps analogous to this, though less refined and without 
the performance aspects. 
Hermeneutics, as a theoretical area, is mainly specdative a t  this 
point. It does however raise the interesting conjecture that a great deal 
'of managerial cognition may depend on comparisons to internal subjec- 
tive sensations -inlormation that is not available to formal models. 
Chapter 11 
4. The Ego Problem 
People have preferences, computers don't. Computers (as we know 
them) will never prefer chocolate to vanilla. By preference we mean 
basic or intrinsic values, as opposed to instrumental or intermediate 
goals. Chess programs, for instance, have intermediate goals leading to 
the winning of the game. The goal of winning itself, however, is presumed 
prior to the system design. 
The argument here is not absolute, but rather political. We could for 
instance imagine a robot with h g h  priority heuristics for survival. This 
might lead down eventually to a sub-goals such as a taste for sweets or a 
compulsion to win at chess. However, we aren't likely to allow such 
machines to indulge these preferences if they compete with our own. 
(Note how Asimov's robots (1978) are pmgrammed to be socially inferior.) 
Robot suffrage is not forthcoming. 
The converse concept to the social right to have and indulge one's 
preferences is responsibility. The outcome of a computer fraud trial is 
never to put the computer in jail. Interestingly, not only people but also 
organizations are granted t h s  social status. A corporation (as well, a 
sovereign state) has independent legal responsibility; it can sign con- 
tracts, can be sued, etc. 
The preferences (goals, values) of an organization are generally 
regarded as deriving from the preferences of individuals. Capitalist 
economics assumes these to be the values of investors. Socialist econom- 
ics presumes these are imposed by the society at  large. Theories of 
organization, however, tend to ascribe a larger role to the preferences of 
- 32 - Chapter 11 
people within the organization. Cyert and March (1963) note that the 
influence of stockholders in large corporations has come to be minimal, 
and regard the preferences of managers as more significant in a predic- 
tive theory. Earlier, bureaucracies were characterized as organizations 
where the influence of individual preferences was minimized. Managers 
fill prescribed roles and are substitutable over time. The organization's 
life is'not limited to the life of its members. On the other hand, the 
mechanistic character of bureaucracy, which gives it permanence, also 
fixes its value structure. Hence railroads, post offices and the military 
continue to pursue ends that no longer coincide with social interests 
(Boulding 1978). 
In the other extreme, March and Olsen (1979) discuss the nature of 
organizations where the goals expressed in the organization's formal 
charter are vague and difficult to measure - e.g. universities, research 
institutions, charity organizations. Here the organization's goals are 
heavily influenced by those of individual members, and shift in a fluid way 
in what they call a 'garbage can process'. 
Deal and Kennedy (1982) provide an interesting intermediate 
viewpoint in their concept of 'corporate culture' (see also Peters 1980). 
In numerous case examples, for instance IBM, General Electric, Dupont, 
and 'Japan. Inc. ' , they observe coordinated, cohesive behavior yet without 
heavy bureaucratic regulation The differentiating variable, they argue, 
is that these organizations have built a strong organizational culture, 
which influences and molds individual drives and interests to coincide 
with the organization at  large. Conversely, individual preferences and 
values also exert influence on those of the organization. The dual 
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membershp of the individual in the corporate culture as well as the cul- 
ture a t  large ensures that the organization maintains goals and values 
compatible with its larger social context. 
The point is that individual preferences play an important role in the 
adaptation and goodness-of-fit of the organization to its social environ- 
ment. While we might conceive of a scenario where a robot or information 
system also displayed intrinsic preferences, this would be socially inad- 
missible (and has been in all the science fiction to date). It is of course 
not the preference itself but the tendency to indulge that preference that 
matters. 'Having the right to indulge one's preferences (within socially 
detined bounds) amounts to political participation, a right still not won by 
all human beings, let alone robots. 
We observed in the beginning of this section that an important func- 
tion of managers is planning. Planning is also an important AI topic. 
However, one limitation of AI systems to do organizational planning is in 
the selection of the ultimate preferences and values to which the plans 
are directed. Another limitahon, a semantic one, is discussed next. 
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D. CONSEQUENCES FOR MANAGEMENT SUPPOm SWlZIB 
This chapter began by postulating a certain triangular relationship, 
with the descriptive, fact-oriented focus of database management (DM) at 
one corner, the inferential orientations of artificial intehgence and 
operations research (MIOR) at another corner, and the 
semantic/epistemologicaI focus of decision support systems (DSS) a t  the 
third corner. 
Moreover, the concerns of DSS are not merely adjuncts to these 
other disciplines, but involve fundamental problems for information tech- 
nology applications in general. 
Two main issues have been stressed throughout. One is the semantic 
aspects of data, which were related to the broader issues of formal 
language semantics. Eiere the principle concern was the validation of 
computational inference and the problems posed by semantic change. 
Thie led to the second m'ajor issue, namely the similarities and diffel- 
ences between human and mechanical types of cognition. 
Our conjecture here has been that managerial and machine cogni- 
tion are in many ways complementary. A management support system 
ought to enhance that complementarity, but first we need to understand 
.it better. 
The use of artificial intelhgence for psychological mode- provides 
a useful input, particularly if we note where the computer models 
encounter the most difficulty. 
A problem here is that we need a way of discussing the two forms of 
cognition (manager vs machine) in a neutral way. Artificial intelligence is 
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rich with psychological metaphors intended to blur the differences. For 
management support systems we want to enunciate them. 
It is for this reason that a linguistic approach was adopted 
throughout this book. Computers and people are both language proces- 
sors. On the other hand, the distinction between formal and natural 
languages is a long standmg one, and underlies much of the modern work 
in linguistic philosophy: The argument for the complementarity of 
managerial vs mechanical cognition is in fact similar to the one Orwell 
(1963) made in his 1984. The timing of these concerns is certainly 
appropriate. 
An underlying concern of information technology, particularly 
knowledge representation, is epistemology. The way we structure 
knowledge is a matter of pragmatic choice. There are many 'Ways of 
Worldmaking' (Goodman. 1878). The way we structure our perceptions of 
the world is the most fundamental of cultural artifacts. Information tech- 
nology, in this view, is a branch of anthropology, or to use Simon's 
(1969/1981) term, 'sciences of the artificial'. They are artificial in that 
the objects they study are the result of human d e c i s i a  rather than mere 
obscnvarion as in the natural sciences. This suggests a much more gen- 
eral interpretation to the term decision support. Decision entails goals, 
and goals, in turn, entail values (Churchman, 1979). Epistemology intezc 
faces with ethics. 
Tbc paraQm example of this is the s h i f t  in philcmophical poaition made by Wittgenstein 
between his early lhutatus (1821). and his later Hdosophicd hvo~tigcrtias (185S/ 1958). 
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Many technologists have felt an occasional twinge of guilt about the 
lack of humanism in their work. Most of us manage to shrug it off by an 
appeal to Adam Smith's invisible hand, or by saying that technology, like 
tire, is ethically neutral and it's up to sociologists and political scientists 
to assess its proper role in the society. The problem is that there is very 
little as regards a conceptual or theoretical link between 'hardv technol- 
ogy and the 'soft' social sciences. The paradigms seem more to compete 
than cooperate. 
Thus one agenda in this book has been to initiate a conceptual bridge. 
between the two by building outwards from the technology side. Our stra- 
tegy was to work towards the intermediating domains of logic and formal 
philosophy. We have attempted to employ observations and arguments 
that are intuitive yet rigorous in an effort to convince the hard-nosed 
technologists. An important theme has been the theoretical -similarity 
between information technology (which we love) and bureaucracies 
(which we hate). 
Another recurring theme has been the foundational role of contrac- 
tual relationships both between and within organizations. Contracts are 
the threads that tie the organization's past to its future. The theory of 
contracts, however, depends heavily on theories of norms (deontic logics) 
thus making at -least a tenuous link to the study of ethics and value sys- 
tems. 
The overall thrust has been an attempt to bring an epistemological 
focus to the study of management technology. We are soon to have more 
technologies than we know what to do with. It is easy to be amazed and 
dazzled. But the usefulness of these technologies will depend on what 
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they do. What we have them do and not do is the problem of decision sup- 
port systems. 
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Throughout the text, the fundamental importance of contractual 
obhgation and deontic relationships was stressed as the formal basis for 
many administrative concepts. The reasoning underlying tinancial 
accounting, contract law and bureaucratic regulations is to be found in 
the eventual extensions of deontic logic. This appendix presents a formal 
language for describing concepts involving contractual commitment. The 
language is defined using a model theoretic semantics based on "possible 
worlds," an approach currently popular in the literature of formal logic 
and lmgustics (see for example, van F'raassen (1971), Thomason (1974), 
Cresswell (1973)). The notation and form of presentation adopted here is 
based on (Dowty 1981), which serves as a n  excellent background tutorial. 
The applications of a computer system implementing an axiomatized 
form of such a formal language are manifold. For instance, much of the 
legislation regarding contracts, exchange and taxation could potentially 
be formalized in a language of this sort. Thus, legal retrieval systems 
such as LMlS and )VESTLAW, which are based on keyword matches, could 
be euperceded by a system performing deductions on theorems express- 
ing the content of the pertinent laws. More than simple retrieval, such a 
eystem would be capable of certain analyses that presently require the 
expertise of a professional lawyer. Even more important, the formulation 
of lam and regulations in a f ormd lawuage such as proposed here would 
allow the system of legislation to be mechanically verified for con- 
sistency, completeness, redundancy. etc . 
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Such a facility could therefore help to remedy a problem, cited in 
Lee (1983a), with large governmental bureaucracies that make, interpret 
or enforce these laws: the system of rules becomes much too complex for 
a single person to compre5end totally. Hence knowledge of the law tends 
to be spread between multiple individuals, so that use of the laws must 
contend with the coordination problems between control procedures, 
paper work, etc. Modification of the laws becomes all the more difficult 
since it involves not only the legislation itself but also these organiza- 
tional coordination problems. 
The most promising applications, however, would probably arise from 
the development of a 'logic of bureaucracy', based on deontic logic. The 
complexity of the rule systems in large bureaucracies is often overhelm- 
ing. As discussed in the text, this may be the internal rules of an organi- 
zation; the rule systems of regulatory agencies; or the interlocking rule 
aystems of inter-state and international exchange. 
The complexity of these systems becomes so intimidating that they 
become the private domain of specialists such as lawyers and bureau- 
crats. However, even the specialists often have lost the sense of effec- 
tively managing these rule systems. Rather they simply follow them in 
the accretion of more and more rules and details. 
The generation of natural language "leg alese" from the formalized 
versions of laws and bureaucratic regulations does not present difficult 
computational problems. A system called AUTOTEXT, wrftten by the 
author, performed a similar function in a different subject domain (see 
Lee 1080b, appendix). Going the other way, i.e., converting formal 
language translations of their natural language forms, however, presents 
Appendix 
a more formidable problem. In a criticism of certain efforts to use formal 
languages as a tool for analyzing natural languages, Jardine (1975:229) 
comments: 
The illusion that much has been achieved in this field may arise 
from the relative ease with which NL [natural language] sen- 
tences cen often be generated from sentences of a formal 
language. But whilst t h s  may be a valuable f i s t  step towards 
the construction of rules which "go the other way," in itsell it 
merely corroborates the uncontroversial claim that NL can cap- 
ture fragments of 'many formal languages. 
To see the gulf which lies between translation from a formal 
language into NL and its converse, consider definite pronouns. 
To generate pleasingly colloquial NL representatives for sen- 
tences of a predicate calculus it is fairly easy to write programs 
which eliminate or reduce repetition of narnes and definite 
descriptions by introducing definite pronouns, and which do so 
without introducing unacceptable ambiguities. But "going the 
other way" it is exceedingly difficult to write a program which 
disambiguates the reference of definite pronouns using contex- 
tual information to find the admissible substitutions of names 
and definite descriptions. 
The applications we foresee tor the type of work here, however, amid 
this criticism. We do not claim that this formalized language has all the 
flexibility and nuances capable in natural language. However, the fact 
that a formal language does not have this flexibility is, we argue, advanta- 
geous for these types ot applications. One principle difference between a 
formal and a natural language is that in the first case the rules of 
interpretation and inference are k e d .  whereas in the second they 
depend on the consensus of the speakers, which may and often does 
change, even within the span of a single conversation.+ In situations of 
Vittgcrukin (Iref], [ref]) gives mrwhelmiog evidence af t h i s  tendency in ordinary 
dincowme and cites it aa the acnzrce of many philomophical puzzler. Far irmtance, (1958:D). a 
diviner mtght say that when he holdn the rod he feels that water in five feet under the 
ground. Here the normal umge of 'feel' is extsnded. Or. through the influence d AI. we have 
come to annodate the verb 'think' with the babavior of machines. This too is a change of 
that lea& ur to cel.rsin comhshs. WitQenstein (1938:16) w e s t s  that the questios 
"Can a nucMPe th idP t 1e.s puzzling when compared to the question "Can a machine have 
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legislation and regulation this is precisely the feature of natural language 
that one wants to avoid: the interpretation of these pronouncements 
should be as fixed and uniform as possible. A way of accomplishmg this is 
to formulate these pronouncements in formal terminology that reduces 
the dimensions of ambiguity to a limited number of primitive terms. 
The purpose of this work is thus one of "explication," Carnap's term 
for the task of "makmg more exact a vague or not quite exact concept 
used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical develop- 
ment" (Carnap 1947). This is regarded as preliminary and complemen- 
tary to the eventual axiomatization and automation of these concepts. 
The language described here is a subset of the notation, called CAN- 
DID, originally proposed in Lee (1980a), and extended in Lee (1981). Here 
we will be primarily concerned with the so-called "deonticU+ aspects of 
that notation. The approach builds on the deontic logic of von Wright 
(1968). Section 11 is therefore a summary of von Wright's formalism and 
its model theoretic interpretation. Section III adds several extensions to 
this formalism that adapt von Wright's general concepts of obhgation, 
etc., to specific situations of contractual commitment. 
The mode of presentation here uses a so-called "model theoretic 
semantics" (also called "denotational semantics"). 
Briefly, the idea behind this is that there is some universe of 
discourse consisting of sets ot objects. The symbols of the formal 
language "stand for" or denote these objects. Lisewise, combinations of 
symbols also have an exact denotation. Thus the syntactic rules describe 
a toathache?". 
" d d n  &err to concepb of ethical/legal obligation, permisdarn, and prohibition. 
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the vocabulary of symbols and their allowable combinations while the 
semantic rules describe the denotation of these individual symbols and 
their combinatons. One particularly important set in the universe is the 
set ITrue, Falsej, called the set of truth values. Other sets will be added 
to the universe as we proceed. 
IL SUMlWW OF VON WRIGHT'S DEONTIC WGIC 
A deontic logic is one that formalizes the concepts of obligation per- 
mission, obhgation and prohibition. It is now generally recognized that 
theee concepts are inter-definable - that obhgation and permission are 
logical duals wher~as  prohibition is the negation of permission. 
Von Wright actually presents two deontic calculi, the second being a 
generalization of the first. Both of these are based on a logic of action, 
which in turn includes a concept of change. 
Our summary will proceed from elementary to complex - i.e., from 
an ordinary propositional calculus of states, to a calculus of change, and 
then action, through a modal calculus to the deontic calculi. 
A Propositional Calculua 
The various stages of von Wright's deontic logic build on an elemen- 
tary propositional calculus (PC): By way of introduction, and to help 
orient the reader to the model theoretic descriptions used throughout 
this paper, we present this here as the language PC. 
Appendix 
a. Basic ~ r t ~  
Propositional constants are denoted as single upper case letters or 
as an alphanumeric string of characters beginning with a capital letter, 
e.g., P, Q, Raining. 
Metalanguage variables for propositions will be denoted as lower 
case Greek letters, e.g., a, 8,  y, @, 4'. 
b. Fornurbhm d e s  
The set of meaningful ezpressions, denoted ME, is defined r e c w  
sively as tollows: 
SynpC. 1: Every propositional constant is in ME. 
SynpC.2: 1 f @ ~ M E t h e n " @ ~ M E .  
SynpC.3 If @ and + are in ME then so is (a & \k). 
2. S e m u n t i c ~ s  
A model M for P C is any ordered pair <D,F> such that D (the universe 
oJ discmrsa) is a non-empty set ot propositional constants and F (the 
intarpretafion f i n c h )  is any function whose domain is D and whose 
range is the set  IFalse,Truej, representing falsehood and truth, respec- 
tively. The semantic rules of PC d e h e  recursively for any meaningful 
expression Q, the eztension of @ with respect to model M, abbreviated 
Denl( (a) as follows: 
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SempC.l.: If cP is any basic expression, the Deny (+) = F ( Q ) .  
Sempc.2: If 9 E ME then Deny cP = True i f f  DenM "9 is False, and DenM 
"a is False otherwise. 
Sempc.3: If iP and \k are in ME, then Deny (+ & +) is True i f f  both DenM 
and Deny are True. 
a. m e r  Defbrwms 
The symbol "::=" is a metalanguage symbol read "is defined as." 
For a and 8 in ME 
( a  V 8) ::= "("a & -8) 
( a  + 8)  ::= ("a V 8) 
(a  C. 8) ::= ( a  4 8) & ( 8 4  a)  
4. commtmt: Logic Proofs irr PC 
So far, we have described the formal language PC, which gives pre- 
cise rules for interpreting, i. e., determining the extension or denotation 
of, any meaningful expression. 
A s  discussed more fully in for example, van Fraasen (1971), a logic is 
a further specification of a formal language that in addition to the above 
language description also specifies certain expressions in ME as axioms 
and provides certain h m f o r m a f i o n  or inference rules, which, when 
applied repeatedly to the axioms, are capable of generating any other 
meaningful expression in the language. The sequence of transformations 
that leads to a particular expression is called a proof and an expression 
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derived in this way is called a theorem. The axioms of a logic are there- 
fore theorems by virtue of a null transformation. 
A logic for the propositional calculus language described above is as 
follows. 
a. Azimns: (from van Fraasen 1971 :78) 
Axpc. 1 : a -, (a & a) 
Axpc. 2: ( a & @ )  -,a 
~ x x .  3: "(a a 8) + "(8 a a) 
AxpC.4: (a  + 8) + ("(7 a 8) -4 N ( ~  & a)) 
IRPC. 1 : substitution: any meaningful expression may be substituted 
for the metalanguage variables. 
IRPC. 2: detachment (modus ponens): if a and a -+ 8, then #I 
IRpc. 3: extensionality ii a - #I, then a may be substituted for 8 and 
vice versa. without changing the denotation of the expres- 
sion in which it appears. 
-- 
B. Fbrmal Description of Change: The T Calculus 
Von Wright interprets the meemingful expressions in PC as represent- 
ing "some arbitrary state of affairs, such as that it is raining or that a 
certain window is shut" (von Wright 1988:13). That is, they represent 
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some property of the (actual or possible) world, unbound with respect to 
time. (This interpretation is discussed in more detail later.) 
The first step in extending the PC is to introduce a concept of change 
in these states of affairs. Von Wright does this by introducing a connec- 
tive T, where 9 T \k is read 9 "and then" \k. For instance, if R is the propo- 
sition "it is raining" and S is the proposition "the sun is shining," then 
R T  S indicates that "it is raining and then the sun is shining." The 
language for the T calculus (TC) is described as follows: 
a. Bcrsic mss imrs  
(as for PC) 
b. FamdGon rules 
The set of meanhgful~expressions, ME, is defined recursively as fol- . 
lows: 
Syqc.  1: Every propositional constant is in ME. 
Syqc.2: If iP E ME then "a is in ME 
Snc.3: If iP and are in ME then so is ( i P  & \k) 
Syqc.4: Ii iP and 9 are in ME then so is (9 T \k). 
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2, Semnt ic  d e s  
A model M for TC is any ordered quadruple <D, J, <, F>, where D is a 
non-empty set of propositional constants, J is a set of points in time 
ordered by the predicate <, and F is any function whose domain is <D, J> 
and whose range is the set tFalse,True]. 
The semantic rules of TC define recursively for any meaningful 
expression @, the danotution of @, abbreviated Denyj @, as follows: 
SemTC.l: If @ os any basic expression, then (a) = F(B,j) 
SemTC.Z: If Q E ME then DenMlj "@ = True i f f  Denylj @ is False, and 
DenMlj "@ is False otherwise. 
SemTc.3: If @ and * are in ME, then DenMlj (a & *) is True iff both 
DenMlj Q and Denlkj + are True. 
SemTc.4: If @ and + are in ME, then Denyj (B T +) is True iff DenMj. * is 
True for the unique j' such that for all j", not (j < j" < j'). 
3. E f r r f h e r d e j h ~ .  
(same as for PC). 
4. Logicjmths TCPLcuLvs 
Using the axioms and inference rules for the PC logic, von Wright 
proposes the following additional axioms for the T calculus: 
A w . 1 :  Distributivity: 
(aV@)T(@V+)  - (aT#)V(aT+)V(BT@)v(@T*)  
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kTc.2:  Coordination: 
( a  T 8) & ( a  T *) -, a T ((B & +) 
earlier (von Wright 1965) t h s  was 
( a  T (B) & ( 4  T +) - ( a  & 4)  T ((B & *) 
Axrn.3: Redundancy: 
a - a T  (@VN(B) 
%.4: Impossibility 
"(a T ((B & "8)) 
5. Add4tGmd Theorsms, Gmwnenk 
%. 1 : (aT(B)V(aTN(B)V("aT(B)V("aTN(B)  
%.2: ( a  T a )  V ( a  T "a) V ("a T a )  V ("a T "a) 
This is a corollary of ThTC.l. The four disjuncts here are regarded as 
the four types of elementary changes or state transformations. 
TLLpC.3: "(a & "a) T (B 
The second Principle of Impossibility. 
ThTC.4: ( a  T 8) -, 
TLLpC.5: a & ( @ T r )  - ( a & ( B ) T 7  
*.fi:- ( ( a  T 8) T 7)  - ( a  T ( B  7)) 
Cbmmad: As indicated by T h . 4  and %.0, the perspective of the T 
connective is from the time of the left argument (em i.e., the right argu- 
ment is asserted as a state that wiU Jollow, but is yet in the future. 
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f3mmm.f (W): "The connective T is not  associative. (a T 8) T y is 
not equivalent to a T (8 T 7). The first expression refers, in fact, to two 
successive points in time only, the second refers to three." 
Cbmmmf: This is because (a T 8) "resolves to" the time-reference of 
its first argument. The prececbg remark points out that T expressions 
may be iterated, e.g., a T @ T (9 T 9. However, because T is not associative 
this would be syntactically ambiguous. We therefore adopt the conven- 
tion of evaluation from right to left, e.g., 
C. F d  Description of Action: The TI Calculus 
Von Wright portrays action as a composite concept. This depends on 
another connective, "I" for "instead of," whch behaves similarly to T. 
Indeed, the axioms he proposes that govern I are exactly analogous to 
those. for T. Von Wright (196?:124-5) comments: 
The description to the left of I is, in the I-expression, asserted to 
hold true of a world in which there is a certain agent. The 
description to the right holds true of the world which would be, 
it from the world which is we remove (in thought) the agent. 
This "experiment of thought" calls for some comments. The 
"removal" of the agent does not mean the removal (in thought) 
of him body. The physical presence of the agent may have a 
causal influence on the world which is not at  all connected with 
his actions. His physical absence would then make a difference 
ta the world, - but this difference does not tell us anythmg 
about his actions. The "removal" of the agent is the removal (in 
thought) of whatever Mentiom he may have. It is, therefore, 
the removal of him q u a  agent. 
One could substitute for this experiment of thought one in which 
the contrast is between a world in which the agent is present 
physically and a'world from which he is about physically. Then 
the comparIson of the states would tell us for which changes and 
non-changes the agent, through his presence, is causally 
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responsible.  This class of changes (and not-changes) includes, 
but is not necessarily included in, the class of changes (and 
not-changes) for which he is responsible also qvlr agent. 
In von Wright ( 1968:44-45), he adds: 
Both connectives, "T" and "I", could be called "co-ordimtors of 
possible worlds." "T' coordinates the world whch is now and the 
world which wiU be next. "I" coordinates the world as if is with 
an agent in it and the world as if would be, if the agent remained 
passive . 
An action, indicating the effect of some agent to change the world, 
involves the combination of a T expression and an I expression in what is 
called a TI expression: 
a T t B I 7 )  
is read "a and next p instead of 7," i.e., that because of the influence of 
some (unspecified) agent, the world changes from state of affairs a to p 
instead of y, as it would have without the agent. 
Since the connective I really only has interest when combined with T 
in TI expressions. we skip over a separate description of the "I calculus," 
and go directly to a statement of the language tor the TI calpulus, TIC. We 
see that a new dimension is introduced a t  this level, that of the applica- 
tion of a proposition not only to a point in time, but also to one or another 
"possible worlds." A t  the moment we wlll assume this to be understood 
without further explanation. The concept of a possible world will be 
examined in more detail later on. 
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THE LANGUAGE TIC: 
1. mtz 
a Basic ezpresskms  
(as for PC) 
b. Fonnatwn rules  
The set of meaningful expressions, ME, is defined recursively as fol- 
lows: 
S Y K I ~ ~ ~ . ~ :  Every propositional constant is in ME. 
S m C . 2 :  If @ E ME then "@ is in ME. 
Synm.3: If @ and + are in ME then so is: 
2. Semantic M e s  
A model M for TC is any ordered sextuple, <D, I, Ins, J, <, F>, where D 
is a non-empty set of propositional constants, I is a set of possible worlds, 
Ins is a two place relation coordinating possible worlds, J is a set of times, 
< is a linear ordering on J, and F is any function whose domain is <D, I ,  J> 
and whose range is the set IFalse,True{. 
The semantic rules of TIC define recursively for any meaning-ful 
expression @, the denotation of @, abbreviated DenM,i,j i P ,  as follows: 
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SemTIC1: If 'P is any basic expression, then 'P = ~ ( @ , i , j )  
SemTIc.2: If @ E ME then DenM,i;j "@ = True iff DenMlinj @ is False, other- 
wise DenMlij -@ = False. 
SemTIc.3: If @ and 'k are in ME, then DenM,i,j (@ & 'k) is True iff both 
DenMlij @ and DenMjlj 'k are True. 
SemTIC.4: If @ and * are in ME, then DenMj,j (@ T 'k) is True iff DenMeij @
is True and DenMjlp 'k is True for the unique j' such that for 
dl j", not ( j  < j" < j'). 
SemTIC.5: If @ and 'k are in ME, then DenM (@ I 'k) is in ME iK DenMeij @ 
I I 
is True and DenMxIj, is True for some world i', such that <j, 
j'> E I n s  and for all times, j'. 
3. M h e r  D e j k d i m s  
(same as PC). 
4. Logic f o r  the TI ClaLcuius 
Using the inference rules and axioms for the PC logic, as well as the 
axioms for the TC logic, additional axioms are provided here that control 
the I connective. As can be seen, they parallel those for T. 
For all a, /3, @, and * in ME: 
AxTlc. 1 : (aV/?) I (@V'k)  - ( a I 9 ) V ( a I ' k ) V ( / 3 1 9 ) V ( / 3 I ' k )  
h C . 2 :  (a 1 8) & (a I 9) -, aI(@ & a) 
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D. Modals and the Deontic Calculus 
von Wright introduces the formal concepts of permission and obliga- 
tion by extension from interpretations of modal logic. 
In modal logic, the notation " 0 9 "  is commonly used to indicate "it is 
possible that 9." In the terms and to describe the semantics of TIC this 
would have the interpretation: If 9 E ME then Denpsi,, (0O) is True iff 
is True for some i' E I and some j' E J. 
That is, 0 9  is true if and only if 9 is true in some possible world a t  
some time. The dual concept of possibility, necessity, is denoted 09 and 
is defined as follows: 
lJ@ ::= "0 "9 
These two operators refer to logical possibility and necessity. That 
is, indicates 9 to be tautological, " 0 9  indicates that 9 is contradic- 
tory. Between these two is the notion of contingent truth, indicated by 
o @ .  
Within this area of logically c o n w e n t  truth, one can apply the pre- 
varllng physical theories and designate certain logically contingent truths 
to be impossible or necessary according to the laws of nature. Ii we 
designate the quality of a world being naturally possible by "Nat," we can 
then define this more restricted concept of natural possibility, (oN 9) as: 
If O E ME then Denikij ON 9 is True Ut Denrracj. (9) is True for some j' E 1 
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such that Nat(jl), and some j' E J. 
The concepts of permission and obhgation are developed in analo- 
gous fashion. Here, instead of qualiiying contingent truth with possibility 
according to natural laws, it is qualified by its acceptability under some 
code of ethics or legal system. For the applications we have in mind, this 
w i l l  be the system of laws of some soverebn government (or perhaps a 
world governing body). The quality of a world being permissible in this 
system will be designated as "Per." The corresponding concept of deontic 
possibility might thus be denoted as "OD @." However, following von 
Wright, we will use the more suggestive notation, P3, to indicate that " i p  is 
permitted." 
Its semantic interpretation would then be as follows: I! 3 E ME then 
DenMnij (PI) is True iff (Q) is True for some i' E I and some j' E J 
such that Per(i'). 
The concept of obhgation or deontic necessity, abbreviated "0". is 
defined as the logical dual: 
Following the semantic definition, this says that ip must be true in all p e p  
mitted worlds a t  all times. 
Natural possibility, we observed, was a restriction of the concept of 
logical possibility. Correspondingly, deontic possibility is reasonably 
viewed as a restriction on natural possibility. Von Wright (1967:133-4), 
notes (using "M" for "o~"):  
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The concept of possibility within the limits of natural law 
(including the laws of "human nature") we have denoted by "Mu. 
The concept of possibility within the limits of a normative order 
we shall denote by "P." It seems plausible to regard "P" as the 
narrower concept in the sense that the expression "P(-)" entails 
the expression "M(-)," when the blanks in both expressions are 
filled by the same description of an action or a life. To accept 
this relation between 'P' and 'M' is tantamount to accepting a 
(rather strong) version of the well-known principle which is usu- 
ally formulated in the words "ought implies can." 
The language of the deontic calculus, DC, can now be summarized: 
(same as for PC) 
b. F'armation rules 
Same as for TJC with the addition: 
S-. 4: If iP is in ME then PiP is in ME. 
2. Sm*AuLes  
A model M for DC is any septuple cD, I ,  Ins, Per, J, <, F>, where D is a 
non-empty set of propositional constants, 1 is a set of possible worlds, Ins 
is a two place relation coordinating possible worlds, Per is a subset of I 
(the permissible worlds), J is a set of times, < is a linear ordering on J ,  
and F is any function whose domain is <D, 1. J> and whose range is the set 
lFalse,Truej. 
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The semantic rules of DC define recursively for any meaningful 
expression 9, the extension of @, denoted Denuqij 9 as follows: 
SemDCl-5: (Correspond to semantic rules 1-5 for TIC) 
SemDc.B: If is in ME then DenyJj P I  = True iff Denu,itJ~ I = True for 
some i' E Per and some j'. 
3. A a d i t h n l d  r n ~ ~  
Same as for PC with the addition: 
4. Logic jar the lkontie Cdnrlus  
a h f m e n c e r u l e s  
(Same as for PC). 
6. A2ioms 
The axioms of PC. 
The 4 axioms for T (presented for TC). 
The 4 axioms for I (presented for TIC). 
Plus: 
AxDc. 1: P(Iv\Ir) -PIVP\II 
kDc.2: P @ v P N @  
Appendix 
It is important to note how von Wright intends the variables in his 
calculi t o  be interpreted. In von Wright (1965:294): the variables (and, 
presumably their truth functional compounds) refer to "generic proposi- 
tions" whch "are not true or false 'in themselves.' They have a truth- 
value only relative to a (point in) time. They may be true of one time, 
false of another. And they may be repeatedly true and false. Let the gen- 
eric proposition be, e.g., that it is raining. It may be true of today, false 
of tomorrow, but true again of the day after tomorrow. (The relativity of 
generic propositions to a location in space will not be considered.)" 
In von Wright (1987) he comments: 
The nobon of a state of affairs is thus basic to the notion of 
change. I shall not attempt to answer here the question what a 
state (of affairs) is. I shall confine myself to the follow~ng obser- 
vation: 
One can distinguish between states of affairs in a generic and an 
indiuidud sense. Individually the same state, e.g., that the sun 
is s h m g  in Pittsburgh on 18 March 1966 at 10 a.m., obtains 
only once in the history of the world. Genercally the same state, 
e.g., that the sun is shmmg, can obtain repeatedly and in &f- 
ferent places. Of the two senses, the generic seems to me to be 
the primary one. An individual state is, so to speak, a generic 
state instantiated ("incarnated") on a certain occasion in space 
and time. 
In the sequel "state" will always be understood in the generic 
sense. As schematic descriptions of generic states we shall use 
the symbols p,q,r, ..., or such letters with an index-numeral. 
Let us assume that the total state of the world on a given occa- 
sion can be completely described by indicating for every one of 
a finite number n of states pl, . . . , p, whether it obtains or does 
not obtain on that occasion. A description of this kind is called 
a state- d e s d p t h .  As is well known, the number of possible 
total states is 2I' if the number of ("elementary") states is n. We 
can arrange them in a sequence and refer to them by means of 
state-descriptions: sl, . . . , S* 
A world which satisfies the above assumption could be called a 
Wtgmtein-  world. It is the kind of world whch Wittgenstein 
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envisaged Ln the Tractatus. I shall not here discuss the (impor- 
tant) ontological question, whether our real world i s  a 
Wittgenstein-world, or not. The answer is perhaps negative. But 
nobody would deny, I think, that, as a simplified model of "a 
world," Wittgenstein's idea is of great theoretical interest-and 
state-descriptions of great practical importance. O u r  study of 
changes and actions will throughout employ this model. 
In a reply to a critique of this paper, von Wright adds: 
I agree with Robison that the distinction between generic and 
individual states of affairs is problematic. An individual state is 
apatio-temporally fully specified. A generic state can be generic 
in the spatial and individual in the temporal component; or vice 
varsa; or it can be generic in both components. A description of 
the total state of the world must, of course, not contain both p 
and not-p. Therefore, if we let "the world" embrace the whole of 
space, any generic state of affairs p, the presence or absence of 
which may be a characteristic of the world, must be individual- 
ized in the spatial component. p could then be, e.p., the state 
that i f  is raking an Pittsburgh. If. on the other hand, we con- 
fine "the world" to a specified location ("point") in space, the 
states of affairs which characterize it need not be individualized 
in either component. p could now be, e.g.. the state that i f  i s  
raining. 
In von Wrlght (1968:13) he starts with the simple explanation: "Let 
next 'p' represent some arbitrary state of affairs, such as that it is. rain- 
ing or that a certain window is shut." Later. p. 16, he adds: 
A few words should be said about the r e a m  of the formulae. In 
my first construction of a system of deontic logic the variables 
were treated as schematic names of actions. According to this 
conception, "Pp could be read "It is permitted to p." This con- 
ception, however. is connected with difficulties and inconveni- 
ences. It is, first of all, not clear whether the use of truth- 
connectives for forming compound names of actiun is logically 
legitimate. It is, furthermore, obvious that, on this view of the 
variables, higher order expressions become senseless. "Pp1' 
itself cannot be the name of an action; therefore it cannot occur 
within the scope of another deontic operator either. 
It now seems to me better to treat the variables as schematic 
sentences which express propositions. This agrees with the 
course "taken by most subsequent authors on deontic logic. 
Instead of "proposition" we can also say "possible state of 
affairs."dccording to this conception, "Pp" may be read "it is 
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permitted that it is the case that) p." 
h a i n s t  this reading, however, it may be objected that it does 
accord very well with ordinary usage. Only seldom do we say 
state of affairs that it is permitted, obligatory, or forbidden. 
a#y we say this of actions. But it is plausible to think that, 
n an action is permitted, etc., then a certain state of affairs 
a "secondary" sense permitted, etc., too. This is the state 
in a technical sense to be explained later, can be called 
sult of the action in question. 
l i  can take account of this combination of action and resulting 
@ate of affairs in our reading of deontic formulae. Instead of 
simply "to p" or "that p" we employ the phrase "see to it 
". "The formulae "Pp" is thus read "it is permitted to see 
it that (it is the case that) p" or "one may see to it that p." It 
be noted, however, that this reading, though convenient 
w d  patural, is somewhat restrictive since it applies only to 
pprms which are rules of action. 
Op p. 18 he adds the additional definitions: 
m e  single variables will be said to represent elementary s tates  
NthLZl the universe. The 2" different (order of conjuncts being 
jyrelevant) so-called state- descriptiars in terms of the n vari- 
Mles represent total s ta tes  of the universe. These total states 
algo be called possible worlds  (in the universe of elementary 
!@tea represented by the propositional variables of the set). F 
As these excerpts illustrate, von Wright uses two kinds of variables 
(dependiq on his purposes), an (elementary) s tate  (denoted as p,q etc. 
as 4 the preceding syntax), and a composite notion that he variously 
calls a s ta t e  descAption, total s ta te ,  Wittgemtein urarld, or possible warld. 
we belabor t h s  in order to enunciate a change we propose to make in this 
interpretation. 
Von Wright's notion of a possible world seems similar to one that 
Creamyell (1073:34) attributes to Carnap: 
Carnap recognizes his debt to Wittgenstein for the notion of a 
possible world and introduces the notion of a state- description. 
If we assume that there are a set of atomic sentences which may 
be either true or false without prejudice to the truth or falsity of 
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any other atomic sentences then a state-description is a class 
which contains for every atomic sentence either that sentence 
or its negation. 
possible world semantics. Cresswell observes (p.4): 
The big advance in the semantical study of modal logic after 
Carnap was to remove possible ~ o r l t i s  porn the dependence tnt 
Language which they have in Carnap's work and treat them as 
primitive entities in their own right, in terms of which the 
semantical notions required by the modal system can be 
defined. 
In the remainder of this paper we too adopt the view of a possible 
world as a primitive concept. This view may be related to that of von 
Wright by means of an intermediate interpretation. Let us refer to von 
Wright's concept of a possible world as a 'W world" and the more current 
view of a possible world, as reported by Cresswell, as a "C-world." Let us 
call the view of a possitle world by a third, intermediate interpretation on 
"I world." 
Recall that a VW world was unbound with respect to time. An I world 
will be a WI' world extended across time. An I world is thus individuated 
by a state description at a particular point in time. An I world is there- 
fore by this interpretation a sequence of state description/time point 
pairs. This is illustrated in Figure 1. so, sl, and s2 indicate state descrip 
tions, b, t l  , and tz indicate time points and wo, wl, and w2 indicate possi- 
ble worlds. 
The possible worlds are therefore the paths through these states 
across time, e.g., 
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Wo = t<~o,tO>.<sO,tl >, <s0,t+] 
W1 = t < ~ ~ # t ~ > , < ~ ~ , t ~ > , < ~ ~ , t ~ > ]  
W 2  = t<so,tO>,<s1,tl>,<~#t2>] 
There are in total 27 such paths, hence 27 possible worlds distin- 
guishable from these three state descriptions and three time points. In 
general, for m state descriptions and n points in time there will be mn I 
yorlQs (i.e., one choses from m possible states at each of n points in 
time). 
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If time is considered to be continuous, the set of 1 worlds obviously 
becomes infinite over any interval of time. 
Under this interpretation, von Wright's state descriptions become 
predicates of possible worlds, predicates that uniquely identify an I world 
at a given time. 
The difference between an I-world and a C-world is in the linguistic 
dependence of the former. In an I-world, a state description, a conjunct 
consisting of each elementary proposition or its negation, serves to 
uniquely ident~fy the 1 world a t  a point in time. A C-world does not have 
this feature. For a given state description and point in t h e ,  there may 
be many C-worlds that the vocabulary is not refined enough to distin- 
guish. 
In the discussion to follow, we will interpret possible worlds to be C- 
worlds, unless otherwise indicated. 
We now proceed to re-interpret von.Wright's operators and connec- 
tives accordmg to this view. 
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IV. EXTENSIONS FOR DESCRIBING CONTRAWAL COlDLKMENT 
A contractual commitment (as we view it) differs from the general 
concept of obhgation in that it is an obligation for some particular party, 
say x, to another party, say y, to do some action, e.g., i P ,  within some 
specified time interval, e.g., before time t. m s  requires that we bring 
variables and constants for inhvidual entities and times into the object 
la4Zuag e. 
A F ' h t  Order Predicate Calculus 
Let us consider first the problem of recognizing entities w i t h  the 
object language. This involves, essentially, extending the role played by 
the propositional calculus, to that of a first order predicate calculus 
(FOPC), i.e., introducing individual constants and variables as well as 
quantifiers. 
Partly to set the stage for later developments, we will introduce the 
FOPC as a "type theoretic" language (see e.g., Dowty (1978: 40-55)). Basi- 
cally, this approach asslgns a syntactic category, called a type, to each of 
the symbols in the language, and then proceeds to  descrlbe further 
characteristics of the language in terms of relationships between these 
types. Principally, t h s  allows greater compactness in the language 
specification. 
A t  this level, there are two basic types, e (for entity) and t (for truth 
value). Individual constants and variables will have type e, propositions 
have type t. More complex symbols will be denoted as relations between 
types. To make effective use of the notation of functional application, 
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these will be confined to two place relations, which may however have 
other relations in either of their places. So, for instance, 
<eat> is a one place predicate (mapping entities to truth values) 
<e,<e,t>> is a two place predicate (mapping entities to one place 
predicates). 
<t,t> is an operator (mapping truth values to truth values) 
<t,<t,t>> is a connective (mapping a truth value to an operator). 
With this brief background, we introduce the language FOPC. 
1. Sptaz of FOPC 
1 The set of types, defined as follows: 
a) e i s a t y p e  
b) t i s a t y p e  
c) it a and b are any types, then <a,b> is a type. 
2. The basic expressions of FOPC consist of: 
constants for each type a 
- constants of type e are denoted as a lower case alpha numeric 
string beginning with a "Q", e.g., @a, Oron, Qalec 
- constants of type t or <a,t> where a is any type, are denoted by 
an alphanumeric string beginning with a capital letter, e.g., P, Q, 
Raining, Married. 
- all other constants will be assigned special notations in the ayn- 
tactic rules and definitions. 
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Vmiubles  for each type a. 
- variables of type e are denoted as a lower case alpha numeric 
string beginning with a letter, e.g., x, y, z l ,  22. 
- variables for 2ii other types are denoted as an alpha numeric 
string, beginning with a "?", e.g., ?P, ?Q. 
Note: in the metalanguage, the italicized letters u and v will be used 
to denote variables, and as before, lower case Greek letters denote con- 
stants. 
a. F o w n d i m  d e s  of FOPC 
The set of n e a n i n g w  ezpressixmr of type a, denoted ME,, for any 
type a (i.e., the well formed expressions for each type) is detined recur  
sively. as follows: 
SpFOPC.l: For each type a, every variable and constant of type a is in 
MEa 
SyqOpC.2: For any types a and b, if a E ME,,,b, and p E MEa, then a@) 
E MEb 
SyqOpC.3: If @ E % and u is a variable (of any type) then Vu @ E ME, 
SpFopC.4: If @ E then "@ E MEt 
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2. Semantics of FOPC 
Given a non-empty set D (regarded as the domain of individuals or 
mtifies), the set of possible denotations of meaningful expressions of type 
a, abbreviated D,, is given by the following recursive definition: 
D (3) DCanb, = ha for any types a and b, where yX stands for "the set 
of all possible functions from the set  X into the set Y." 
A model for FOPC is an ordered pair <D,F> such that D is as above 
and F is a function assigning a denotation to each constant of FOPC of 
type a from the set D,. 
An assignmnt o j  values to variables (or simply a variable assign- 
-t),g is a function assigning to each variable a denotation from the set 
D, for each type a. 
The denotation of an expression a relative to a model M and variable 
assignment g, abbreviated DenMlg (a) is defined recursively as follows: 
SemFOpC. 1: If x is a constant, then DenMag (a) = F(a). 
SemmpC.2: If x is a variable, then Denlkg (a) = g(a). 
SemFOpC3: If a E ME,b, and @ E ME,, then DenMBg (a(@)) = Denu,g 
(a)(DenM4 (8))  where Y(X) stands for "the value of the fuoe- 
tion Y when applied to the argument X." 
SemFOpC.4: If 9 E q, then Denpvg ("@) is True iff DenMlg (9) is False, 
and DenM4 ("9) is False otherwise. 
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SemFopc.5: If @ and Y are in MEt, then Denyg [@ & Y] is True iPf both 
DenMtg ('P) and Denpmg (Y) are True. 
SemFopC.6: If @ E M q  and u is a variable, then DenHag (Vu @) = True iff 
for all g' such that g' is exactly like g except possibly for the 
value assigned to u. DenMJt (a) = True. 
3. arther Definifimm 
For a and 8 in Mq: 
[a V 81 ::= "["a & -81 
[a -) 81 ::= [maVB] 
[a - 81 ::= [a -. 81 & [a --r 81 
For @ E MEt and u a variable 
B. Lambda Abstraction 
One additional concept will be useful, that of so-called lambda 
abstraction. Dowty (1978:55) introduces this by comparison to the fami- 
liar notation for defining a set by means of a predicate, e.g., if Q, is a one 
place predicate, 
is the set of individuals in the domain that satisfy this predicate. The 
operator A, is used in the object language to the same effect, e.g., 
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denotes the set  of individuals in the domain that satisfy @. More specifi- 
cally, if  u is of type e, and e, and iP E MEt, then Au[@u] is the set of <e,t> 
pairs mapping individuals to truth values. 
The converse concept to lambda abstraction is called Lambda c o m e r -  
sion, which is essentially only' functional application. For example, for a 
variable v, of type e, 
applies the variable v to the function Au[iPu], resulting in iP(v). This seems 
to take us back where we started from in the first place. The advantage 
however (as Dowty points out) is to make the syntax of the language "flex- 
ible." More to the point, it allows reference to predicates and other func- 
tions as extensional sets, independent of the variables to which they are 
applied. (More extensive explanation is given in Dowty, (1978:Section 1.8), 
and Cresswell, (1973:chapter 6).) 
The use of lambda abstraction is not limited to variables of type e, 
but in fact may be used with variables of any type. Syntactically, it 
behaves just like the quantifiers, serving to bind the variables. 
Recognition of lambda abstraction and conversion in the calculus 
requires the following additional syntactic and semantic rules: 
SynA. 1: If a E ME, and u is a variable of type b, then Au a E ME<b,,,. 
S p A .  2: If a E hU3,,b, and p E ME,, then a (8) E MEb. 
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SemA. 1: If a E ME<,,b, and u is a variable of type b, then 
ExtpmiDjDg (A u a) is that function h with domain Db such that 
for any object x in that domain h(x) = Exty j,j,g. (a), where g' 
is that value assignment exactly like g with the possible 
difference that g'(u) is the object x. 
SemA.2: ll a E ME,,b> and @ E ME,, then E x t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~  (a (8) )  is Ext~,i , j ,g  
(a) (ExtLijJ (@)) (i.e., the result of applying the function 
E ~ t p  j,jDg (a) to the argument Extib,i,j,g (@)I. 
We should note that the introduction of lambda abstraction by com- 
parison to definition of sets by some critical predicate can be slqhtly 
misleading. For u a variable of type a. and 3 a predicate, 
is a set of individuals of type a, i.e., the subset of all individuals of type a 
that satisfy 3. 
on the other hand is a set of ordered pairs, <a,t> one for each element of 
type a in the domain, and whose second place is True ii this individual 
satisfies iP ,  False otherwise. 
Further, it is seen that the basic information contained in these two 
concepts is equivalent. Correspondmgly, the predicate of elementhood, 
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has its analog in lambda conversion (functional application): 
a(u). 
C. Pirst Order Deontic Calculus 
If we now combine this definition of the FOPC language with the 
extensions von Wright added to the PC, we arrive at  a first order deontic 
calculus, FODC. Its description would be as follows: 
1. 9yrtaz of FODC 
a. B~~~ 
(same as for FOPC) 
b. F u n n u f i o n d s s  
SmFODC. 1-5: Same as SynpC. 1-SynpC.5. 
SpFox.6;7: %me as 1, 8 ~ ~ 2 .  
Sy40DC.8-9: If 'P and * are in MEt, then so are 
SpFoDC.B: [QT*] 
m p o ~ c . 9 :  [@' I *I 
SyqoDC. 10: If Q E Mq, then so is [P '#I. 
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2. Senaanfics 01 FODC 
Given a non-empty set D (the domain of entities), the set of possible 
denotations of meaningful expressions of type a, abbreviated D,, is given 
by the following recursive definition: 
(1) D , = D  
(2) Dt = lFalse,Truej 
D (3) DCab> = ha for any types a and b. 
A model for FODC is an ordered septuple <D, I, Ins, Per, J, <, F> 
where D is as above, I is a set of possible worlds, Ins is a two place relation 
on I coordinating possible worlds (those with and those without the influ- 
ence, Per is a subset of I (the permissible worlds), J is a set of times, < is 
a linear ordering on J and F is a function that assigns an appropriate 
denotation to each constant of FOPC relative to each pair <i,j> for i E I 
and j E J. (Thus "F(a,(i,j>) = is to be interpreted as that the extension 
(denotation) of a in possible world i at  time j is the object 8.) 
The set of possible denotations of type a is defined as follows: 
D DCanb> = ha for any types a and b. 
A variable assignment, g, is a function assigning to each variable a 
denotation from the set D, for each type a. 
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The denotation of an expression a relative to a model M ,  a possible 
world i, time j and value assignment g, abbreviated ExtMAjIg ( a ) .  is defined 
recursively as follows: 
SemFODC. I: Ii a is a constant, then ExtlLij,g (a )  = F(a) .  
SemFODC.2: If a is a variable, then ExtM,i,j,g (a )  = g(a) .  
SemFoDC.3: If a E MEchb> and 8 E IdE,. then ExtlLUng ( a  (8))  = Extyij,g 
( a ) ( E x t ~ j l j , g  (8)) .  
SeqODC.4: If @ E ME,, then ExtMlijle ("@) is True iff ExtyI,i,j,g ( 9 )  is False 
and Extlbjj,g (-9) is False otherwise. 
SemFODC.5: If Q and $ are in ME,, then E ~ ~ J L ~ , ~ , ~  [@ & $1 is True iff  both 
ExtMJeisg ( 0 )  and Exty,i,j,g (*) are True* 
SemFODC.6: If @ E ME,  and u is a variable, then El(tylitjeg (VU a) = True iii 
for all g' such that g' is exactly like g except possibly for the 
value assigned to u. Extld,ij,g. (Q) = 1. 
SemFo&: Ii @ and $ are in ME,, then ExtM . , a  [9 T +] is True iff Extlb,ij,g 
(9)  is True and ExtYi,j.,r (+) is True for the unique j" such 
that for all j", not (j < j" < j'). 
SernFODC.8: If @ and + are in KEt, then Extl(,ij,g [Q I $1 is True iff Extyljng 
(Q) is True and ExtMj:j,18 (+) is True for some world i ' , such 
that <i,i'> E Ins, and for all times, j', 
SernFoDc.9: If Q E ME, then ExtyOiljg [P @I = True iff  EX^^^^^,^,^ (Q) = True 
for some i' E Per and some j'. 
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a. liLrthsr D s ~ ~  
For a and @ in ME, 
[avp] ::= & Np] 
[a -) @I ::= ["aV@] 
[a - @] ::= [a -) @] & [@ -) a] 
For iP E ME, and u a variable, 
[2u $1 ::= ["VU N9] 
For 9 E ME, 
[0 $1 ::= ["P .-@I 
The next problem to be considered is the recognition of times within 
the object language. This can be done relatively easily. Adopting a nota- 
tion suggested by Rescher and Urguhart (1971), the expression 
is read that the formula @ is "realized at time u. This can be assimilated 
into the precedmg FODC language by means of the following additions. 
Consistent with our earlier metalanguage notation using J as a set of 
times, with j used to indicate elements of J, we revise the specification of 
types as follows: 
e is a type 
j is a type 
t is a type 
a and b are types, <a,b> is a type. 
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Variables and constants of type j and type <j,t> will be denoted in 
the same fashion as variables and constants of type e. 
To the formation rules we add the following: 
If 9 E and u is a variable of type j ,  then [(R u) 91 E MEt. 
The denotations of each type are correspondingly as follows: 
Ds D<a,b, = Da for any types a and b. 
The following is added to the semantic rules: 
SemFoDC. 10: If 9 E ME, and u is a variable of type j, then Extplnjg [(R u) 91 
is True i.ff.ExtM,ij.,e (a).= True for all j' = g(u). 
Several additional definitions wi l l  prove useful. 
u <= v ::= [u  < v] v [ U = v] 
u > v::= "[u <= v] 
u > = v : : = [ u > v ] v [ u = v ]  
The variables and constants of type <),t> denote sets of times. Ot 
special interest are sets of contiguous points in time, i.e., tims spans. To 
designate this, we introduce an additional function, span, defined as fol- 
lows. 
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For variables u,v and w of type j, 
span ::= hu hv hw [(u <= w) & (w <= v)] 
Note that the variables must be of type j, since the definition depends on 
"<," a relation only defined over the set J. 
Span is thus a function of type <j ,  <j, <j, t>>>.  By applying two (time 
point) arguments to it, e.g., span (u)(v), the result will be of type <j,t>,  
i.e., the set of points between u and v (or, strictly, the set of pairs <j,t>,  
indicating by a 1 in the right hand place which points on the time line are 
between u and v, inclusive.) 
Note that by the application of a third argument, e.g., span (u)(v)(w) 
the result is of type t ,  i.e., true iff w is between or equal to u and v. 
Further realization operators can be defined as convenient. For 
instance, for u a variable of type <j,t>,  and iP E ME, 
Reading: 3 is "realized throughout" time span u. 
(RD u) 3 :: = 3 v  u(v) & (R v) 
Reading: 3 is "realized duripg" time span u. 
We have a t  this point extended the deontic calculus to recognize indi- 
vidual entities as well as temporal reference. However, several further 
problems remain in order to adequately describe contractual commit- 
ment. 
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E. Identifying the Agents of Actions 
One issue is that we need to particularize actions to identify the 
agent involved. This entails adding an additional place to the I connec- 
tive, i.e., of the form (a Iu 8).  This will lssd to a corresponding revision of 
the predicate Ins, call it Ins', where 
Ins' (u,il,i") 
indicates that world i' is the case rather than i" due to the influence of 
agent u 
This requires replacing the former syntactic and semantic rules for I 
as f OUOWS: 
SydFoDC.9:If a and 8 are in ME, and u is a variable or constant of type e, 
then (a lu @) E MEt. 
Sem'FODC.9:If 3 and + are in ME,, and u is a variable or constant of type e, 
E*~,ij,e [O Iu *] is True iff ExtKij,e (a) is True and ExtL(j.:j.,g (*) is 
True for $ome world ie such that <g(u),<il, i">> E Ins', for all times j'. 
When substituted in a TI expression this provides an explication for 
the sense that x does some action a. 
We still however need to account for the sense that x is obhgated to y 
to do a. Before addressing that, however, we need to introduce a notation 
for contingent permission and obligation. 
Appendix 
. Contingent Permission and Obligation 
Von Wright goes beyond the deontic definitions described so far to 
what he calls a "dyadic" version of the deontic logic. For various reasons 
(noted in the appendix), we are unable to incorporate that here. How- 
ever, we do have need of an analogous concept to his contingent permis- 
sion and obhgation. Using a notation analogous to his, we write 
to indicate that in some permissible world, both /3 and a are true. Con- 
tingent obligation is defined as 
which may be interpreted that in any world, if p is true then if the world is 
permissible, then a is true. 
The scopmg and quantification may be a bit hard to follow in these 
explanations. To help clarify, we will temporarily make use of formal 
notation in the metalanguage, distinguishing this from the object 
language by enclosing it in double brackets, e.g., [[ I]. 
In this notation, w will be a variable for possible worlds. 
Thus, 
P a/@ ::= [ [3  w p(w) & Per(w) & a(w)]] 
0 a l p  ::= [["3 w p(w) & Per(w) & N a ( ~ ) ] ]  
- [[b'w "p(w) V "Per(w) V a(w)]] 
- [[b'w B(w) -) (Per(w) -) a(w))ll 
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We find it useful to generalize these concepts of conditional permis- 
sion and obligation to arbitrarily many levels. We therefore define 
Analogously, we define the generalized form of conditional obligation as: 
(Here the additional square right bracket is meant to close all open left 
hand parentheses.) 
To incorporate these concepts of condibonal permission and obhga- 
tion in the formal language, the following additions are needed: 
SYn. If a, 82, ..., Bn are all in ME,, then P(a/p2/ ... / pn) is in Mq. 
Sem. II a, file..., & are all inME,, thes  Extyj,j,g P(a/p1/ ... /&) = 1 iff 
for some i' , i' E Per, and Extei. j,g (a)  is True and Exty , i, 4 ,  (pk) 
is True for k = 1, ..., n. 
Def. If a, p2, ..., pn are all in q, then O(a/pl/ ... / pn) ::= 
"P("a/pl/ ... / pn). 
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G. The Benefactors of Contractual Commitments 
As mentioned above, while the formal language is now refined to dis- 
tinguish the agent of actions in contractual commitments, we yet lack a 
way of idenldymg the other party, what we might call the "benefactor" of 
the obligation or permission. 
The commitment to this party might a t  first examination be con- 
sidered as a sort of local obligation separate from the overall legal system 
represented by 0 and the other deontic operators. However, if when we 
deal with contractual, as  opposed to say informal, obligation between two 
parties, we are nonetheless referring to obligations allowed and enforced 
within a broad system of contract law. There are therefore certain c i r  
cumstances prescribed in law that allow x to become (legally) obligated 
to g to  do iP.  
For instance, x's obligation to give y some object, say z, may only 
come in force if y pays x some sum of money (perhaps only a partial or 
token payment). Contracts are  thus often stated as pairs of obhgations, 
with opposite roles of the same two parties. However, neither obhgation 
may in fact become effective until all or part  of the other has been exe- 
cuted. These conditions for creating a contractual obligation, however, 
depend on the specifications of the legal system governing the parties. 
(International contracts, involving perhaps several legal systems, 
entail further complications that we ignore here.) 
By this view x becomes generally obligated to do a. That is however 
not quite the case in a contractual obigation. In a contract, if y defaults 
and does not do 3, y has recourse to certain l e g d  actiars against x. But 
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these do not come automatically; y must initiate them in the form of a 
lawsuit, or some similar type of appeal to the governing body for enforce- 
ment of his/her claims against x. 
'IEs leads us to the view that contractual obligation is not a general 
obligation for x to do @, but rather a permission on the part of y to take 
legal action against x if x does not do @. This notion of "legal action'' can 
obviously be very complex and as well varies dependmg on the govern- 
ment having jurisdiction. 1 do believe though that the possibility of takmg 
legal action is a necessary element to explicate obligation. It is therefore 
adopted as a primitive predicate, namely, 
indicates a "legal action of x against y." 
With this assumption, we are now able to define a concept of contrac- 
tual obhgation: 
O(x,y) ::= P LA (y,x)/"@(x). 
O(x,y) has the reading that "x is obligated to y to a," and is defined 
as the permission of y to take legal action against x it x does not a. 
Note that "0" here for contractual obligation is not the same as the 0 
for general oblgation The two are distinguished by the presence of the 
two arguments in the case of cohtractual obligation. 
As  was the case with general oblgation and permission, we take con- 
tractual obligation and permission to be dual concepts: 
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P(y,x) 9 ::= "O(x,y) -9 
::= "[P LA(y,x)/"("*(x))] 
::= "P LA(y,x) /*(x). 
Note that the places are reversed in contractual permission and its dual 
obhgatory form. The definition says that if y permits x to Q,, then y is not 
permitted to take legal action against x it x does @. 
This conforms with usual intuitions. A contractual permission of y to 
x allows x to do something heishe would normally be forbidden (not p e r  ' 
mitted) to do, i.e., 
"P(y,x) * ::= O(x,y) "a 
: : = "P LA( y,x) / @ (x) 
i.e., normally, y would be allowed legal action against x if x did @. A per- 
mission to do @ is thus a suspension of this right to take legal action. 
The concepts of conditional obligation and permission can be 
extended to the contractual case: 
Reading: x is obligated to y to do Q, given * is defined that it is permitted 
for y to take legal action against x given that x does not do Q, given 9, 
which. in the symbolic metalanguage form, is in turn defined that in some 
permitted world, x has not done @, + is true and y takes legal action. 
Correspondingly, 
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Reading: the permission of x to y to do @ given + is defined (last line) that 
in any possible world, if + is true then if y does 9 then if the world is per- 
mitted there is no legal action taken by x against y. 
In all the above cases, the enforcement of the contractual obhgation 
(or permission) has been the application (or suspension) of some 'legal 
action', which we have adopted as a primitive concept. However, in many 
contracts, the enforcement is a specific action that we would want to 
explicate in the calculus, e.g., the right to claim ownership of some par- 
ticular asset serving as collateral for a loan in the case of default. 
We will incbcate the relationship to an enforcement action by the 
connective OE read "or else." 
In the case of contractual obhgation this is defined: 
Reading: the obhgation of x to y to do 9 or else y is defined as the per- 
mission of x to y given that x does not do @. 
This has a natural extension to cases of conditional contractual obli- 
gation: 
Reading: the obhgation of x to y to do x given or else y is defined as the 
permission of x to y to do y given that x does not do a given #. 
- 47 - Appendix 
Specific enforcements may likewise be considered tor contractual 
permission, though this is much less naturalqindeed I can think of no 
practical example). 
The definition would go as  follows: 
Reading: the permission of x to y to 3 or else y is to say that y is not obli- 
gated to x not to 3 or else y, which is to say that  y does not permit x to y 
given that  y does @. 
I. Formal -. hngu.age CC (Contractual Commitment) 
1. Synttxz of CC 
a. mes 
Let t, e and j be any fixed objects.' Then the se t  of types is defined 
recursively as  follows: ,- - 
i. t is a type 
ii. e is a type 
iii. j is a type 
iv. If a and b are types, then <a,b> is a type. 
b. Bas& eqwes- 
i. For each type a,  CC contains a denumerably infinite se t  of mn- 
logical constants (or simply c m t a n t s ) ,  C, for each natural 
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number n. The set of all constants of type a is denoted Con,. 
ii. For each type a, CC contains a denumerably idinite set of variables 
V,, for each natural number n. The set of all variables of type a is 
denoted Var,. 
c. SyniacfiC d e s  of CC 
The set of rneaningw ezpressions of type a ,  denoted ME,, is defined 
recursively as follows: 
Syqc .  1: Every variable of type a is in ME, 
Syqc.2: Every constant of type a is in ME, 
SyncC.3: If a E ME, and u is a variable of type b, then X u a E ME,b,,. 
SyncC. 4: If a E ME<4b, and p E ME,, then a(p) E MEb. 
S m C .  5: If a and f3 are both in ME, then a = p E Mq. 
SmC.6-7:  If iP and 4' are in Mq, then the following are also in 3&: 
Syncc.8: " iP  
Syncc.7: i P & *  
Syqc.B: If 9 E % and u is a variable of any type, then W u  iP E % 
S m C . 9 :  If @ and 4' are in Mq, then iP T E ME, 
... 
Syncc. 10: If @ and 4' are in ME, and u is of type e then Iu 4' E ME,. 
Sync-. 12: If alp,, . . . , pn are all in Mq, then P(a/pl / ... / 8,) E ME, 
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Syncc. 13: If 9 E ME,  and u is a variable of type j, then [R u iP ]  E ME, 
2. se7nanfics o f c c  
A modal for CC is an ordered octuple <D, I, Ins', Per, LA, J, <, h such 
that D, I and J are non-empty sets, Ins' is a relation on D X I X J, (where 
one world is a counter factual alternative to another because of the influ- 
ence of some agent in D), Per is a subset of I (the permitted worlds), LA is 
a relation on D X D X I (the predicate for legal action), < is a Linear order- 
ing on the set J,  and F is a function that assigns an appropriate denota- 
tion to each constant of CC relative to each pair <i,j> for i E I and J E J. 
The set of possible denatabkm of type a is defined as follows: 
ii. Dj = J 
iii. Dt = tFalse,Truej 
D iv. DCawb> = Db a for any types a and b. 
An assignment of values to variables, g, is a function having as 
domain the set of all variables and giving as value for each variable of 
type a a member of D,. 
The denotation of an  expression a relative to a model M, a possible 
world i, time j, and value assignment g,  abbreviated  EX^^,^,^^ (a), is 
defined recursively as follows: 
SernCC. 1: If a is a constant, then  EX^^,^,^,, (a) = F(a) 
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If a is a variable, then ExtM*j,g (a) = &(a). 
If a E MEcalb, and u is a variable of type b, then ExtMtijng (A u 
a) is that function h with domain Db such that for any object 
x in that domain, h(x) = (a), where g' is that value 
assignment exactly like g with the possible difference that 
g'(u) is the object x. 
If a E and 8 E ME,, then ExtM,i,j,g (a (8)) is E f i ~  jj,g 
(a)(ExtM (8)) (i.e., the result of applying the function 
E x t ~ ~ j . ~  (a) to the argument Extyi,j,g (8)). 
If a and 8 are in ME,, then E x t ~ , ~ , ~ , ~  (a = 8) is True if and only 
if E x t ~  j,j,g (a) is the same as ExtM,ij,g (8)- 
If 3 E ME,, then Extyi (-9) is True if and only if Extp 
I I I , .  
(9) is False, and EXty,i,j,g (-3) is False otherwise. 
If 3 and + are in ME,, then Extlki,j,g [3 & +] is True if and only 
if both ~ x t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  (3) and  EX^^,,,^,^ (+) are True. 
If 3 E M q  and u is a variable of type e, then Extei , I a (Vu 3) 
is True it and only it Extyjjg , , (9) is True for all g' exactly like 
g except possibly for the value assigned to u. 
If 3 and + are in Ml&, then ExtMeijIg (3 T +) is True iff ExtM,i,j,g 
(9) is True and ExtM I I (+) is True for the unique j' such 
that j < j' and for all j", either not j < j" < j' or j" = j'. 
If 3 and+ are inME, anduis  of type e thenExtMijg [3 Iu+] 
.., 
is True iff ExtMj,j,g 3 is True and ExtM,ie,jlg (+) is True for 
some i' such that <g(u),i,i'> E Ins'. 
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S e w c  1 I: If 9 E ME,, then  EX^^,^,,^ P9 is True iff Extu,j.,g 'P is True for 
some i' such that i' E Per and some j' . 
Semcc.12: If a. PI, . . . , B, are all in Mq, then Extyjj,8 P(a/pl /  ... / 8,) is 
True iit for some i', such that i' E Per and Extll,i,j9 (a) is 
True and ExtYi',jn8 (#Ik) is True for pk = PI / ... / 8,. 
Semcc.13: If @ E ME, and u is a variable of type j, then ExtLI,i,j,8 [R u $1 
is True iff Extlkielj.,g (9) = True for all j' = g(u). 
iv. 
v. 
vi. 
a. Add- Definitions 
i.-iii. For a and p in ME, 
i. [a V ::= & Np] 
ii. [a.-#I]::=["aVp] 
iii. [ a - p ] : : = [ a - @ ] & [ p - a ]  
For iP E ME, and u and v variables of type e, 
3u 'P  : : = " V u N @  
For iP E ME, O# ::= "P "iP 
If a, PI, . . . , pn are all in ME,, then O(a/pz/ ... / p,) 
::= "P "a/pl/ ... /pn. 
For u, v and w variables of type j, 
vii. [ U T V ]  ::= [u < v ] V [ u =  v] 
viii. [ u >  v] ::= "[US v] 
ix. u r v : : =  [ u > v ] V [ U = V ]  
Appendix 
x. span ::= Xu Xv Xw [ ( u s  w) & (w r v)] 
For u a variable of type t ,  and iP E 
xi. RTu Q ::= Wvu(v) --, [Rv a] 
xii. RD u Q ::= 2 v  u(v) -4 [R v a] 
If 9 E MEt and u and v are of type e, then 
xiii. O(u,v) Q ::= P LA(v,u) INQ(u) 
xiv. P(u,v)Q ::= "O(v,u) "0 
If a, p and y are in ME, and u and v are variables of type e, then 
XV. O(x,y) a//l ::= p(LA(v,u) Ima(x) I@) 
xvi. P(u,v) a//l ::= "O(v,u) "Q/\k 
xvii. O(u,u) a OE y ::= P(u,v) y/"a(x) 
xviii. O(u,v) a/@ OE y ::= P(u,v) y/-a(u) //l 
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